A Linguistic Evaluation of the Calvinist "All Without Distinction" Reading of πᾶς in the Pastoral Epistles

By

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Abstract

This thesis examines the Calvinist "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς, an interpretation that safeguards the Calvinist teachings of double predestination and limited atonement by claiming that in four key passages within the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11) πᾶς denotes not all individual people but all kinds of people. By exegetically refuting other Calvinist proposals for these verses, this thesis demonstrates that double predestination and limited atonement are unviable without the "all without distinction" reading. Nevertheless, it also documents how the primary motivations for these Calvinist teachings—preserving God's role as sole cause in election, conversion, and salvation, and preserving an effective atonement—are maintained without double predestination and limited atonement by other Christian traditions.

Although Calvinists allege that linguistic support for the "all without distinction" interpretation is found in other passages where πᾶς denotes something less than every individual, no prior study quantified the linguistic rationale for the referent of πᾶς being limited. This thesis undertakes this missing linguistic analysis using a corpus-based lexical analysis. It identifies six manners of restriction found with πᾶς: hyperbole, implicit domain restriction, nonveridicality, intensive nouns, collective nouns, and superordinate categories. Using Gricean pragmatics, exegetical analysis, operator scoping, semantic analysis, and cognitive linguistics, it determines the linguistic features by which restricted uses of πᾶς might be identified. By applying these criteria to 1 Timothy 2:4, 6; 4:10 and Titus 2:11, this thesis finds that these verses lack the linguistic features necessary for such restrictions. Consequently, it demonstrates that the "all without distinction" interpretation is unviable, as are the Calvinist teachings of

double predestination and limited atonement that depend on it. Conversely, it confirms as scriptural teaching that God desires the salvation of all and that Christ died for the sins of all.

This thesis further articulates the practical significance of recognizing the universal scope of the Father's merciful will and the Son's atoning death. Non-Christians being evangelized can be presented with a sure basis for faith, and Christians doubting their own faith or elect status can be offered direct assurance from God's will, Christ's death, and the means of grace.

Declaration

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and has not previously in its entirety or in part been submitted to any institution for a degree.

Signed: Aaron Michael Jensen

Date:

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Contents

Abbreviations

Am Ethnol	*American Ethnologist*
Annu Rev Psychol	*Annual Review of Psychology*
ASCP	Amsterdam Studies in Classical Philology
ASV	American Standard Version
AYBC	The Anchor Yale Bible Commentary
BDAG	Arndt, William, Frederick W. Danker, Walter Bauer, and F. Wilbur Gingrich. 2000. *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*. 3rd rev. ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
BDB	Brown, Francis, Samuel Rolles Driver, and Charles Augustus Briggs. 1977. *Enhanced Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.
BDF	Blass, Friedrich, Albert Debrunner, and Robert Walter Funk. 1961. *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
BECNT	Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament
BETL	Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium
BHS	Weil, Gérard E., K. Elliger, and W. Rudolph. 1997. *Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia*. 5th rev. ed. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft.
Bib. Sac.	Nicholas of Lyra, *Biblia Sacra*

BNTC	Black's New Testament Commentary
BTNT	Biblical Theology of the New Testament
CCC	Crossway Classic Commentaries
CCSL	Corpus Christianorum: Series Latina
Child Dev	*Child Development*
CLS	*Chicago Linguistic Society*
Cogn Psychol	*Cognitive Psychology*
Coll.	Peter Lombard, *In omnes D. Pauli Apost. Epistolas collectanea*
Coll Compos Comm	*College Composition and Communication*
Comm. in Paul.	Thomas Aquinas, *Commentaria in Omnes Epistolas B. Pauli*
ConcC	Concordia Commentary
C. Jul.	Augustine of Hippo, *Contra Julianum* [*Against Julian*]
Civ.	Augustine of Hippo, *De civitate Dei* [*The City of God*]
Comm. Eph.	Jerome, *Commentariorum in epistulam ad Ephesios libri III*
Correpț.	Augustine of Hippo, *De correptione et gratia* [*A Treatise on Rebuke and Grace*]
CSB	Christian Standard Bible
CSEL	Corpous Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum
CTR	*Criswell Theological Review*
Descr.	Pausanias, *Graeciae descriptio* [*Description of Greece*]
ECF	extreme case formulation
Enchir.	Augustine of Hippo, *Enchiridion de fide, spe, et caritate* [*The Enchiridion; or On Faith, Hope, and Love*]
Ep	Epitome to the Formula of Concord. In Arand, Charles P., Robert Kolb, and James A. Nestingen. 2012. *The Lutheran Confessions: History and Theology of the Book of Concord.* Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press.
Ep.	Augustine of Hippo, *Epistula*; Fulgentius of Ruspe, *Epistula*; Hilary, *Epistula*
Ep. ad Ruf.	Prosper of Aquitaine, *Epistula ad Rufinum*
Ep. ad Val.	Januarius, *Epistula ad Valentinum*
ESV	English Standard Version
EvQ	*Evangelical Quarterly*
Exp. in I Tim.	Pelagius, *Expositio in I Timotheum*

FC	Fathers of the Church
Fid. orth.	John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* [*Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*]
GE	Montanari, Franco, Madeleine Goh, and Chad Schroeder. 2015. *The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek*. Leiden; Boston: Brill.
Glossa ord.	*Glossa ordinaria.* In Nicholas of Lyra, *Biblia Sacra.*
Graeco-Lat Brun	*Graeco-Latina Brunensia*
HALOT	Koehler, Ludwig, Walter Baumgartner, M. E. J. Richardson, and Johann Jakob Stamm. 2000. *The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
HIP	hyperbole identification procedure
Hist. eccl.	Eusebius of Caesarea, *Historia Ecclesiastica* [*The Church History of Eusebius*]
HTR	*Harvard Theological Review*
HTS Teol Stud	*HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies*
Hum Stud	*Human Studies*
IBMR	*International Bulletin of Mission Research*
ICC	International Critical Commentary
Inst.	John Calvin, *Institutio Christianae Religionis* [*Institutes of the Christian Religion*]
Inst. orat.	Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*
ISV	International Standard Version
J Philos Logic	*Journal of Philosophical Logic*
J Pragmat	*Journal of Pragmatics*
J Semant	*Journal of Semantics*
JBL	*Journal of Biblical Literature*
JEH	*Journal of Ecclesiastical History*
JETS	*Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society*
JGL	*Journal of Greek Linguistics*
JSNTSup	Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement Series
JTS	*Journal of Theological Studies*
KJV	King James Version
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
LEB	Lexham English Bible

Lect. in Sent.	Gregory of Rimini, *Lectura in Primo et Secundo Sententiarum*
Linguist Inq	*Linguistic Inquiry*
LN	Louw, Johannes P., and Eugene Albert Nida. 1989. *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament: Based on Semantic Domains*. New York: United Bible Societies.
LQ	*Lutheran Quarterly*
LSJ	Liddell, Henry George, Robert Scott, Henry Stuart Jones, and Roderick McKenzie. 1996. *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th ed. with supplement. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
LW	*Luther's Works*
LXX	Septuagint
MBDS	*Martin Bucers Deutche Schriften*
Metaphor Symb	*Metaphor and Symbol*
Mind Lang	*Mind & Language*
MSJ	*The Master's Seminary Journal*
MT	Masoretic Text
NAC	New American Commentary
NASB	New American Standard Bible
Nat Lang Linguist Theory	*Natural Language & Linguistic Theory*
Nat Lang Semant	*Natural Language Semantics*
NICNT	The New International Commentary on the New Testament.
NICOT	The New International Commentary on the Old Testament
NIDNTTE	Silva, Moisés. 2014. *New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology and Exegesis*. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.
NIGTC	New International Greek Testament Commentary
NIV	New International Version
NKJV	New King James Version
NLT	New Living Translation
NovT	*Novum Testamentum*
NPI	negative polarity item
NPNF^{1}	*Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Series 1
NPNF^{2}	*Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Series 2
NRSV	New Revised Standard Version

NRTh	*La nouvelle revue théologique*
NT	New Testament
NTL	New Testament Library
OG	Old Greek
OT	Old Testament
PG	Patrologia Graeca
Pharos J Theol	*Pharos Journal of Theology*
PL	Patrologia Latina
PNTC	Pillar New Testament Commentary
Pol.	Aristotle, *Politica* [*Politics*]
RBén	*Revue bénédictine*
Rech Linguistiques de Vincennes	*Recherches Linguistiques de Vincennes*
Res Lang Soc Interact	*Research on Language and Social Interaction*
Rev de Lingüística y Leng Apl	*Revista de Lingüística y Lenguas Aplicadas*
RHT	Reformed Historical Theology/Reformierte Historische Theologie
Hom. Rom.	John Chrysostom, *Homiliae in epistulam ad Romanos.*
RPTJ	*Reformed Presbyterian Theological Journal*
RTJ	*Reformed Theological Journal*
RTR	*Reformed Theological Review*
SBG	Studies in Biblical Greek
SCE&S	Sixteenth Century Essays & Studies
SCHT	Studies in Christian History and Thought
Script. Super Sent.	Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Sententiis*
SD	Solid Declaration of the Formula of Concord. In Arand, Charles P., Robert Kolb, and James A. Nestingen. 2012. *The Lutheran Confessions: History and Theology of the Book of Concord.* Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press.
Sent.	Peter Lombard, *Libri IV Sententiarum*
SLAP	Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy
Southwest J Theol	*Southwestern Journal of Theology*

Spir. et litt.	Augustine of Hippo, *De spiritu et littera* [*On the Spirit and the Letter*]
ST	Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*
Stud Linguist Sci	*Studies in the Linguistic Sciences*
Them	*Themelios*
TLOT	Jenni, Ernst, and Claus Westermann. 1997. *Theological Lexicon of the Old Testament*. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers.
TNTC	Tyndale New Testament Commentary
TSBPL	Text and Studies: Contributions to Biblical and Patristic Literature
UBCS	Understanding the Bible Commentary Series
UCL Work Pap Linguist	*UCL Working Papers in Linguistics*
Verit.	Fulgentius of Ruspe. *De veritate praedestinationis ad Ioannem presbyterum et Venerium diaconum l. III*
Vocat.	Prosper of Aquitaine, *De vocatione omnium gentium* [*The Call of All Nations*]
WBC	Word Biblical Commentary
WEB	World English Bible
Wesleyan Theol J	*Wesleyan Theological Journal*
WLQ	*Wisconsin Lutheran Quarterly*
WTJ	*Westminster Theological Journal*
YLT	Young's Literal Translation
ZECNT	Zondervan Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament

Chapter 1:
Introduction

1.1 Background

1.1.1 *The "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς*

Four passages within the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11) identify the scope of the Father's merciful will or of the Son's atonement as πάντες, "all," or πάντες ἄνθρωποι, "all people." On the basis of such passages, most denominations, traditions, and theologians throughout church history have taught that God sincerely desires to save all people and that Jesus died for all people. Such doctrinal tenets have direct application to faith and life, as they allow Christians to tell anyone else, and also know for themselves, that God wants to save them and that Jesus died for them.

However, no small number of Christians have disagreed with such teachings, most notably within the Calvinist tradition. Calvinists have historically denied that God sincerely desires to save all people, instead teaching a double predestination (Reymond 2006; Ware 2006; Daniel 2019, 397–411; Nimmo 2020; Sammons 2022). A prominent view within the Calvinist tradition further denies that Jesus died for all people, instead teaching a limited atonement, often less pejoratively called "definite" or "particular" atonement (Gibson and Gibson 2013a; Trueman 2015; Allen 2016, 35–653; Daniel 2019, 492–531; Horton 2019; Vanhoozer 2020, 490–92). Such Calvinists have needed a way to account for those passages (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4;10; Titus 2:11) that speak of πάντες or πάντες ἄνθρωποι as being the scope of the Father's merciful

will or of the Son's atonement (Gatiss 2012, 41–45; Gibson 2013a; Schreiner 2013). Their traditional explanation distinguishes between πᾶς as meaning "all without exception" and as meaning "all without distinction." If πᾶς can mean "all without distinction," this would denote the inclusion of any kind of person but not every individual. According to this interpretation, then, passages that on their face would seem to refute double predestination and limited atonement would no longer do so.

The debate over the scope of God's merciful will and of the atonement has remained ongoing in recent years (Brand 2006; Gatiss 2012; Gibson and Gibson 2013a; Shultz 2013; Naselli and Snoeberger 2015; Allen 2016, 2019; Johnson 2019; Sammons 2022). And since Calvinist doctrines have increased their influence within American Christianity during the last few decades over against Arminian doctrines (Hansen 2008), Calvinist views regarding the scope of God's merciful will and of the atonement will continue to merit serious attention and response. This thesis, undertaken in the discipline of biblical studies (Asumang 2014), enters into this discussion by testing the linguistic viability of the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς for these verses in the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11).

1.1.2 Linguistic argumentation in favor of the "all without distinction" reading

The "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς seems to have originated with Augustine of Hippo (*Ep.* 149.17; *Enchir.* 103; *Correpț.* 14), who suggests it as a possible way to avoid the thought that in 1 Timothy 2:4 God is said to want something that he would not carry out. He provides Luke 11:42 and 1 Corinthians 10:33 as parallel verses where πᾶς includes all kinds but not all individuals. John Calvin employs this reading in defense of his position on predestination (*Inst.* 3.24.16; [1549–1556] 1998, 38–40, 196; [1552a] 1856, 90; [1552b] 1857, 55–56; 1563, 73–79). Theodore Beza (1588, 192–93) develops the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς into a more fully argued interpretation, adding eleven more Scripture verses where πᾶς must refer to something less than all individuals. He also cites the frequent use of כֹּל as an allegedly indefinite modifier and labels πᾶς in 1 Timothy 2 as synecdoche. William Perkins (1617, 623–24) appeals to Aristotle's (*Pol.* 2) distinction between everyone doing something "distributively," as individuals, or "collectively," as a group, an argument also made by Paul Jewett (1985, 103). Samuel Rutherfurd (1647, 422), Ralph Wardlaw (1857, 470), and Louis Berkhof (1936, 168–69) argue that πᾶς denotes not absolute universality but only universality of what is already being discussed. John Owen (1648, 345–46) claims that the more limited meaning of πᾶς is its default meaning, attempting to shift the burden of proof onto those who

interpret it as denoting all individuals. Contemporary commentaries on the Pastoral Epistles (Knight 1992, 115, 119; Yarbrough 2018, 156) continue in this same interpretive tradition, attempting to use parallel verses to demonstrate a restricted meaning for πᾶς.

J. William Johnston's (2004, 33–36) monograph *The Use of Πᾶς in the New Testament* describes πᾶς as having either a summative (all as a group) or distributive (all as individuals) sense and as having either a universal scope or one limited to the subject matter or to kinds. Surprisingly, Johnston never directly addresses the passages in the Pastoral Epistles where the "all without distinction" reading has been historically employed. However, since for other passages (Matt 23:27; Luke 12:15; Acts 7:22; Rom 1:29; Eph 4:31; 5:3; Col 1:28; 1 Tim 4:4), he variously advocates and allows for such readings (72, 85–87), his treatment of πᾶς has been cited as linguistic justification for the "all without distinction" reading in those key verses (Gatiss 2012, 43; Gibson 2013a, 296). Though it is the most recent substantial work on πᾶς in the NT, Johnston's monograph has been criticized for simply restating lexicographical and translational traditions without providing an adequate or compelling framework for understanding the semantics of πᾶς (Porter 2006). Nevertheless, Johnston's (2004, 48–52) introduction of the linguistic concepts of abstract nouns and referentiality constitutes a first step toward discerning the motivation for why the referent of πᾶς is at times restricted.

The linguistic dimension of the argumentation for the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς has remained largely unchanged since it was first employed by Augustine. At least 151 different Scripture passages (listed in ch. 2, n. 3) where the sense of πᾶς is limited have been advanced as potential parallels for the key verses from the Pastoral Epistles. Once the existence of more restricted meanings has been demonstrated, linguistic arguments are typically discarded in favor of contextual or theological arguments. No apparent investigation has been made into the linguistic features that trigger or enable such a restricted meaning either in the passages from the Pastoral Epistles or in the proposed parallels.

1.1.3 Linguistic argumentation against the "all without distinction" reading

A standard response to the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς has been first to concede that πᾶς is capable of such limitation but then to argue that such a deviance from the default sense of the word must be not merely permissible in context but dictated by the context (Goodwin [1651] 1840, 158–60; Weeks [1823] 1863, 582–83; Kennedy 1841, 17, 25, 150, 228; Marshall 1989, 61–63). This point is underscored using examples of strange things other

passages could be interpreted to mean if it were acceptable to arbitrarily insert a meaning for a word merely because it had that meaning elsewhere (Goodwin [1651] 1840, 161; Weeks [1823] 1863, 581; Kennedy 1841, 4–6, 18–21).

David Allen objects to the "all without distinction" reading (2016, 675, 707–9; 2019, 226–27), stating that "all without distinction" would still refer to all individuals. He further decries it as illegitimate to interpret πᾶς as meaning "some of all kinds of people." However, his arguments assume but do not prove that πᾶς itself is incapable of meaning "all kinds of." Most recent writers who reject the "all without distinction" reading do so primarily on contextual and logical grounds (Marshall and Towner 1999, 268, 427; Mounce 2000, 85; Marshall 2003, 328–33; Towner 2006, 746; Picirilli 2015, 54–55; Shellrude 2015, 41). Norman Geisler (2004, 354–55) does briefly comment that the linguistic contexts where πᾶς elsewhere is restricted in sense are qualitatively different from those for which this restriction is cited ("geographic or hyperbolic" as opposed to "generic or redemptive"). However, he overlooks most of the proposed parallels and does not develop this observation. What linguistically triggers a limited sense for πᾶς elsewhere, and the presence or absence of such factors in the key verses in the Pastoral Epistles, is yet to be addressed.

1.1.4 Crosslinguistic research capable of application to an evaluation of the "all without distinction" reading

While it has not yet been applied to Koine Greek, there has been considerable crosslinguistic research that could be developed and applied so as to examine the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς.

Claudia Claridge (2011, 5–16) and Burgers et al. (2016, 164–66) demonstrate that positive identification of a hyperbole depends on already knowing the literal truth that is exceeded by the hyperbolic expression. This need for prior knowledge seriously complicates attempts to identify hyperbole when there is uncertainty or debate over what the literal truth lying behind a statement might be. Claridge further explains (2011, 135) that a hyperbole must be truthful enough to be accepted within its context. Consequently, hyperbole operates according to the maxim of quantity within the cooperative conversation principles of Gricean pragmatics (Grice 1989, 26). This research is relevant to the use of πᾶς with hyperbole.

Andrea Iacona (2016) discusses how universal quantifiers such as "all" often quantify over a restricted domain and not over all things in existence. Opinions vary as to how these domains

become implicitly restricted, with syntactic (Collins 2018), semantic (Stanley and Szabó 2000), and pragmatic (Bach 1994, 2000) explanations having been offered. Yet despite these theoretical disagreements, all agree that the domain of a universal quantifier is often implicitly restricted by its context. This research is relevant to the use of πᾶς with implicit domain restriction.

C. L. Baker (1970) labels words that can appear in negative sentences but not positive sentences as "negative polarity items" (NPIs). Anastasia Giannakidou (1998, 2002) classifies several sentence types, in addition to negative statements, that can use NPIs, and groups them together under the label of "nonveridicality." Different languages use either universal quantifiers or indefinites in nonveridical sentences (Giannakidou 2000, 2006; Giannakidou and Zeijlstra 2017). This research is relevant to the use of πᾶς with nonveridicality.

Danièle Van de Velde (1995) defines a class of abstract nouns called "intensive nouns," whose distinguishing feature is their gradability (Haas and Jugnet 2018). David Nicolas (2010) and Stefan Hinterwimmer (2020) show that when intensive nouns are quantified, they are typically quantified as to the degree of their intensity. This research is relevant to the use of πᾶς with intensive nouns.

Katherine Ritchie (2014, 2017) shows that collective nouns can receive either distributive predication (applying to each member of the collective entity) or group-level predication (applying to the group as a whole but not necessarily its individual members). This research is relevant to the use of πᾶς with collective nouns.

Eleanor Rosch (Rosch et al. 1976; Rosch 1979; Mervis and Rosch 1981) finds the mental lexicon to be hierarchically arranged so that the basic-level terms have superordinate and subordinate categories. D. Alan Cruse (2002; Croft and Cruse 2004, 141–50) distinguishes the taxonymic hyponymy of superordinate categories from the nontaxonymic hyponymy of basic-level categories. This research is relevant to the use of πᾶς with superordinate categories.

Currently, the debate over the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς in these key verses pertaining to the scope of the Father's merciful will and of the Son's atonement (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11) is at a centuries-long standstill, with both sides recognizing that πᾶς can admit restrictions in its sense but disagreeing on whether the context of these verses or the wider context of all of Scripture favors such a restriction. What remains to be done is to identify the respective linguistic factors that cause or allow the sense of πᾶς to be limited in some way and

then to identify whether such factors are present in the key passages. Applying this crosslinguistic research on these different kinds of restrictions to the use of πᾶς in these verses could potentially serve to clarify the validity and relevance of proposed parallels for these verses and also test the viability of the "all without distinction" reading altogether. Moreover, since those who appeal to this interpretation do so to keep these verses from undermining the teachings of double predestination and limited atonement, if a linguistic analysis of πᾶς and how it is limited does falsify the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς in these verses, these findings would have a direct bearing on how we answer those important questions of whom God wants to save and for whom Jesus died.

1.2 Argument and Purpose

So, what bearing does the way πᾶς functions linguistically have on these questions of whom God wants to save and for whom Jesus died? The central theoretical argument of this study is that the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς in 1 Timothy 2:4, 6; 4:10 and Titus 2:11, and thus also the Reformed Calvinist doctrine that limits the scope of the Father's merciful will and of the Son's atonement, are undermined by a linguistic analysis of the factors that restrict the sense of πᾶς.

Theologically, this study aims to contribute to ongoing discussions over the extent of God's desire to save and of the atonement. If the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς is found linguistically indefensible, this lends support to theological systems that posit a universal scope for the Father's merciful will and for the Son's atonement. Alternatively, Calvinist theologians who hold to double predestination and/or limited atonement would require a new explanation for how such verses can fit within their systematic framework.

Practically, this study aims to clarify how to think and speak about God's desire to save and the death of Jesus, both with respect to those who are not in Christ by faith and with respect to those who are. When it comes to witnessing to people not currently in Christ, it is important to know whether one can speak to them of God's desire for their salvation or of Christ's work to redeem them as being already established truths or as mere possibilities that can only be properly and directly applied to the already converted. If God's desire to save and Christ's atonement are universal in scope, these truths can and should be universally applied.

Similarly, even for those who are already converted, the question of the universality of the atonement and of God's desire to save also has ramifications for whether a believer should be

pointed primarily to the cross or to the Spirit's working in their own life for reassurance of God's love and forgiveness. Calvinist soteriological models that restrict the scope of God's desire to save and of the atonement to merely a subset of humanity would imply that one must look to their own faith for evidence that God has any desire to save them or that Christ in any way died for them. However, if God's desire to save and Christ's atonement are universal in scope, Christians can know directly from passages about God's merciful will and about Christ's atoning death how God feels about them. A further consequence is that the encouragement Christians give each other can prioritize the objective truths of God's love and Christ's redemption being for them over the more subjective evidence of the Spirit's working within them.

1.3 Design and Methodology

This study falls within the field of biblical studies (Asumang 2014). It primarily employs linguistic and exegetical analysis to address the interpretation of πᾶς in 1 Timothy 2:4, 6; 4:10 and Titus 2:11, but it also employs historical and systematic analysis to situate and explore the implications of this linguistic and exegetical analysis. Since it is exegetical work aimed at solving a historical-systematic question, the design of the study is a synthesis of designs typical for exegetical theology (Fee 2002, 79–95; Smith 2008, 169–82), particularly the more intermediate steps of lexical and exegetical analysis, and of designs typical for systematic theology (Smith 2008, 183–201; Falconer 2019), particularly the more initial steps of establishing the context of the contemporary state of the question and the pertinent historical doctrinal views, and also the more terminal steps of addressing the overall theological viability of the theories of double predestination and limited atonement and of exploring the study's practical ramifications.

Methodologically, the linguistic analysis begins with a corpus-based lexical analysis (Stefanowitsch 2020) to identify and classify restricted occurrences of πᾶς within the Biblical Greek corpus (Old Greek [OG] and New Testament [NT]), which contains over 7,700 uses of πᾶς. The six varieties of restriction (hyperbole, implicit domain restriction, nonveridicality, intensive nouns, collective nouns, and superordinate categories) are analyzed in that particular order, beginning with the situation that least resembles the "all without distinction" reading and ending with the situation that most resembles it. Different linguistic methodologies are employed based on the nature of the various restrictions. Hyperbole requires Gricean pragmatics (Grice 1989). Implicit domain restriction requires a more exegetical examination

of the context. Nonveridicality requires consideration of operator scoping (Van Valin 2005, 8–16). Intensive nouns and collective nouns require a semantic approach. And superordinate categories require diagnostic tests derived from cognitive linguistics (Cruse 2002; Croft and Cruse 2004, 141–50).

Chapter 2 presents the current state of scholarship pertaining to the linguistic interpretation of πᾶς in 1 Timothy 2:4, 6; 4:10 and Titus 2:11 vis-à-vis the Reformed Calvinist doctrine that limits the scope of the Father's merciful will and of the Son's atonement. A more thorough review of writers who make linguistic arguments in favor of the "all without distinction" reading and those who make linguistic arguments against it identifies unexplored avenues of research and unanswered questions as to the linguistic probability of the "all without distinction" reading.

Chapter 3 details the major tenets of this Reformed Calvinist doctrine from a historical-theological perspective. This review analyzes the systematic motivations that have historically led some to adopt double predestination and then analyzes the systematic motivations that have historically led some to adopt limited atonement. This chapter then examines other interpretations proposed for 1 Timothy 2:4, 6; 4:10 and Titus 2:11 that support double predestination or limited atonement without placing restrictions on the sense of πᾶς. The chapter also includes a brief exploration of how the Calvinist concerns that have motivated the doctrines of double predestination and limited atonement might still be met even without these specific teachings.

Chapter 4 identifies the various linguistic factors that cause or allow a restricted sense for πᾶς. This linguistic inquiry begins with a corpus-based lexical analysis (Stefanowitsch 2020) to identify and classify restricted occurrences of πᾶς. Following this, the various kinds of linguistic analyses appropriate for each particular kind of restriction are employed. Verses which have been cited as parallels for the "all without distinction" interpretation receive special attention. After a brief examination of proposed parallels where πᾶς is not really being restricted in any way, this chapter concludes with a synthesis of the various linguistic factors that cause or allow a restricted sense for πᾶς.

Chapter 5 examines the effect that this linguistic analysis of πᾶς has on the Reformed Calvinist doctrine under discussion. To do so, it applies this linguistic analysis to 1 Timothy 2:4, 6; 4:10 and Titus 2:11, examining the contexts of these key verses to identify the extent to which the

various linguistic factors triggering restrictions on πᾶς are present. On the basis of this examination, the chapter then offers an assessment of the overall linguistic viability of the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς and also of the doctrines of double predestination and limited atonement.

Chapter 6 explores the theological and pastoral implications of the study. First, it compares the ways in which one will speak of God's stance toward someone depending on whether the Father's merciful will and the Son's atonement are considered limited or universal in scope. The findings of the study are then applied to how one should speak of God's stance toward someone who is not in Christ. Finally, the findings of the study are applied to the question of where Christians should seek—and encourage others to seek—reassurance of God's stance toward them.

Chapter 7 provides an overview of the study.

1.4 Conclusion

The "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς, which many Calvinists have utilized to interpret 1 Timothy 2:4, 6; 4:10 and Titus 2:11 in harmony with their understanding of the scope of God's merciful will and of the Son's atonement, requires a more thorough linguistic evaluation. This study performs this linguistic analysis of how πᾶς can be restricted and then examines the effects of this analysis on how one should think and speak about God's stance toward all people. To that end, the next chapter undertakes a more thorough review of previous linguistic argumentation concerning the meaning of πᾶς in these key verses.

Chapter 2:
The History of the "All Without Distinction" Reading of πᾶς

2.1 Introduction

Questions over the extent of God's merciful will and of the Son's atonement are not new within the Christian church. In fact, such debates can be traced back to the Pelagian controversy in the early fifth century. Additionally, passages from the Pastoral Epistles, particularly the statement that God wants all people to be saved (1 Tim 2:4), have always figured prominently within this discussion. Those who limit God's desire to save to a subset of humanity have always appealed to other passages in Scripture where "all" means less than every individual in order to justify reading "all" in a limited way there too. This chapter takes up this thesis's first subsidiary research question: What is the current state of scholarship regarding the linguistic analysis of πᾶς in 1 Timothy 2:4, 6; 4:10 and Titus 2:11 as it relates to the Reformed Calvinist doctrine that limits the scope of the Father's merciful will and of the Son's atonement?

The first main section of this chapter will review the linguistic argumentation that has been made in favor of the "all without distinction" reading. It starts by discussing the origination of the interpretation by Augustine and its subsequent preservation and development until reformers such as Calvin. Then it shows how argumentation for this interpretation was fleshed out more fully within the Calvinist tradition, starting with Beza and continuing through the Calvinists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Then it demonstrates that from the nineteenth century through today, the "all without distinction" reading and the argumentation for it has largely ossified within the Calvinist tradition. This section then discusses

lexicographical works that attest to the existence of restricted uses of "all." This section concludes by synthesizing the historical arguments in favor of the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς to define where such argumentation currently stands.

The second main section of this chapter reviews the linguistic argumentation that has been made against the "all without distinction" reading. It starts by offering an explanation for why we find no real explicit argumentation against the interpretation before the Reformation. It then examines the linguistically-based response to the "all without distinction" reading that developed during the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries. Then it documents how there has been very little development in such argumentation since that time. This section concludes by synthesizing the historical arguments against the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς to define where such argumentation currently stands.

The concluding section synthesizes the findings of this chapter concerning the present state of scholarship in the form of two main observations. First, it shows that the various forms of argumentation employed from the beginning of the debate to the present day, both for and against the "all without distinction" reading, are in fundamental agreement on the basic linguistic observation that πᾶς is capable of being used in a more restricted way than to refer to every single individual. However, both sides have the same lacuna in their linguistic argumentation—they fail to identify what it is linguistically that causes πᾶς to have a restricted sense in some occurrences and not in others. Because they have been unable to quantify what causes such a restricted sense, they have been unable to bring any objective criteria to the interpretation of πᾶς in the key verses within the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11).

The second main observation is that, despite some increased refinement over the years, the argumentation for and against the "all without distinction" reading has exhibited rather little change, resulting in the present standstill between the two sides. Together, these observations indicate the need for a more thorough linguistic analysis of πᾶς, both as it is limited elsewhere and also as it is found in these key verses, in order to more critically evaluate the Reformed Calvinist doctrine that limits the scope of the Father's merciful will and of the Son's atonement.

2.2 Linguistic Argumentation in Favor of the "All Without Distinction" Reading

2.2.1 From Augustine to Calvin

Augustine of Hippo seems to have originated the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς, and he did so as a way to safeguard his doctrinal position amid the Pelagian controversy. The polemic motivation for this reading is seen from the fact that such an interpretation is absent from his comments on 1 Timothy 2:4 that predate the controversy. Originally, Augustine had understood the verse as saying that it is God's will that all people be saved and that, consequently, it is also God's will to punish those that defy his will through their unbelief (*Spir. et litt.* 58). However, the emerging Pelagian controversy centered on the question of the respective contributions of God's will and a human being's will regarding salvation. So, in response to this controversy, Augustine consistently and explicitly sought to interpret the verse in ways that did not imply that God had willed something and then not carried it out (*Ep*. 149.17; *Enchir*. 103; *Correpț*. 14; *Ep.* 217.19; *C. Jul*. 4.8.42–44; see Solignac 1988, 836–37; Rist 1994, 270–71; Ogliari 2003, 357–366; Karfíková 2012, 186–87, 264, 284; Teske 2014, 18–22).

Throughout his various writings, Augustine offers two different possibilities for how 1 Timothy 2:4 can be interpreted in a way he considers theologically acceptable. The first is that "God wants all people to be saved" means merely that all people who are saved are saved only by God's will (*Ep*. 149.17; *Enchir*. 103; *Ep*. 217.19; *C. Jul*. 4.8.44). Augustine provides different parallel passages to support such a reading. Augustine cites John 1:9, which he understands as saying not that the true light enlightens all people but that all who are enlightened are enlightened only by him (*Enchir*. 103). He cites 1 Corinthians 15:22, which he understands as saying not that all will be made alive in Christ but that all who will be made alive will be made alive only in Christ (*Ep*. 217.19). He also cites Romans 5:18, which he understands as saying not that all receive justification and life in Christ but that all who receive these things receive them only in Christ (*C. Jul*. 4.8.42–44; 6.24.80).

It is the second possibility offered by Augustine that has given rise to the "all without distinction" reading. Under this second interpretation, "all people" speaks of "the human race in all its varieties of rank and circumstance" (*Enchir*. 103, 270; cf. *Ep*. 149.17; *Correpț*. 14). According to Augustine, God wills the salvation of individuals out of any and all such classifications as can be made of the human race, and this is all that is meant by "all people."

In support of this reading, Augustine cites the use of "all" in Luke 11:42, where Jesus tells the Pharisees that they tithe "every herb," which Augustine understands as referring to every kind of herb and not every herb in existence (*Enchir*. 103; *Correpț*. 14). He also cites the use of "all" in 1 Corinthians 10:33, where Paul says that he pleases "all people," which Augustine understands as referring to every kind of person and not all people (*Correpț*. 14). In referencing these other verses, Augustine became not only the originator of the "all without distinction" reading, but he also began the tradition of defending such an interpretation on the grounds that there are other verses in which "all" apparently means merely "all kinds of."

Augustine's commitment to reading 1 Timothy 2:4 in a way that did not imply that God's will could be defeated was continued by his followers, who became the opponents of what has become known as Semi-Pelagianism.[1] Each of Augustine's two interpretive suggestions was adopted by different ones of these followers. Following the first, the little-known priest Januarius (*Ep*. *ad Val.*) limits the referent of "all people" to all those who will be saved, appealing to two of the same verses cited by Augustine (Rom 5:18; 1 Cor 15:22). Initially Prosper of Aquitaine followed this same interpretation of Augustine, but he later moved away from it (Teske 2014, 14–15, 26–30). While arguing against the Semi-Pelagians, Prosper (*Ep. ad Ruf.* 13) reads 1 Timothy 2:4 as merely saying that all people who are saved are saved only by God's will. However, after his debate with the Semi-Pelagians ended, he insists that he understands God's merciful will to be universal and interprets the verse as stating that God wants to save all people (*Vocat*. 1.12; 2.2, 19, 31).

Fulgentius of Ruspe followed Augustine's second interpretive suggestion for 1 Timothy 2:4, the "all without distinction" reading, and added more evidence in its favor. Fulgentius's views on this verse shifted much like Augustine's had before him, with him believing at first that God's merciful will was universal and only later restricting it in response to the Semi-Pelagians (Gumerlock 2009). Ultimately, Fulgentius takes "all people" to mean "all kinds of people" (*Ep*. 17.61–66; *Verit*. 3.15–20), an interpretation Gumerlock (2009, 121–22; 2014, 169–72) describes as synecdoche. As parallel examples of other passages where "all" means something less than "all," Fulgentius notes that some individuals are excluded from the biblical statements that all the nations will worship God (Ps 86:9), that all will have the Spirit poured out on them (Joel 2:28), that all will hate the disciples (Matt 10:22), that all will be drawn to Christ (John

[1] According to Backus and Goudriaan (2014), the term "Semi-Pelagianism" was first applied as an anachronistic label for the fifth- and sixth-century Massilians by the Roman Catholic Nicholas Sanders in 1571.

12:32), that all receive justification and life (Rom 5:18), that God has mercy on all (11:32), that all are motivated by self-interest (Phil 2:21), and that all are reconciled to Christ (Col 1:20). These citations represented a significant expansion in the amount of evidence advanced as support for the linguistic possibility of the "all without distinction" reading. However, Fulgentius's adoption of such an interpretation, just like Augustine's before him, seems to be based not so much on its linguistic plausibility as on its polemical necessity.

Augustine's two potential explanations for 1 Timothy 2:4 were eventually carried into and preserved by scholastic theology, though they do not seem to have received as much direct attention during this era. Peter Lombard (*Sent*. 1 d. 46 c; *Coll*. 212), Thomas Aquinas (*Script. Super Sent*. I, d. 46 a. 1; *ST* I q. 19 a. 6; *Comm. in Paul.* 199), and the *Glossa Ordinaria* and Nicholas of Lyra (*Bib. Sac*. 6.118–19) all include these two suggestions among the possible ways to interpret this verse without implying that God's will can go unfulfilled. Gregory of Rimini (*Lect. in Sent*. 1.46–47) even specifically advocates for the "all without distinction" reading. However, the predominant method by which scholastic writers resolved the theological issues posed by 1 Timothy 2:4 was to distinguish between different wills in God (Foord 2009, 180–91), a distinction credited to John of Damascus (*Fid. orth*. 2.29). Consequently, by the time of the Reformation, Augustine's two readings of this verse had been allowed for a long time within the church. However, they were no longer crucial enough to be controversial or to still be garnering any explicit argumentation for or against.

Augustine's readings of 1 Timothy 2:4 naturally continued into Reformation readings of the verse. Martin Luther frequently utilizes Augustine's one interpretive suggestion that "God wants all people to be saved" means that all who are saved are saved only by God's will (LW 4:177; 25:375–76; 28:261; 43:54). However, other interpretations can be found in Luther as well. Luther's translations of the verse take "saved" as referring merely to the providential help given to all people, using glosses such as *genesen* and *geholffen* (Green 1995, 284). On other occasions, Luther seems to take the verse as teaching that God does desire the eternal salvation of all people (LW 3:138; 10:95; 33:140).

A millennium after Fulgentius, Martin Bucer revived a more conscious and explicit argumentation for Augustine's interpretations of 1 Timothy 2:4, including on linguistic grounds. Bucer (MBDS 5:82–84) restricts the referent of "all" in several soteriological verses (Gen 22:18; John 1:9; 12:32; 1 Cor 15:22; 1 Tim 2:4) to just believers. As evidence, he provides three ways in which the sense of "all" is limited in Scripture. The first is that sometimes "all"

means simply "many," such as when the Pharisees say that everyone will believe in Jesus (John 11:48). The second way adduced by Bucer is that sometimes it refers simply to any potential person without distinction, such as when the whole crowd is said to have been trying to touch Jesus (Luke 6:19) and when Paul says he has become all things to all people (1 Cor 9:22). The third is that sometimes it communicates simply that something only happens in no other way. These last two ways by which the sense of "all" can be limited closely correspond with the interpretive possibilities offered by Augustine.

While he does not use the term here, with the first of these explanations, Bucer (MBDS 5) may be the first to suggest a hyperbolic understanding of "all" as the way to read such verses. Additionally, in distinguishing between times where "all" means "many" (his first way listed) and where "all" means "any" (his second way listed), Bucer may also be the first person to articulate that not only does "all" not always mean "all," but that there are multiple ways in which "all" can mean something less than "all" and that they can be distinguished from each other. Ultimately, Bucer's revivification and expansion of Augustine's argument in the early days of the Reformation would help to position the "all without distinction" reading to become a staple within the developing Reformed tradition.

Likely influenced in this regard by Bucer (Pelikan 1984, 237), John Calvin consistently interpreted "all" as referring to all kinds of people but not all individual people as a way of countering the idea that verses such as 1 Timothy 2:4, 6 and Titus 2:11 were problematic to his position on predestination (*Inst*. 3.24.16; [1549–1556] 1998, 38–40, 196; [1552a] 1856, 90; [1552b] 1857, 55–56; 1563, 73–79).[2] Calvin attempts no linguistic justification for this reading; instead, he appeals to elements in the context, suggesting that Paul is seeking to include a specific kind of people (i.e., kings in 1 Tim 2:4, Gentiles in 1 Tim 2:6, and slaves in Titus 2:11). During this same time, the Italian-born Calvinist Peter Martyr Vermigli ([1558] 2003, 62–64) gives four options for interpreting 1 Timothy 2:4: the two distinctions of Augustine, the distinction between divine wills originated by John of Damascus, and taking "all" particularly in reference to the elect. For this last proposal, he offers six parallel verses (Ps 145:14; Joel

[2] Foord (2009, 198–99), crediting the observation to David Ponter, suggests that Calvin departs significantly from an Augustinian reading to interpret "all" not as "some from all kinds" but as "all from all kinds." Ponter (2013, 256–60) later published this argument, and it was further followed by Allen (2016, 674). This way of interpreting Calvin comes from a misreading of the French collective noun *peuple* (plural: *peuples*). When Calvin states that Paul is speaking here of *tous peuples*, they read that as "all people," as in, still including all individuals, while more accurately it says "all peoples," as in, much like the English cognate, referring to all people-groups, but not including all individuals within those people-groups, as the rest of Calvin's words make clear.

2:28; Isa 66:23; Jer 31:34; Luke 3:6; John 12:32), which he further supports with three verses where "all" speaks only of the godless (Ps 14:3; Matt 10:22; Phil 2:21).

2.2.2 From Beza through the eighteenth century

Theodore Beza, successor to Calvin, not only followed him in employing the "all without distinction" reading but also greatly expanded upon Calvin's argumentation for it. In his response to the annotations of the Lutheran Concordist Jakob Andreae on their discussion at the Colloquy of Montbéliard, Beza (1588, 192–93) identifies ten passages whose meanings would be bizarre if "all" must always be understood to mean "all." All nations being blessed in Abraham (Gen 18:18) would include even people God had rejected, such as Ishmael, Esau, and the Edomites. All people knowing the Lord (Jer 31:34) would include every single person despite Jesus's statement that no one can know God except through him (Luke 10:22). The woe Jesus pronounces on being praised by all people (Luke 6:26) would include being praised even by those who are not worldly. Jesus's prophecy that his disciples would be hated by all (Luke 21:17) would include even being hated by good people. John's statement that we all have received grace from Christ's fullness (John 1:16) would not be limited to just believers. Jesus's promise to draw all people to himself (John 12:32) would include even the reprobate. Paul's statement that everything is permissible (1 Cor 6:12) would mean absolutely anything is allowed. Similarly, his statement that he has become all things to all people (1 Cor 9:22) would mean there was no limit to what Paul would become. God doing all in all (1 Cor 12:6) would make God responsible for all the sins in all the wicked. Similarly, God being all in all (1 Cor 15:28) would include even the demons and the damned.

Beza does not explain what linguistically might cause "all" to have a limited meaning in those verses. However, afterward, he does move on to more explicit linguistic evidence for his understanding of "all" in 1 Timothy 2:4 (193). He cites the frequent use of the Hebrew כֹּל as an allegedly indefinite modifier ("any") instead of as a universal modifier ("all"), in keeping with which Jesus healing "every disease" (Matt 4:23) would mean he healed "any kind of disease," and the Pharisees tithing "every herb" (Luke 11:42) would mean they tithed "any herb." Having established the point that "all" in Scripture does not always mean "all," Beza explains the uses of "all" in 1 Timothy 2 specifically as being synecdoche, referring to the inclusion of kinds, not individuals.

A century later, another Genevan, Francis Turretin (1688, 450–51), adopts this same "all without distinction" reading. He provides seven parallel examples: every animal being on the ark (Gen 7:14), all people having the Holy Spirit poured out on them (Joel 2:28), all Judea and the whole region of the Jordan going out to John (Matt 3:5), Jesus healing every disease (Matt 4:23), all people seeing God's salvation (Luke 3:6), the Pharisees tithing every herb (Luke 11:42), and the sheet in Peter's vision containing every four-footed animal (Acts 10:12). He also points to other examples of "all" specifically within 1 Timothy 2 that he takes to be less than universal in scope. Turretin understands the command to pray "in every place" (v. 8) to mean "indiscriminately in any place" and not in every single place. And appealing to John's clarification that those sinning unto death are not to be prayed for (1 John 5:16), he understands the command to pray "for all people" (v. 1) to mean "indiscriminately for any people."

The "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς was also adopted by early English Calvinists. For example, John Bridges (1571, 23, 31–32), Jacob Kimendocius (1592, 104–6, 475–76), and John Dove (1597, 20) all cite and follow Augustine's interpretation of 1 Timothy 2:4. A more detailed linguistic justification for the reading is made by the Puritan William Perkins (1617, 623–24). After citing with approval both of Augustine's proposed explanations for 1 Timothy 2:4, Perkins distinguishes between "all" being used "distributively" for "every several and particular person" and "all" being used "collectively" for "any, and not every one," citing as an example Matthew 9:35, where Jesus is said to have healed every disease. For this distinction in the meaning of "all," he appeals to Aristotle's discussion (*Pol*. 2) of Plato's *Republic*, which differentiates between all the people owning something individually and all the people owning something collectively. However, Perkins seems to be operating with a different sense of collective predication than Aristotle. For Aristotle, a collective sense of "all" is true of all group members but only when considered as a group. For Perkins, a collective sense of "all" means that it properly predicates something only of a subset of the group. Perkins proceeds to quote Jerome's (*Comm. Eph.*, 463–64) citation of Psalm 116:11 and Colossians 1:28 to explain "all" in Ephesians 1:22 as meaning all those who are in the church.

Argumentation for the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς continued in Great Britain after Perkins. The Scottish Presbyterian Samuel Rutherfurd identifies several rules by which he finds the referent of "all" to be limited throughout Scripture. Rutherfurd's (1647, 422–25) first rule pertains to times when "all" means "the most part" (Gen 18:18; 22:18; 41:57; Exod 9:6; 32:26; Ps 86:9; Isa 2:2; 40:5; 60:7; Jer 13:19; Hag 2:7; Matt 3:5; Mark 14:64; Luke 17:27), which

would properly be considered hyperbole. Rutherfurd's second rule merely acknowledges that "all" can speak of individuals or kinds, and his third rule digresses to speak of the referent of the word "many" (425–26). His fourth rule (426–27) argues that in passages concerning redemption, "all" refers to every kind but not every individual (Joel 2:28; John 12:32; Acts 2:17; Rom 11:26), but he supports this understanding by appealing to other verses that he explicitly labels as hyperbole (Gen 2:16; 24:10; Matt 4:23; Luke 11:42; Acts 2:5). Rutherfurd's fifth rule (429–36) follows Augustine's other interpretive suggestion and provides examples where "all doing something in a certain way" cannot mean that all actually do it, but must instead mean that all who do it do so in that certain way (Exod 28:14; John 1:16; 3:26; 11:48; Acts 3:25; Rom 5:18; 1 Cor 15:22; Rev 13:8). Finally (438), instead of limiting the sense of "all" in 1 Timothy 4:10, Rutherfurd restricts the idea of "Savior" there to a providential and nonsoteriological sense on the basis of parallel nonsoteriological uses of the word "save" (Ps 106:8, 10; 36:6; Neh 9:27; Matt 8:25).

The following year, the English Nonconformist John Owen (1648) dedicated the fourth book of his classic defense of limited atonement, *The Death of Death in the Death of Christ*, to addressing passages commonly used to argue in favor of universal atonement. Owen states without citation or documentation that there are almost five hundred examples in the Bible of "all" not being universal in scope (344). Later, offering only three examples (Jer 29:1; Matt 4:23; Luke 11:42), Owen claims that "many of all sorts" is the default meaning of the word "all," and he makes the strange suggestion that "all" will only mean "all" if the context forces it; otherwise, the word will default to a more restricted meaning (345–46). Another Englishman, the Independent John Hurrion (1732, 191), considers the fact that those in heaven and hell are not to be prayed for to be evidence that "all" has a limited referent in 1 Timothy 2:1 and thus also in its subsequent uses within the chapter.

Much the same manners of limiting "all" are found in the English Baptist John Gill (1796, 2.182–84). Gill opts for different explanations of "all" in each of the key verses under debate. In 1 Timothy 2:4, it speaks of kinds, but two verses later, in v. 6, it speaks only of many as opposed to few. In 1 Timothy 4:10, he finds the solution to be a providential and nonsoteriological meaning of "save." However, he explains away the relevance of Titus 2:11 by making the expression "to all people" dependent on the verb "appeared" instead of the adjective "salvific."

After the Reformation, the "all without distinction" reading was also utilized by one reform movement within Roman Catholicism. Only several years before Rutherfurd and Owen were writing, Cornelius Jansen (1641), the bishop of Ypres, posthumously published a treatise on Augustine. In it, he alleged that there were those within the Catholic Church whose teachings on free will and grace were Semi-Pelagian and not properly Augustinian. In this treatise, he cites and advocates for the interpretations Augustine proposed for understanding "all people" in 1 Timothy 2:4 (1.3.19). The same views were adopted by the one who came to lead the Jansenite movement, Antoine Arnauld (1644, 206, 210, 244–54). However, Jansenite views, including those limiting the extent of the atonement, were quickly outlawed within the Catholic Church, condemned by Pope Innocent X in the 1653 papal bull *Cum occasione* (Denzinger 1955, 1096). With this formal condemnation of Jansenism, it was no longer possible to limit the extent of God's merciful will and of Christ's atonement while staying within the fold of Catholicism. This development effectively ended any need for Catholics to appeal to Augustine's interpretations of "all" in their interpretation of the key verses within the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11). From the ending of the Jansenite movement on, all subsequent proponents of the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς are found within Protestantism and, as such, can be broadly considered as part of the Calvinist tradition.

2.2.3 From the nineteenth century through the twenty-first century

The way in which Calvinist writers from the nineteenth century forward adopt and argue for the "all without distinction" reading demonstrates that this interpretation has solidified within the Calvinist tradition. Despite criticizing his fellow Calvinists for, at times, twisting the words of Scripture to support their views on the extent of the atonement, the Scottish Presbyterian Ralph Wardlaw (1857, 468–70, 476–77, 483) still argues for the "all without distinction" reading in John 12:32, 1 Timothy 2:4, and Titus 2:11. He further argues that words such as "all" are always limited by the subject matter under discussion, as in 1 Corinthians 15:22. However, instead of appealing to such a reading in 1 Timothy 4:10, there he interprets "Savior" in reference to temporal preservation and not eternal salvation. Similarly, another Scottish Presbyterian, John Smyth (1830, 60–71), after offering evidence that the meaning of "all" is commonly restricted (Matt 10:22; Luke 6:26; John 12:32; Rom 16:19), restricts its meaning in 2 Corinthians 5:14–15, 1 Timothy 2:6, and Titus 2:11, but for 1 Timothy 4:10 he interprets "Savior" as "preserver" instead of restricting "all." The American Baptist Howard Malcolm (1840, 77–78) accuses those who cite the word "all" as definitive proof against limited

atonement of begging the question and then lists fourteen other passages where he finds the sense of "all" to be restricted (Exod 32:3; Ps 145:14; Zeph 2:14; Matt 3:5; 10:22; 21:26; Mark 1:37; 13:13; Luke 21:17; John 1:7; 3:26; 4:29; 1 Cor 9:22; Phil 2:21).

Louis Berkhof (1936, 168–69) gives several English examples of his own making, speaking of a society, a church, and a ship, where "all" would be limited by the context. However, for the uses of "all" within the Pastoral Epistles, he adopts the "all without distinction" reading (169–70). Loraine Boettner (1932, 288) provides six parallel examples where "all" is limited in its reference (Mark 1:5; John 12:32; Acts 4:21; 21:28; 1 Cor 15:22; Heb 2:9). In arguing for the "all without distinction" reading, Arthur Custance (1979, 162–64) lists parallel passages where "all" is translated "all manner of" in the KJV (Matt 4:23; 5:11; 10:1; Luke 11:42; Acts 10:12; Rom 7:8; 1 Pet 1:15; Rev 21:19), as well as other passages where he finds "all" to have that same meaning (Mark 11:32; John 1:7; 8:2; 12:32; Rom 5:18; 14:2; 1 Tim 6:10).

Paul Jewett (1985, 103) appeals to the difference between collective and distributive quantification, stating that "elementary logic courses teach us that adjectives of quantity—*all*, *every*, *some*, *any*—are ambiguous." He cites Matthew 3:5, John 12:32, Acts 2:5, and Colossians 1:23 as examples of times where the context limits "all," and he limits "all" in 1 Timothy 2:4 to "all *classes*" (103–4). Steven Baugh (1992, 333) recognizes that the "all without distinction" reading is insufficient on its own to address the complications 1 Timothy 4:10 poses for limited atonement because believers still would appear to be a subset of and not coextensive with "all kinds of people." So, for that verse, he appeals to broader meanings of "Savior" (333–38). However, for explaining 1 Timothy 2:4, 6 (333, 338–40), he interprets "all" as "all kinds of peoples," citing several parallel passages (Matt 4:23; 1 Cor 6:18; 1 Tim 6:10) as linguistic evidence for this meaning. He accuses the assumption that "all" means "all" of "beg[ging] the question," stating that "both are legitimate senses of the Greek word determined by their contexts" (339 n. 33).

Lee Gatiss (2012, 42–45) provides several passages where "all" means something less than all (Gen 6:13, 17; 2 Kings 8:9; 1 Chr 22:15; Neh 13:16; Ezek 39:20; Zeph 2:14; Matt 3:5; 5:11; Luke 2:1; Acts 2:17; 10:12; Rom 7:8; 1 Tim 6:10). Gatiss seems to be in favor of reading "all" hyperbolically in the difficult passages in the Pastoral Epistles. The following year in *From Heaven He Came and Sought Her*, a collection of twenty-three essays arguing for definite atonement, two of such essays specifically advocate for the "all without distinction" reading. Both Jonathan Gibson (2013a, 295–321) and Thomas Schreiner (2013, 376–87) make chiefly

contextual and theological arguments in favor of the "all without distinction" reading. They cite as linguistic support only a single parallel expression (Acts 22:15), where Ananias tells Paul that he will be Christ's witness to all people.

Commentaries on the Pastoral Epistles can be found to employ the "all without distinction" reading and to argue for it in much the same manner. George Knight III (1992, 115, 119) defends the "all without distinction" interpretation, offering parallels in support (Acts 22:15; Rom 10:12; 11:32; 12:17–18; 1 Cor 12:12; 2 Cor 3:2; Gal 3:28; Phil 4:5; Col 3:11; 1 Thess 2:15; Titus 3:2). Robert Yarbrough (2018, 156) makes use of the "all without distinction" reading, not only providing parallels in its support (Matt 23:27; Rom 1:29; 7:8; Eph 1:3) but offering the theory, based on Qumranic parallels, that πᾶς may have as its referent "the elect." However, Yarbrough has misread NIDNTTE on this point, which speaks not of πᾶς but of πολλοί as being a Qumranic designation for the "elect eschat. community" (s.v. λυτρόω).

2.2.4 Lexicographical works

While few lexicographical treatments of πᾶς specifically address the "all without distinction" reading in reference to the key passages from the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11), many assume the existence of such a meaning. Thayer (1889, s.v. πᾶς I.1.β) gives as its second meaning for adjectival uses with anarthrous nouns "*any and every, of every kind*, [A. V. often *all manner of*]." There is an ambiguity in Thayer's glosses. "Any and every" seems to speak of all individuals of all kinds, while "of every kind" seems to allow a reference to only some individuals of all kinds. Thayer finds this meaning to occur "esp. with nouns designating virtues or vices, emotions, character, condition, to indicate every mode in which such virtue, vice or emotion manifests itself, or any object whatever to which the idea expressed by the noun belongs." Many supposed examples are given for this meaning (Matt 3:15; 4:23; 9:35; 10:1; Acts 7:22; 23:1; 27:20; Rom 1:18, 29; 7:8; 15:13–14; 1 Cor 1:5; 2 Cor 1:4; 8:7; 9:8; 10:6; 12:12; Eph 1:3, 8; 4:19, 31; 5:3, 9; Phil 1:9; Col 1:9–11, 28; 3:16; 4:12; 2 Thess 1:11; 2:9; 1 Tim 1:15; 2:11; 5:2; 6:1; 2 Tim 4:2; Titus 2:15; 3:2; Jam 1:21; 1 Pet 2:1; 5:10; 2 Pet 1:5). However, this meaning is not applied to any passages where the "all without distinction" reading has historically been applied. Thayer's definition is cited in support of the "all without distinction" reading by Custance (1979, 163).

LN (§58.28) gives as one definition of πᾶς "a totality of kinds or sorts," providing Matthew 4:23 and 1 Corinthians 6:18 as examples. LN's definition is cited in support of the "all without

distinction" reading by Baugh (1992, 333). BDAG (s.v. πᾶς 5) lists "every kind of, all sorts of" as the last of its meanings for πᾶς, saying that it is being used "for the words παντοδαπός and παντοῖος, which are lacking in out lit." It cites many examples for this meaning (Matt 4:23; 23:27; 28:18; Acts 2:5; 7:22; 13:10; Rom 1:18, 29; 7:8; 1 Cor 1:5; 6:18; 2 Cor 7:1; 9:8; 10:5; Eph 1:3, 8, 21; 4:19; 5:3; Phil 1:9; 2 Thess 2:17; Titus 1:16; 2:14; 3:1; Heb 13:21; Jam 1:17, 21; 1 Pet 2:1; Rev 8:7). However, it does not give this as the meaning for any of the key passages where appeal has been made to the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς. NIDNTTE (s.v. λυτρόω, 2) takes up the "all without distinction" reading more directly, allowing for either a hyperbolic meaning or the "all kinds of" meaning for πᾶς in 1 Timothy 2:6, citing parallels for both (for the former, Matt 3:5; 4:23; Acts 2:5; Eph 1:8; for the latter, Matt 23:27; Rom 1:29; 7:8; Eph 1:3).

J. William Johnston's (2004, 33–36) monograph *The Use of Πᾶς in the New Testament* describes πᾶς as having either a summative (all as a group) or distributive (all as individuals) sense and either a universal scope or one that can be limited to the subject matter or to kinds. Surprisingly, Johnston never directly addresses the passages in the Pastoral Epistles where the "all without distinction" reading has been historically employed. However, since for other passages (Matt 23:27; Luke 12:15; Acts 7:22; Rom 1:29; Eph 4:31; 5:3; Col 1:28; 1 Tim 4:4), he variously advocates and allows for such readings (72, 85–87), his treatment of πᾶς has been cited as linguistic justification for the "all without distinction" reading in those key verses (Gatiss 2012, 43; Gibson 2013a, 296). Though the most recent substantial work on πᾶς in the NT, Johnston's monograph has been criticized for simply restating lexicographical and translational traditions without providing an adequate or compelling framework for understanding the semantics of πᾶς (Porter 2006). Nevertheless, Johnston's (2004, 48–52) introduction of the linguistic concepts of abstract nouns and referentiality constitutes a first step toward discerning the motivation for why the referent of πᾶς is at times restricted. Johnston (2011) has profitably applied his work to the question of the referent of πάντες in Romans 3:23, interpreting it as anaphorically describing all believers and not all people. However, he confusingly mislabels this interpretation of πᾶς as being "all without distinction."

2.2.5 Analysis

The preceding history of linguistic argumentation in favor of the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς represents a comprehensive search of patristic-, scholastic-, reformation-, and modern-era writings, including polemical, exegetical, systematic, and lexicographic works.

The history presents the writings that made significant or otherwise historically noteworthy contributions to the linguistic argumentation for the Calvinist "all without distinction" reading from its conception by Augustine to the present day. From this history emerge several key themes.

First, although the "all without distinction" reading has received linguistic argumentation in its support, it is not itself motivated linguistically but theologically. The manner in which Augustine devised this interpretation and in which many subsequent writers argue for it reveals that this is not a reading that arose simply from the verses themselves. Instead, this reading commended itself to those writers because it served as a way to explain passages that might otherwise seem to contradict various points of doctrines that have been believed within the Christian church. While other strategies have been utilized for interpreting these verses in keeping with such doctrinal viewpoints, the history of interpretation since the Reformation shows a strong coalescence around the "all without distinction" reading within the Calvinist tradition. It suggests that Calvinists have come to view the "all without distinction" reading as their best option for interpreting these verses in a way that safeguards teachings such as double predestination and limited atonement.

Second, the linguistic dimension of the argumentation for the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς has remained largely unchanged since it was first employed by Augustine. Its primary source of evidence is to identify and cite various passages where the sense of πᾶς is limited, intending them as parallels to show that πᾶς could also be limited within the key verses within the Pastoral Epistles. Compiling the different examples already mentioned throughout this chapter into a single list, at least 151 different passages have been cited for such a purpose.[3] For many writers who advocate for the "all without distinction" reading, this citation of potential parallels represents the totality of their linguistic argumentation for their interpretation.

[3] Gen 2:16; 6:13, 17; 7:14; 18:18; 22:18; 24:10; 41:57; Exod 9:6; 32:3, 26; 2 Kgs 8:9 (OG 4 Kgd 8:9); 1 Chr 22:15; Neh 13:16 (OG 2 Esd 23:16); Ps 14:3 (OG 13:3); 86:9 (OG 85:9); 116:11 (OG 115:2); 145:14 (OG 144:14); Isa 2:2; 40:5; 60:7; 66:23; Jer 13:19; 29:1 (OG 36:1); 31:34 (OG 38:34); Ezek 39:20; Joel 2:28 (OG 3:1); Hag 2:7; Zeph 2:14; Matt 3:5, 15; 4:23; 5:11; 9:35; 10:1, 22; 21:26; 23:27; 28:18; Mark 1:5, 37; 11:32; 13:13; 14:64; Luke 2:1; 3:6; 6:19, 26; 11:42; 12:15; 17:27; 21:17; John 1:7, 9, 16; 3:26; 4:29; 8:2; 11:48; 12:32; Acts 2:5, 17; 4:21; 7:22; 10:12; 13:10; 21:28; 22:15; 23:1; 27:20; Rom 1:18, 29; 3:23; 5:18; 7:8; 10:12; 11:26, 32; 12:17–18; 14:2; 15:13–14; 16:19; 1 Cor 1:5; 6:12, 18; 9:22; 12:6, 12; 15:22, 28; 2 Cor 1:4; 3:2; 5:14–15; 7:1; 8:7; 9:8; 10:5–6; 12:12; Gal 3:28; Eph 1:3, 8, 21–22; 4:19, 31; 5:3, 9; Phil 1:9; 2:21; 4:5; Col 1:9–11, 20, 23, 28; 3:11, 16; 4:12; 1 Thess 2:15; 2 Thess 1:11; 2:9, 17; 1 Tim 1:15; 2:1, 8, 11; 4:4; 5:2; 6:1, 10; 2 Tim 4:2; Titus 1:16; 2:14–15; 3:1–2; Heb 2:9; 13:21; Jam 1:17, 21; 1 Pet 1:15; 2:1; 5:10; 2 Pet 1:5; Rev 8:7; 21:19.

Third, several of those who argue in favor of the "all without distinction" reading have attempted to classify restricted uses of πᾶς. They have even used linguistic terminology to articulate the kinds of restriction for πᾶς they observe, referring to concepts such as synecdoche, hyperbole, collective predication, and contextual limitations. Such clearer linguistic argumentation represents a significant improvement over simply pointing to other passages where πᾶς occurs. However, it still stops short of demonstrating linguistically why a certain kind of restriction must be present within a given verse, which is what would be necessary to prove the "all without distinction" reading as the correct interpretation. It also stops short of even demonstrating linguistically under what circumstances a certain kind of restriction *may* be present within a given verse, which is what would be necessary to fully establish the "all without distinction" reading as a linguistically possible interpretation.

2.3 Linguistic Argumentation Against the "All Without Distinction" Reading

2.3.1 Pre-Reformation

Although the "all without distinction" reading can be traced back to the early fifth century, there does not seem to be any extant scrutiny of it before the Reformation. Pelagius (*Exp. in I Tim*. 480), other Pelagians (cf. Augustine, *C. Jul*. 4.8.42), and the later so-called Semi-Pelagians (cf. Prosper, *Ep*. 225; *Ep. ad Ruf.* 13) did cite 1 Timothy 2:4 to refute the Augustinian position on grace and free will. A letter to Augustine from a certain Hilary (*Ep*. 226.7) even reports that the Semi-Pelagians specifically rejected the interpretation that limited "all people" to those God wanted to save. However, any comment those Semi-Pelagians may have made about the interpretation's linguistic viability or probability has not been preserved.

Similarly, there does not appear to be any critique of the "all without distinction" reading in the scholastic period. That the linguistic viability of this interpretation received no attention during this period is unsurprising. Many scholastic writers considered Augustine's opinions authoritative (Pelikan 1978, 270–77) and freely allowed the "all without distinction" reading as one possibility for interpreting the verse (Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* 1 d. 46c; *Coll*. 212; Thomas Aquinas, *Script. Super Sent. I*, d. 46 a. 1; *ST* I q.19 a. 6; *Comm. in Paul.* 199; *Glossa Ord.* and Nicholas of Lyra, *Bib. Sac*. 6.118–19). However, in answering how God could will something and then not do it, they preferred to distinguish between different wills in God (Foord 2009, 180–91). It was not until Calvinist appeals to the "all without distinction" reading

brought this long-standing interpretation increased attention and importance that serious questions about its cogency were raised.

2.3.2 From the Reformation through the nineteenth century

Although Martin Luther had often followed one of Augustine's suggestions for evading interpreting 1 Timothy 2:4 as saying that God wants to save all individual persons, subsequent Lutherans consistently argued against any Calvinist attempts to limit the scope of God's merciful will. Green (1995, 284–86) attributes this development to Philipp Melanchthon. When discussing predestination early in his career, Melanchthon (1522) solved the difficulty posed by this passage by allowing either Augustine's interpretive suggestion that "all" refers to all kinds of people but not all individual people or a providential and nonsoteriological meaning for "saved." Years later, however, when commenting on the verse itself, Melanchthon (1561) dismisses Augustine's interpretation and prefers to understand the passage as speaking of the universal nature of the gospel promise. Green (1995, 286–92) further documents how Melanchthon's views on this passage and on the universal nature of God's saving will were followed by early Lutherans such as Caspar Cruciger (1540, 63), David Chytraeus (1569, 30), Matthias Flacius Illyricus (1570, 1047), Tileman Heshusius (1587, 84–85), Aegidius Hunnius (1599, 68–70), and Nicolas Hunnius (1625, 97). The comments made on 1 Timothy 2:4 by the leading Lutheran dogmatician of the subsequent generation, Johann Gerhard (1643, 32), can be added to this list as well.

The first attempt to respond to the Calvinist "all without distinction" reading at length was made by the Lutheran Concordist Jakob Andreae in his annotations to the Colloquy of Montbéliard. Andreae ([1587] 2017, 590) argues against Beza's interpretation of 1 Timothy 2:4 on three grounds. First, he presses the causal connection between prayer offered for all people and God's desire to save all people. Second, he observes that Paul is commanding that prayer be made for all individual people and not merely for various people types. Third, he specifies that while God desires to save everyone, he only desires to do so in Christ. Later, Andreae comments that under Beza's interpretation, "all" is made to be merely "some" (632). However, Beza (1588, 249–50) rejects this last characterization of his interpretation, saying instead that he interprets "all" as "any."

Jacob Arminius ([1602] 1853) makes similar arguments in response to Perkins. First, Arminius fiercely rejects as logically and contextually unviable Augustine's one interpretive suggestion

whereby "God wants all people to be saved" means that all who are saved are saved by God's will, noting that Paul had just encouraged praying for all people, even those who would not be saved (460–61). Second, he rejects the relevance to the interpretation of 1 Timothy 2:4 of Perkins's distinction between something being predicated of all people individually and of it being predicated of all people collectively, saying that matters such as God's will, predestination, salvation, and the knowledge of the truth all pertain to individuals and not to classes of individuals (461–62). Around the same time, the English Arminian Samuel Harsnett (1658, 153) similarly mocks the idea that "all people" in 1 Timothy 2:4 should be taken in reference to kinds and not individuals, stating that God is concerned about souls, not classifications.

John Goodwin (1651), an independent English Arminian, seems to be the first opponent of the "all without distinction" reading to address the interpretation's use of parallel passages. After admitting that "all" is capable of being used in a restricted sense, he argues that the universal meaning of "all" should be retained in 2 Corinthians 5:14–15 because less common meanings of words must be required by the context (160). Arguing the opposite of what Owen had claimed three years earlier, Goodwin observed that the universal meaning of "all" is its default sense and that the context needs to restrict the scope of "all" if it is to be restricted. Goodwin does not attempt to identify the factors that might serve as a restriction. However, he illustrates his point by noting that, when Scripture uses words such as "door" and "eyes" in a figurative sense in one passage (John 10:9; Acts 26:18), this does not prove or even imply that it is using those same words in a figurative sense in another passage (John 18:16; Psalm 116:5). He thereby refutes the argument that a limited sense for "all" in one passage is sufficient to demonstrate that it has a limited sense in another passage (161).

In 1823, William Weeks, writing in defense of unlimited atonement in the form of a fictional dialogue, grants that there are times "all" is used in a delimited sense. However, he rejects that this allows someone to insert such meanings anywhere they wish, showing the absurdities that would follow if one could read rarer meanings of "God," "everlasting," "salvation," "resurrection," and "baptism" into other passages without warrant (581). To the interlocutor's question of how one is to know when such terms have their limited or unlimited senses, Weeks lays down the principle that "when a universal term is to be understood in a restricted or limited sense, that restriction or limitation is made manifest by the manner in which it is used, or by something which accompanies it" (582). Applying this principle to 1 Timothy 2:4, 6, he finds

nothing there to suggest a restriction to the sense of "all" (583); still, he has not defined what he would be looking for linguistically to trigger such a restriction in sense.

C. John Kennedy (1841) responds to the arguments of Smyth with a series of seven letters. In his first letter, he rejects Smyth's assumption that the restricted sense for "all" is the default (3). He accuses Smyth of treating a sense that is the "exception" as the "rule," further suggesting that any biblical doctrine could be overturned by such an illegitimate hermeneutical practice (3). Kennedy continues to mock Smyth's approach of letting exceptional usages of "all" dictate his reading of other passages, showing the heretical absurdities that would follow if this same method were applied to other passages with "all" (4–6, 18–21). He states as a rule that restrictions to words like "all" "are not to be *assumed*, but *demonstrated*" (17). In his second letter, Kennedy chides Smyth for the fallacious argumentation of first proving merely that "all" can be restricted and then thinking that he can arbitrarily restrict any instance of "all" that he wishes (25). In his sixth letter, as he comes to the relevant passages within the Pastoral Epistles, he reasserts that "all" should be taken universally unless a limitation is proven (150). While still insisting that the burden of proof remains on those advocating for the "all without distinction" reading, Kennedy claims that the context of 1 Timothy 2 and its encouragement to pray for all is nonetheless positive proof against there being any such limitation to "all" later in the chapter (151–53). He repeats many of these arguments in an appendix directed against Wardlaw (197–227).

Even a Calvinist like Charles Spurgeon (1880, 50) criticizes the "all without distinction" reading, calling it "grammatical gunpowder" that destroys the meaning of the text rather than explaining it. He also mocks the attempt to make "all" into "some" or "all kinds" as implying that the Holy Spirit was unable to say what he meant.

2.3.3 The twenty- and twenty-first-century

Several modern commentaries on the Pastoral Epistles explicitly reject the "all without distinction" reading (Marshall and Towner 1999, 268, 427; Mounce 2000, 85; Towner 2006, 746 n. 11). However, they do so with arguments derived from the context and without addressing the linguistic plausibility of the interpretation. Marshall (1989, 61–63; 2003, 328–33), while admitting that "all" is elsewhere used hyperbolically or in reference to kinds and not individuals, notes additional logical complications that would be created by adopting the "all without distinction" reading in 1 Timothy 2:4, 6, and Titus 2:11. Similarly, in an anthology

arguing in favor of Arminianism over against Calvinism, Glen Shellrude (2015, 41) and Robert Picirilli (2015, 54–55) reject the "all without distinction" reading on contextual grounds.

After chronicling the history of the doctrine of limited atonement, David Allen (2016, 675, 707–9) offers his refutation of *From Heaven He Came and Sought Her*, including his objections to the "all without distinction" interpretation. He contends that "all without distinction" would still refer to all individuals, decries as illegitimate the practice of interpreting "all" as meaning "some of all kinds of people," and challenges whether Calvin ever meant such a distinction to support limited atonement. Allen (2019, 226–27) repeats these arguments in another work on the atonement as well. However, his arguments assume but do not prove that "all" itself is incapable of meaning "all kinds of."

Norman Geisler (2004, 354–55) criticizes Owen's use of parallel passages in asserting a restricted sense for "all," stating that he "tactically diverted the issue to other passages where *all* is used geographically or hyperbolically. However, no one has produced a single biblical text where *all* is used limitedly or narrowly when it applies to a generic or redemptive (rather than geographic or hyperbolic) sense." Geisler makes the important point that there are different ways in which "all" might be limited and that the limitations observed elsewhere may not apply to the passages under discussion. However, his brief comment here ignores that those who advocate for the "all without distinction" reading, including Owen, have advanced parallels found in generic and redemptive contexts.

2.3.4 Analysis

The preceding history of linguistic argumentation against the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς is the result of a comprehensive search of patristic-, scholastic, reformation-, and modern-era writings, including polemical, exegetical, systematic, and lexicographic works. The history presents the writings that made significant or otherwise historically noteworthy contributions to the linguistic argumentation against the Calvinist "all without distinction" reading. From this history emerge several key themes.

First, those who oppose the Calvinist "all without distinction" reading readily concede the linguistic premise that πᾶς is capable of being restricted so as to refer to something less than every individual in existence. Nowhere is it denied that there are other instances, or even many other instances, where πᾶς is used in a more limited way. Most responses to the Calvinist

reading tend to focus on whether such a reading would make contextual or logical sense in the key verses within the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11).

Second, the most developed form that linguistic argumentation against the "all without distinction" reading has taken has been to challenge whether the existence of restricted uses of πᾶς elsewhere proves a restricted use of it in the debated verses. Such argumentation does demonstrate well that the Calvinist "all without distinction" reading is yet to be proven linguistically. However, this line of argumentation has stopped short of demonstrating whether the Calvinist "all without distinction" reading can be positively disproven. One relatively recent writer suggests that the parallel uses for "all" to which Calvinists have appealed are quantifiably different from those occurrences in the Pastoral Epistles where they employ such a distinction for theological purposes (Geisler 2004, 354–55); however, no attempt has been made to quantify what those differences might be. Ultimately, while previous scholarship has demonstrated that any limited meanings proposed for πᾶς in the verses under discussion remain unproven by the mere existence of limited meanings elsewhere, no investigation has been made into the linguistic features that might trigger or enable such a restricted meaning either in the passages within the Pastoral Epistles or in the proposed parallels.

2.4 Conclusion

For over sixteen centuries, the sense of the word πᾶς in four verses within the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11) has been a major touchstone within debates over the extent of God's desire to save and of Christ's atoning work. Before this thesis introduces more rigorous linguistic methodology into such debates, this chapter took up the thesis's first subsidiary research question: What is the current state of scholarship regarding the linguistic analysis of πᾶς in 1 Timothy 2:4, 6; 4:10 and Titus 2:11 as it relates to the Reformed Calvinist doctrine that limits the scope of the Father's merciful will and of the Son's atonement? The history of how argumentation has developed both for and against the "all without distinction" reading leads to two noteworthy conclusions about the state of scholarship on this matter.

First, despite the degree to which their interpretations are at odds, there is considerable commonality between those arguing in favor of the "all without distinction" reading and those arguing against it. Both sides agree on the basic linguistic observation that sometimes πᾶς can have a restricted sense. Both sides also, however, share the same lacuna in their linguistic argumentation. Neither side has systematically studied what it is that causes the sense of πᾶς

to be limited in some instances and not in others. Rather than trying to shed light on this debate by more thoroughly studying how πᾶς operates, both sides resort to arguments that are more contextual, logical, and theological in nature. However, as the different sides have different doctrinal assumptions, neither side has made any headway in convincing the other on such grounds.

Second, the debate is currently at a centuries-long standstill. The "all without distinction" reading and the argumentation made in its favor are fundamentally unchanged since Augustine formulated it, even as some degree of greater linguistic sophistication has been added. Similarly, the argumentation against it has largely always been to point out that, even after the citation of other instances where πᾶς is restricted, the restriction of πᾶς within the key verses (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11) remains unproven and, consequently, the default universal sense must be retained. This standstill has left the two sides entrenched in their positions both on these key verses and on the extent of God's desire to save and of Christ's atonement.

The way to move this debate forward and potentially resolve it, then, is to investigate the linguistic factors that elsewhere give rise to restricted meanings and to examine the extent to which they are present in the key verses under discussion. This approach will move the linguistic analysis from the current point of agreement (*can* πᾶς be limited in sense) to the current point of disagreement (*is* πᾶς limited in the relevant verses). Such a line of inquiry also bears promise for moving the debate forward on the basis of on a more objective linguistic methodology without, as currently happens, requiring recourse to doctrinal articles over which the two sides are similarly at odds.

But before undertaking that linguistic inquiry, it is helpful to first clarify the theological issues at stake within this discussion. When Augustine first formulated this "all without distinction" reading, he did so with doctrinal and polemical motivations. With the Pelagian controversy in progress, he needed a way to understand 1 Timothy 2:4 that did not contradict his teachings on the irresistibility of God's will. Similarly, when Calvinists throughout the centuries and still today adopt and advocate for this same reading, they do so for doctrinal and polemical reasons. They need a way to understand these verses (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11) that does not contradict their historical positions on predestination and atonement.[4]

[4] This is not to suggest that it is only the Calvinists who approach this verse with theological biases and that those who oppose them on the matters of predestination and atonement are bias-free. However, as these verses pose theological problems for Calvinists and not those who oppose them, it is the motivation for the Calvinist reading

These Calvinist views on predestination and atonement have their own systematic and practical motivations and concerns. These motivations and concerns must themselves be studied to recognize why the Calvinists espouse the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς and what theologically and pastorally is at stake in this debate. Because of this, ch. 3 explores the role that the "all without distinction" reading plays within Calvinist theology from a historical perspective. It analyzes why many Calvinists believe in double predestination and limited atonement, and it explores whether there would be alternative ways for them to maintain such views apart from the "all without distinction" reading.

that requires the most analysis. However, there are also passages that would pose theological problems for non-Calvinists and, in such instances, it would be their respective motivations that would require the most analysis.

Chapter 3:
The Theology of the "All Without Distinction" Reading of πᾶς

3.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 showed that the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς has become the standard Calvinist interpretation of several key soteriological verses within the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11). This reading has commended itself to the Calvinist tradition because it has been considered advantageous for defending teachings such as double predestination and limited atonement. This chapter takes up this thesis's second subsidiary research question: What are the major tenets of the Reformed Calvinist doctrine that limits the scope of the Father's merciful will and of the Son's atonement?

The first major section of this chapter explores the theological motivations for limiting the Father's merciful will by teaching double predestination within the Calvinist tradition. While double predestination was taught before Calvin,[5] this overview of the motivations for double predestination begins with Calvin, as Calvinism is where the strongest and most enduring tradition of teaching double predestination is found. This largely sequential overview will

[5] A double predestination was first taught by Augustine of Hippo (Sammons 2020, 24–28) and later by Fulgentius of Ruspe (35–36) and Gottschalk of Orbais (40–42). Theologians of the Late Middle Ages, such as John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Thomas Bradwardwine, and Gregory of Rimini, also held to a form of double predestination (50–57). Among the early Reformers, Martin Luther based a more moderate form (Kolb 1976, 325–26, 335–36) of double predestination on his distinction between the hidden and revealed will of God in *The Bondage of the Will* (Rosenthal 2002; Sammons 2020, 60–63). Luther's friend, Nikolaus von Amsdorf, took this teaching to a more extreme position (Kolb 1976). A double predestination was also advocated for by Ulrich Zwingli (Sammons 2020, 64–66).

continue with other Calvinist theologians instrumental in articulating this teaching before the Council of Dordt in 1618–1619, where it was made the official position of confessional Calvinism. This section also surveys writers from the following centuries to show the persisting motivations for this teaching of double predestination. This section concludes by synthesizing the motivations for double predestination within the Calvinist tradition.

The second major section of this chapter explores the theological motivations for limiting the scope of the Son's atonement to the elect within the Calvinist tradition. While limited atonement had been taught before the emergence of Calvinism,[6] this overview of the motivations for limited atonement begins with the Calvinist tradition, as Calvinism is where the strongest and most enduring tradition of teaching a limited atonement is found. After explaining why Calvin himself will not be used as an example for the doctrine of limited atonement, this largely sequential overview covers Calvinist theologians instrumental in articulating this teaching prior to the Council of Dordt in 1618–1619, where it was made the official position of confessional Calvinism. This section also surveys writers from the subsequent centuries to show the persisting motivations for this teaching of limited atonement. This section concludes by synthesizing the motivations for limited atonement within the Calvinist tradition.

The third major section of this chapter examines proposed alternatives to the "all without distinction" reading for understanding the key verses from the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11) in ways that do not contradict the teachings of double predestination and of limited atonement. The alternatives examined include Augustine's exclusivity reading, nonsoteriological meanings of σῴζω/σωτήρ, reading μάλιστα as a marker of specification in 1 Timothy 4:10, and reading πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις as dependent on ἐπεφάνη in Titus 2:11. This

[6] Isolated statements of Augustine have been identified that seem to show that he limited Christ's atonement so that it only pertained to the elect saved by it (Rainbow 1999, 11–16; Blacketer 2004, 308–10; Haykin 2013, 70–72). However, Allen has shown (2016, 16–24) that based on other statements the church father had made, such statements could instead be understood as limiting the application of a universal atonement. Augustine's follower, Prosper of Aquitaine, advocated for an atonement whose intent was restricted to the elect before later abandoning such a position (Haykin 2013, 72–73). The teaching of limited atonement was articulated more fully and defended more forcefully by the ninth-century monk Gottschalk of Orbais and his supporters (Rainbow 1999, 25–32; Gatiss 2012, 62–65; Hogg 2013, 76–80; Allen 2016, 24–26). The teaching is also found among eleventh-century writers such as Haymo and Guibert of Nogent (Rainbow 1999, 33). Peter Lombard gave his name to his much-cited formula that describes the atonement as being "sufficient for all, efficient for some" (Blacketer 2004, 311; Hogg 2013, 80–89; Allen 2016, 27).

section concludes by appraising the overall viability of these alternative interpretations as ways to preserve Calvinist teachings if the "all without distinction" reading were to be falsified.

The fourth major section of this chapter builds on the first three by exploring whether the primary concerns Calvinists have concerning predestination and atonement might still be honored even if the "all without distinction" reading were to be falsified and it became necessary for them to abandon the limits they have historically placed upon the scope of the Father's merciful will and of the Son's atonement. It synthesizes contributions from Scholasticism, confessional Lutheranism, and Anglicanism as to how the most important doctrinal commitments of Calvinism can be maintained without a double predestination or a limited atonement.

The concluding section synthesizes the findings of this chapter concerning the major tenets of these Reformed Calvinist doctrines in the form of three main observations. Together, these observations show what the consequence would be to the larger Calvinist doctrinal system if the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς can no longer be maintained.

3.2 Motivations for the Calvinist Doctrine of Double Predestination

3.2.1 Overview

John Calvin's assumption that God does not sincerely want the salvation of all people is a corollary of his larger views on predestination. Calvin believed that from eternity, God predestined some as the elect, whom he would convert and save, and others as the reprobate, whom he would leave unconverted and damn (*Inst*. 3.21–24; [1552a] 1856; [n.d.] 1954, 179). These views on predestination stem from a larger pattern of concerns regarding both theology proper and soteriology.

Theologically, Calvin maintained that God's will was the ultimate cause of everything that happens (*Inst*. 1.16–18; 3.23.8; [1552a] 1856, 164, 176; [1552b] 1857, 26–27). He explicitly rejected the idea that some things occur merely by God's permission and not by his active decree (*Inst*. 1.18.1; 3.23.8; [1552a] 1856, 25–26, 187; [1552b] 1857, 21, 24, 66–76; [n.d.] 1954, 180), a position that at that time was being advocated by Heinrich Bullinger (Sammons 2020, 72–74). Consequently, easily observable phenomena such as the fact that not all are converted (Calvin, *Inst*. 3.22.1, 7; 3.24.15–16) and that not all are even so privileged as to hear the gospel ([1552a] 1856, 87–89, 151) are considered proof to Calvin that God did not want to

save all people but instead had predestined that many be left unconverted and damned. As "dreadful" as Calvin admits it to be, the evil that occurs in the world, including the fall into sin and the eventual damnation of many people, must be regarded as having been actively decreed by God (*Inst*. 3.23.7).

Soteriologically, Calvin's primary concern regarding predestination to damnation was the ramifications of reprobation for election. He viewed the two divine acts as parallel and assumed a level of consistency between them (*Inst*. 3.23.1, 4; 3.24.12; [n.d.] 1954, 179; [1552a] 1856, 2, 58). Therefore, the different fates of the two groups had to have a common cause: God's will. Calvin sees reprobation as being wholly dependent on God's "uninfluenced will" (Sammons 2020, 69). Foreknowledge of men's sin is not allowed as a factor in God's decree because that sin itself could not happen except by God's decree (69–70). Because God's predestination of some to faith and salvation was not based on any quality or action on their part but had its sole cause within God's will (Calvin, *Inst*. 3.22.1–10; 3.24.1–3, 10–11; [1552a] 1856, 27, 30–31), Calvin insisted that God's predestination of others to unbelief and damnation must likewise have its ultimate cause within God's will (*Inst*. 3.21.7, 11; 3.22.11; 3.23.6; 3.24.12–14; [1552a] 1856, 60, 63–66, 98–99, 108). Under these assumptions, predestination to damnation is necessary to demonstrate and safeguard the fact that salvation is by grace alone and to God's glory alone (*Inst*. 3.21.1; [1552a] 1856, 12–13, 149). The crucial role that Calvin attributed to double predestination as support for the teaching of salvation by grace is shown in the final edition of his *Institutes*, in which he moved the treatment of predestination out of the locus on theology proper and into the locus on justification (Thomas 1997, 16).

To Calvin, the doctrine of reprobation was connected not only to the gracious character of salvation but also to the security of salvation. If people were the ultimate cause of their own unbelief and damnation, then by parallel, their perseverance in the faith and final salvation would ultimately depend on themselves and be insecure ([1552a] 1856, 120–22). However, Calvin points to God's predestining decree, which differentiates between people but not on the basis of anything within those people, as evidence that God's will is entirely free and sovereign as it acts (*Inst*. 3.21.6). From this sovereignty of the divine will over all creation, believers can know that their election will not fail and that God will preserve and save them (*Inst*. 3.24.4–9; [1552a] 1856, 11–12, 23–24, 36–37, 149).

Calvin's views on predestination continued within the tradition that bears his name. For example, Calvin's successor, Theodore Beza, expresses much the same views on predestination

in his debate with Jakob Andreae at the Colloquy of Montbéliard. Beza (1587, 586–87, 597) denies that God wants all people to be saved, arguing that God choosing to save some inherently entails him choosing to damn others (586, 606). Like Calvin, Beza refuses to make anything in people the cause of their reprobation based on the logical problem it would pose for election to locate the source of the differentiation within people (594). Beza saw great practical and homiletical value in the doctrine of predestination, and so the reformer's approach should not be characterized as rationalistic (Blacketer 2013, 126–27). Nevertheless, he did expect there to be a logical coherence to the teaching and he heavily utilized Aristotelian causality in systematizing everything under a single divine decree (Thomas 1997, 45). It is also fair to note that the article of predestination takes on a much more central role within Beza's overall theological system than it had within Calvin's (Allen 2016, 103).

Beza seems sensitive to the criticism Calvin and his followers received over their teachings concerning predestination. Consequently, Beza (1587) modulates from Calvin in two key yet contradictory ways. Unlike Calvin, Beza states that the cause of a person's damnation is that person's own sin and is unwilling to say that God is the cause of anyone's damnation (609–10). However, this is merely a softening of expression and not a substantive change, as Beza remains of the opinion that all that happens does so by God's decree (596) and that this damnation is what these people were created for (610). Beza is distinguishing between the cause of reprobation, which is solely God's will, and the cause of damnation, which is a person's sin (Sammons 2020, 75), even though both the sin and the damnation necessarily result from God's decreeing will.

Also unlike Calvin, Beza (1587) attempts to explain why it was fitting for God to predestine some to damnation. He argues that people were created for God's glory and, since God's glory is proclaimed through declarations of both his mercy and his justice, God decreed that some people would be the elect, through whom he would demonstrate his mercy, and some people would be the reprobate, through whom he would demonstrate his justice (599–601). For Beza, "predestination is not primarily about what it does for man, but how it manifests the glory of God" (Sammons 2020, 84).

Early English Calvinism operated under many of the same concerns and assumptions regarding the doctrine of election, as is apparent in the presentation of predestination by William Perkins (1617). Perkins denies that God wants all people to be saved because of logical consequences of that idea that he deems unacceptable, such as that it makes God's will ineffectual and that it

makes the human will determinative as to who is saved and who is not (627). He is concerned that those who attribute to God merely a universal but ineffective desire to save and who make a person's own faith or unbelief the cause of God's predestination end up making a person uncertain as to whether they will keep their faith, election, and salvation (632).

The continued argument against double predestination was that this teaching made God responsible for sin. So, much like Beza had done, Perkins strove to ensure that his own presentation of double predestination was not guilty of this charge (Sammons 2020, 84). As a result, Perkins (1617, 610–11) too views sin, not God, as the cause of damnation; however, he makes God the sole cause of the person being reprobated without any view to sin. He solves the logical problem this presents by clarifying the manner in which God wills evil. He argues that God does not will to cause evil, but he does will not to stop it (606, 613–15, 621). In this way, Perkins characterizes reprobation not as God causing someone's damnation but as God eternally decreeing that he would not stop the sin that caused their damnation (620). Perkins's student, William Ames (1639, 108), builds on these teachings to clarify that when God willed not to stop the damnation of many people, the damnation of those people was not the end of his act of reprobation but merely its means, as through it he would display his justice.

The teaching of double predestination, as taught by Calvin, Beza, and Perkins, became the official position of confessional Calvinism over against Arminianism in 1619 in the Canons of Dordt. While the Canons make people the cause of their own damnation (1.1.5), this happens as a result of God's eternal decree (1.1.6), which is unchangeable (1.1.11) and is based on no quality or action in any person (1.1.9–10). This reprobation is regarded as demonstrating the gracious character of election (1.1.15).

Calvinist theologians in the subsequent centuries carried on this teaching of double predestination. An eighteenth-century example of one such Calvinist theologian is John Gill. While Gill (1796, 1.284–85) distinguishes between God's acts of passing over individuals and of pre-damning them, he makes God the efficient cause of both these acts (1.287–88) and says that the impulsive cause was God's will and not anything in those people (1.288). He assumes that these acts must have the same qualities as God's acts of electing to faith and salvation (1.289). As a result, reprobation cannot be caused by anything in people (289), and it must also be a decree that predestines specific people to wrath (290).

In the nineteenth century, Charles Hodge ([1872] 1940, 331–32) explains the Calvinist system of double predestination as nothing more than to apply to the matter of salvation four more general theological principles: (1) that God has absolute control over all things, (2) that this control includes rational creatures in a way that does not rob them of free will, (3) that God has a plan and a purpose in all he does, and (4) that we can observe this divine design by what has happened because if something has happened, it must have happened by God's design. As further proof that the Calvinist system is correct, he touts its internal harmony and consistency—it admits no conflict within God's will or unaccomplished divine purposes (334–35). Hodge finds this system to be the necessary result of teachings such as the sovereignty of God's will, the grounding of election in God and not the nature of a human being, the depravity effected by the fall, the inability of human beings to cooperate in their salvation, the gracious character of salvation, the efficacy of Christ's atoning work, and the certainty of the Spirit's preserving work. He argues that no other system manages to maintain all of these teachings (339–47).

On the other hand, the other well-known Charles within nineteenth-century Calvinism, Charles Spurgeon (1880, 50), states that he values Scripture too highly to force its teachings to fit an internally coherent system. Consequently, he has no issue accepting that God wants all to be saved and leaving as a mystery the reason why God does not do what he wants to do (50–51).

Loraine Boettner's (1932, 1) twentieth-century "re-statement" of Calvinism emphasizes that predestination to salvation entails predestination to damnation, such that the former cannot logically exist without the latter (104–5, 123). Like the Calvinists before him, Boettner locates the different destinies of the elect and the reprobate in the divine will (104); however, an important softening of this position is apparent. He makes human sin to be the cause of reprobation, while adding the careful qualification that it is original sin and not a particular individual's continuance in sin or degree of sin (113–15). In this way, Boettner can assert that God is the sole cause of the salvation of the elect, yet the damned are the sole cause of their damnation (115). He explains the purpose of God's reprobation of individuals as being primarily a means to demonstrate God's justice and his wrath against sin (121). Secondarily, it is also a way to display to the elect more clearly what they have been saved from, which would bring them to greater appreciation, trust, and love (122).

These historical views remain in the twenty-first century. Essentially the same presentation is found in contemporary Calvinist treatments of election and reprobation (Daniel 2019, 397–

411, 426–31; Sammons 2022). God's sovereign will, and not anything in a human being, is considered the cause of God passing over certain individuals, although the damnation of those people is attributed to their sin (Daniel 2019, 404; Sammons 2022, 119–31). That God does not want to save all people is considered the necessary corollary to God's sovereign, unconditional election of some particular people to salvation apart from any merit in those people (Daniel 2019, 406–7; Sammons 2022, 158–61).

However, much like Charles Spurgeon (1880, 50–51), some contemporary Calvinists, such as John Piper (2000), Thomas Schreiner (2003, 381–83), and Bruce Ware (2006, 32–35), are more comfortable with letting an unconditional particular election coexist with a universal desire for salvation. They maintain that God indeed wants all to be saved but does not do so because there is something else that he wants and wants more: to more fully display his glory by exercising his wrath and demonstrating that he alone is responsible for salvation. Nevertheless, if God's desire to save some individuals is considered to be less than his desire to damn them, it is fair to question whether such a doctrinal formulation is interpreting passages such as 1 Timothy 2:4 ("God wants all people to be saved") as clear and straightforward assertions of God's sincere will (Deutschlander 2015, 368).

3.2.2 Analysis

Although the Calvinist tradition has displayed a range of opinions on how best to define the ultimate causes of reprobation and of damnation in a manner that preserves both God's sovereignty and goodness and also human culpability, there has been a general agreement that God has excluded many individuals from his desire to save. However, the overriding concern in presenting reprobation is always to protect election. Predestination must be double; otherwise, the single predestination to salvation becomes logically unviable.

Election and salvation must have their cause entirely within God's will—no foreseen quality or action of a person can be considered the reason why God chose one person and did not choose another. The natural implication of this is that there is a difference within God's will that effects the different eternal outcomes of different people: some God wills to save, while others he wills to leave unsaved. This inference is one that the Calvinist tradition has accepted.

In turn, the Calvinist tradition has largely rejected the claim that God intends the salvation of all people. This rejection is due to perceived logical complications that a universal merciful will presents to the idea of God's election being entirely free and sovereign. If God wanted all

people to be saved, and yet all are not saved, the reason why some are not saved would have to be found in those people. The further implication of this would be that the reason why the others were saved was located in them. Under such assumptions, human beings would be the determining factor responsible for their own salvation, and God's will would be subordinated to a human being's will, unable to effect what it desires. The Calvinist tradition has recognized that both of these teachings, present within the Arminian system, would take away from God's glory in being the sole cause of all things, especially of salvation. These teachings would also take away from believers' comfort, as their salvation, now in part dependent on them, is rendered uncertain.

While many Calvinists assume a parallel between election and reprobation and that, logically, predestination to salvation must imply predestination to damnation, it would be wrong to attribute the Calvinist belief in double predestination to merely a desire for logical consistency and internal coherence. While its touted consistency becomes an increasingly significant aspect of its preferential claims under Hodge, the principle of consistency is more an underlying assumption behind the Calvinist teaching of predestination than a motivation for it. The motivation for double predestination is to preserve the truth that God is the sole cause of election and salvation.

Notably, there have been a few voices within the Calvinist tradition who have eschewed the assumption of an entirely coherent system. Boettner (1932) maintains God's role as the sole cause of election and salvation even while making human beings the sole cause of their reprobation and damnation. More to the point, Spurgeon (1880), Piper (2000), Schreiner (2003), and Ware (2006) maintain God's sovereign election of some individuals while also acknowledging a general divine desire to save all people. The fact that some Calvinists already hold both these views suggests that if the Calvinist "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς is falsified and it became necessary to attribute to God a universal merciful will, there is a way for Calvinists to preserve the important teachings they use this reading to defend, provided that the assumption of complete internal consistency is abandoned.

3.3 Motivations for the Calvinist Doctrine of Limited Atonement

3.3.1 Overview

While the doctrine of limited atonement is most associated with the Calvinist tradition, it is doubtful whether Calvin himself held such a view. Some maintain that a limited atonement is

at least implicit within his theological system, even if he did not articulate such a teaching to the degree that later Calvinists did (Nicole 1985; Rainbow 1990, 64–185; Leahy 1992; Blacketer 2004, 313–15; Gatiss 2012, 70–75; Nettles 2012; Helm 2013; Blocher 2013, 550–51). However, a strong case has been made that Calvin considered the scope of the atonement to be universal (Daniel 1983, 777–828; Kennedy 2010; Ponter 2012, 2013; Allen 2016, 48–96, 670–76; Hartog 2021).

Determining Calvin's views on the atonement is outside the scope of this thesis. However, the possibility that Calvin had no such doctrine of limited atonement makes him a poor candidate for this overview of the Calvinist doctrine of limited atonement. Instead, the overview begins with the first Calvinist who all agree taught limited atonement: Theodore Beza (Blacketer 2013, 123, 135–37; Allen 2016, 102–6). The more central systematic role Beza gave to predestination, compared to Calvin, seems to have led him to the strong conclusion that, just as God's desire to save is limited to the elect, so too is Christ's atonement (Allen 2016, 104–5).

Beza is first found limiting the atonement in his debate with Jakob Andreae at the Colloquy of Montbéliard (Allen 2016, 103). In a dismissal of Andreae's appeal to the Lombardian Formula (Blacketer 2004, 317), Beza (1588, 624–26) acknowledges that Christ's death certainly would have been sufficient for all people had God wanted it to benefit all people; however, he denies that Christ actually died for them. He argues that if Christ had died for all people, then they would, of necessity, be saved. Implicit within this argument is the assumption that God always accomplishes his intentions, and so Christ's death has such efficacy that everyone for whom Christ's death was intended will be saved. For Beza, "the divine intention is coextensive with the effect" (Blacketer 2013, 136) because, within his more predestination-centered system, it was necessary to "explicitly trace the effectiveness of the atonement to the divine predestination" (Thomas 1997, 57).

This implicit logic is more fully articulated in William Perkins (1617). Perkins too acknowledges that, in and of itself, Christ's death was sufficient to redeem all people and, in a sense, can be said to be for all people, yet as pertains to its divinely intended outcome, he claims that it was only for the elect (609, 621). Perkins rejects the idea that a person could be redeemed from sin by Christ and yet still be ruled over by sin and ultimately damned, as this would make Christ not a real redeemer and would mean that the saving work God had done in Christ had been undone (622, 628). Perkins likewise rejects the idea that Christ merely merited salvation

by his death and did not actually accomplish it (609). He states that if Christ had really stood in people's place in his saving work, then it would be as if they themselves had done that work, and so they would stand forgiven (609). On this basis, Perkins concludes that since some remain unsanctified, unadopted, unforgiven, and unsaved, they must also have not been redeemed (609, 621–22). Perkins tends to be strident in his responses to universal atonement (Allen 2016, 128) because he regards any attempt to separate redemption from deliverance—such that one could be redeemed and yet not ultimately delivered unless some other condition is met—as reminiscent of Pelagianism (Perkins 1617, 639).

Perkins's student, William Ames (1639), shared his teacher's opinions on the extent of the atonement. He argues that Christ's redemptive act and its application must be coextensive (Allen 2016, 128–29) because God would not have left the outcome of Christ's work uncertain and because otherwise salvation will be made to depend on a person's own free will (Ames 1639, 100). Like Perkins, Ames is comfortable saying that there is a sense in which Christ can be said to have died for all people, namely, concerning sufficiency. Yet at the same time, he also states that concerning intention, Christ only died for those who were ultimately saved (100–101). Allen (2016, 129–31) sees both Ames and Perkins as espousing a milder form of limited atonement than is found elsewhere within the Calvinist tradition, one which at times does see the death of Christ as making satisfaction for the sins of all people, even if not intended to redeem or save them.

This teaching of limited atonement became the official position of confessional Calvinism in 1619 in the Canons of Dordt. After admitting that Christ's death was sufficient to pay for the sins of all people (2.1.3), the Canons state that this redeeming work was intended to extend only to the elect (2.1.8). Moving beyond the sufficiency–efficiency distinction of the Lombardian Formula, the position on atonement articulated at Dordt revolves around a sufficiency–intention distinction (Gatiss 2012, 82–83, 89–90; 2013, 149–50, 153–54). However, for the sake of employing wording amenable to the more moderate position on the atonement held by English Calvinists such as John Davenant, the Canons leave open whether the atonement is intended for only the elect merely with respect to application or also with respect to accomplishment at the cross (Allen 2016, 149–57). The Canons do not specifically rule out that, in addition to the predestination of the elect being the motivation, a general love for mankind may be perceived as motivating the atonement in some sense (Thomas 1997, 133).

However, the Canons do exclude the idea that God actually intended to save all people by Christ's death (Gatiss 2012, 89).

The Canons further reject as Pelagian any distinction between meriting and appropriating, as if Christ earned something for people that they do not receive except on the basis of their will (2.2.6). They also dismiss the idea that Christ was merely buying the right to set faith as the condition people had to meet to be saved (2.2.2–4).

Several decades later, John Owen's ([1648] 1862) four-book work, *The Death of Death in the Death of Christ*, represented the most extensive defense of limited atonement produced to date. His first book (157–200) focuses on the connection between Christ's priestly acts of sacrificing himself and of intercession. Because Owen viewed all of Christ's mediatorial work wholistically and as all being grounded on the single covenant of redemption (Trueman 2013, 214, 221), he argues that these two priestly acts must have the same scope. Therefore, because Christ only mediates for the elect, and effectively so, he also only redeemed the elect, and effectively so.

Book 2 (Owen [1648] 1862, 200–235) responds to two distinctions to which opponents of limited atonement have appealed. To those distinguishing between the intent of Christ's death and its actual effect, Owen responds that this would make Christ's death ineffective (200–216). Not allowing for Christ's work to have merely a potential effect, Owen assumes that "either the cross reconciled sinners or it did not" (Allen 2016, 197). If Christ's death is said to do things such as sanctify, redeem, and adopt, then Owen ([1648] 1862) concludes that such a death for all would be rendered ineffective in that not all stand as holy and free children of God by it. He further argues that it would undermine the sovereignty of God to say that Christ's death was intended not to redeem people but to buy God the right to forgive people as if he could not already do whatever he wanted (205–7).

To those distinguishing between the benefits of Christ's death being obtained for people and being applied to people, Owen ([1648] 1862, 232) acknowledges that such a distinction can be made, because they are two separate acts. However, he maintains that this distinction is not a proper way to resolve the matter of the extent of the atonement (223–35). He states that if something is actually obtained for a person, then they have it (225), and so these two acts of obtaining and application pertain to the same people (223–26). Owen rejects that faith could

be the condition for Christ's death to be applied to a person because this would make the value of Christ's death dependent on faith instead of the other way around (234–36).

Owen's ([1648] 1862, 236–94) third book develops many of the same ideas as the first two books, presenting them as a series of sixteen arguments for limited atonement. Arguments 1 (236–38), 2 (238–40), 6 (246–69), 8 (249–53), and 11–15 (258–90) are all based on the more general argument that if Christ's redemptive work were intended for all people, then it would have effectively delivered them and they would have received all its benefits: "Owen arrived at God's intention directly from its outcome. Thus, every statement in Scripture concerning the result of Christ's work becomes a statement of the intention of that work" (Allen 2016, 206). Arguments 3 (Owen [1648] 1862, 240–43) and 9 (253–57) argue that the significance of Christ's death cannot be conditional upon faith because Christ's death is itself the cause and the object of faith. One of Owen's key assumptions is that Christ's death purchased faith for the elect (Allen 2016, 197, 205, 213–14, 218–19). In the fourth book, Owen ([1648] 1862, 294–421) seeks to refute the arguments that have been made in favor of unlimited atonement.

Owen ([1648] 1862, 200) considered the controversy over the extent of the atonement to be a debate over the purpose of the atonement. Since he finds it unacceptable to say that Christ failed to accomplish God's purposes in his death, Owen finds the teaching of unlimited atonement to be the same as saying that God had no real purposes in mind for Christ's death (159–60). Because Owen categorically rejects the idea of a purposeless act of divine redemption, he also rejects that God purposed the atonement to be for all people (192).

In the eighteenth century, John Gill (1796), in his defense of limited atonement, outlines several ways in which he considers unlimited atonement to contradict and undermine the attributes of God. According to Gill, God's love would be reduced to being unable to effectively secure salvation, devalued by its pertaining equally to the damned as to the saved, rendered fickle by God acting in contrary ways toward the same persons, and shown to be shallow by its failure to actually share the gospel with and convert all (2.174). God's justice would be undermined by the fact that he would have to punish the same sins more than once (2.174). God's immutability would be undermined if he is inconsistent toward a person, wanting variously to both save and damn them (2.174–75). Ultimately, God's wisdom, power, and glory would be negated by his inability to accomplish his purposes of saving all people (2.173–75).

Gill (1796) further outlines several ways in which he considers unlimited atonement to negate the value of Christ's work. According to Gill, if people for whom Christ died were still punished, then Christ's death would have to be incomplete, not providing real satisfaction or real atonement for sin (2.175–76). Ultimately, Christ's death being useless for so many of the people for whom he died means that people would be unable to find a sense of comfort and security in it (2.176–77). Gill states that there is greater encouragement to be had from the idea that some have been given a sure salvation than from the idea that all have been given an unsure salvation (177).

The man who pastored Gill's New Park Street Chapel in the nineteenth century, Charles Spurgeon, often spoke against Arminianism in his sermons. Despite at times showing inconsistencies in how he spoke of the relationship of Christ's atoning work to the nonelect (Allen 2016, 503–6), in two of his sermons Spurgeon (1859, 70–71, 130, 135–36) offers extended comments on the extent of the atonement. He argues that the Calvinist practice of limiting the extent of the atonement is preferable to, and is actually less limiting of Christ's work than, the Arminian practice of limiting the efficacy of the atonement. This is because, within the Arminian system, an individual must still do something to be saved, which would prevent a person from receiving any certain comfort from the fact that Christ died for them. To illustrate why the Calvinist limitation is better than the Arminian limitation, Spurgeon memorably compares them to two bridges (136). He says that the narrow Calvinist bridge that goes completely across the stream is better and more useful than the wide Arminian bridge that only goes half the way across the gap.

A similar but more systematic presentation of limited atonement is found in Charles Hodge ([1872] 1940). Reappearing in Hodge's treatment of the extent of the atonement is the same desire for a neat and tidy system that he displayed when discussing the extent of God's merciful will. Hodge states that election and limited atonement fit together so closely that accepting one requires accepting the other, and denying one requires denying the other (547–48). He claims that the Calvinist teaching of limited atonement is the only system that can synthesize the following four scriptural teachings: (1) that God has given Christ a special people, (2) that God's special love for his people is the motive for and purpose of sending Christ, (3) that Christ came as the substitute and federal head of that special people, and (4) that the salvation of that special people is certain (553–54).

While Hodge ([1872] 1940) remains adamant that Christ died to make atonement specifically for the elect, he is willing to posit that Christ's death did have some reference to the nonelect (545–46) because he recognizes that there are Scripture passages that teach that Christ died for all (558–61). However, the benefits that he says Christ obtained for the nonelect by his death (558) would all appear quite vacuous. Hodge says Christ's death obtained them the blessings they enjoy in this life because it postponed their otherwise immediate condemnation. He says it also provided for the universal offer of the gospel by which it is made clear that they are to blame for their condemnation. In that Christ's death would be serving to clarify and increase their guilt and shame, this latter benefit intended for the nonelect seems to be more curse than blessing.

Loraine Boettner's (1932) twentieth-century treatment of the extent of the atonement is in line with that of Spurgeon and Hodge before him. He ties election and limited atonement very closely together, saying that you cannot have one without the other (151). The question of the atonement's extent is considered a question about the atonement's nature. Since not all are saved, the atonement must either apply to all without saving them or only to some while saving them (150, 152). Like Spurgeon, Boettner argues that the Arminian teaching of atonement is just as limiting as the Calvinist teaching of atonement, only that it limits the power of the atonement instead of its extent (153). According to Boettner, an unlimited atonement cannot be true because it would mean God had failed to carry out all his intended redemptive work, which would diminish God's love for his people and the glory of Christ's atoning work (159). Like Hodge, Boettner allows that there was some sense in which Christ died for all, as all receive some benefit from it. However, these benefits are restricted to the temporal sphere and they do not coincide with a sincere desire to save all people (160–61).

A few years later, Louis Berkhof (1936, 149–62) makes the same arguments for limited atonement. He rejects all other views on the atonement chiefly on the grounds that they separate the extent of God's intent for the atonement from the extent of its actual result (155–56). He finds it absurd that Christ would have paid for someone's sins, and yet that person still has to pay for them themselves. As a result, he considers Calvinism (i.e., not all are atoned for, but all who are atoned for are saved) and Universalism (i.e., all are atoned for and all are saved) to be the only theological systems that are logically coherent (162).

These historical views remain, as essentially the same presentation is found in contemporary Calvinist treatments of the atonement (Gatiss 2012; Gibson and Gibson 2013a; Trueman 2015;

Daniel 2019, 509–31; Horton 2019). The question of the atonement's extent is framed in terms of Christ's intent in the atonement to die as the substitute for particular persons (Gatiss 2012, 10–14; Gibson and Gibson 2013b, 46; Williams 2013; Daniel 2019, 507, 509, 516–17; Horton 2019, 121–24). The effective nature of Christ's atoning work (Gatiss 2012, 10–11, 31–35; Gibson and Gibson 2013b, 51; Trueman 2015, 40–41, 47, 55–56; Daniel 2019, 514–16; Horton 2019, 126–27), coupled with the fact that not all are saved (Gatiss 2012, 18; Williams 2013, 480; Horton 2019, 129–30), is taken as decisive that God did not intend for Christ to make saving atonement for all people. A common scope for all God's saving acts is assumed to be the necessary and natural consequence of unity within the Trinity (Gatiss 2012, 13; Gibson and Gibson 2013b, 49–51; Macleod 2013, 343; Letham 2013; Trueman 2015, 25–26, 47) and of unity within Christ's office and work (Gibson and Gibson 2013b, 45–51; Macleod 2013, 434–35; Wellum 2013; Trueman 2015, 25–26, 46; Daniel 2019, 509–10, 519; Horton 2019, 118–21). One key aspect of the previous argumentation that has been expanded upon in recent years has been the identification of additional universal purposes intended for a limited atonement.

Gary Shultz Jr. (2013) has attempted to articulate a more moderating position on the extent of the atonement, a position he calls the "multi-intentioned view." Shultz believes that Scripture does make Christ's death a payment for the sin of all people, not just some (54–88), and so he seeks to harmonize that with the Calvinist assumption that the atonement accomplished its particular designs for the elect (1–11). Shultz greatly expands on Hodge's list of general, universal benefits to the atonement. To the universal nature of the gospel invitation (90–98), the increase of guilt on the part of the condemned (98–101), and the temporal blessings of natural gifts, restrained evil, and delayed judgment (101–6), Shultz adds that the atonement reveals God's love (106–10), triumphs over all sin (110–14), reconciles all things (114–18), causes the resurrection of both believers and unbelievers (118–19), and displays Christ's office as king (119–20). However, none of these general results that Shultz attributes to the atonement provide any enduring benefit to those who are not the elect. Shultz also still does restrict any desire to save by the atonement to God's particular intention for the elect (122–52).

More nuanced Calvinist attempts to synthesize universal and particular intentions of the atonement have been made by D. A. Carson (2000, 73–79) and John Hammett (2015). Carson (2000, 77) adds to the traditional sufficiency–efficiency distinction by saying that it should be believed that "Scripture portrays God as inviting, commanding and desiring the salvation of all, out of love." However, Carson's use of the word "portray" seems to imply that this is the

way God wants to be seen, not the way he actually is. Hammett (2015, 151, 157, 162, 193), on the other hand, more clearly articulates that he sees Scripture as saying that God had a universal intent in the atonement, but that the intent was merely to make provision for the salvation of all, not to actually save all.

Millard Erickson (2013, 760–61) rejects the position that the extent of the atonement can be deduced from other doctrines, including even that of election. He advocates for a more moderate Calvinist position that returns to the Lombardian Formula as a way to synthesize the beneficial aspects of limited and unlimited atonement: "Jesus provided salvation for all people, but actually accomplished it for the elect" (762). However, Erickson never directly addresses the question at the heart of the debate: In providing salvation to all, is there a sense in which God actually desired or intended the salvation of all? Additionally, in light of how doctrinal positions have developed over the past five centuries, attempting to recycle the Lombardian Formula would not resolve debates over the extent of the atonement but would merely sidestep them. Both Calvinist and Arminian writers have appealed to the formula as if it supports them, assuming very different meanings for "sufficient" and "efficient" (Allen 2016, 31).

3.3.2 Analysis

The Calvinist teaching of limited atonement is motivated by many of the same theological concerns as is the teaching of double predestination. This similarity is unsurprising, as these two beliefs tend to be held by the same persons, and many of them consider a limited atonement the natural consequence of a double predestination. An adherence to double predestination was seen to be motivated more by what it means for the elect than by what it means for the reprobate. Similarly, an adherence to limited atonement is motivated more by what it means for the redeemed than by what it means for the unredeemed.

The primary Calvinist concern in limited atonement is not to restrict the extent of the atonement but to safeguard its effectiveness in light of the fact that not all people will ultimately be saved. The Calvinist reasons that if Christ's death were intended for all, and yet not all were effectively saved by it, then no one can be effectively saved by it, because Christ's atoning work would be insufficient to save on its own without some other condition being met. Such a view is considered a rejection of the intrinsic power of Christ's act of redemption and as undermining God's role as the sole cause of salvation by introducing the need for people to do something before receiving salvation. Therefore, the historical Calvinist position has been to restrict

Christ's atoning death in its extent so that it was only intended for the elect. The result of this is that Christ's death can be positively viewed as effecting salvation for those people on its own, even if this salvation is not intended for all.

The same relationship with logical coherence and doctrinal systematization is apparent in the Calvinist teaching of limited atonement as is seen in its teaching of double predestination. As the debate over the extent of the atonement developed over the centuries, the Calvinist argumentation for a limited atonement increasingly appealed to logic and internal coherence as proof that its position was correct. There was a growing tendency to criticize the logic of the Arminian position and accuse it of attributing to God a double-exacting of punishment and an atonement that intended the salvation of no one at all. However, as with double predestination, the Calvinist doctrine of limited atonement should be seen as assuming there is a logic and coherence to God's actions but not as being primarily motivated by a desire for internal logical coherence (Blacketer 2004, 322).

The concerns behind limited atonement are practical in nature, because they relate to how a believer should view the death of Christ. If Christ died for all, but that death did not actually effect salvation, and many of the people for whom Christ died are still ultimately lost, it becomes difficult to see what concrete consolation a believer can take in the fact that Christ died for them. Because of this, the Calvinist perceives there to be more comfort for the believer in knowing that, even though Christ did not die for everyone, those he died for certainly will be saved.

Many Calvinists have acknowledged that there are senses in which Christ can be said to have died for all people. Most commonly, they attribute to Christ's death a power sufficient to have paid for the sins of all people had that been what God intended by his death. Some have articulated further universal intentions that they believe God to have had in Christ's atoning death, but they stop short of attributing to God an actual desire to save all people by it.

In section 3.3.1, it was seen that some Calvinists have given up the assumption of internal consistency and maintain both a particular divine election and a universal desire to save. If the Calvinist "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς is falsified and, consequently, any basis for denying God's desire to save all people is removed, this precedent of positing multiple intentions in the atonement may serve as a way to still honor the Calvinists' primary concerns and commitments over the extent of the atonement. Christ's atoning death could be seen as

paying for the sins of the world in a way that is divinely intended for all people and yet does, of its own power, effectively save the elect.

3.4 Alternative Exegetical Methods for Interpreting Key Verses in Keeping with Calvinist Doctrines of Double Predestination and Limited Atonement

3.4.1 Augustine's exclusivity reading

Besides the "all without distinction" reading, Augustine proposes an additional way that someone could interpret 1 Timothy 2:4 not to be saying that God desires the salvation of all people. In this other interpretation, the statement that God wants all people to be saved merely means that all people who are saved are saved because God wants them to be (*Ep*. 149.17; *Enchir*. 103; *Ep*. 217.19; *C. Jul*. 4.8.44). Under such a reading, "all" denotes not the universality of God's desire to save but the exclusivity of salvation by God's will.

Augustine offers several potential parallels for this kind of exclusivity reading; however, it is doubtful that any of these parallels have the meaning Augustine attributes to them. He understands John 1:9, "the true light that enlightens every person," as meaning merely that all who are enlightened are enlightened only by the light of Christ (*Enchir*. 103). However, the verse's standard interpretation throughout most of church history was to understand it as speaking of the natural illumination that consists of the endowment of reason (Miller 1993, 70–74), and Augustine himself seems to follow such a reading elsewhere (*Civ.* 10.2). Calvin ([1553] 1994, 1:9) also favored this "natural illumination" interpretation. Despite articulating concerns about reading John 1:9 as teaching as a universal offer of illumination, Calvin states that he finds Augustine's exclusivity reading to be an unpreferable interpretation of the verse.

Two other options for understanding John 1:9 have been proposed, both of which are simpler and more in keeping with the context of John's Gospel. The word φωτίζω, "give light," could be speaking not of inner illumination but of an outward revelatory shining (Brown 1974, 9; Köstenberger 2009, 181). Assuming this meaning in John 1:9, this verse would correspond with John 1:4 to speak of the true light's entrance into the world as being the beacon emitted to all people in the world. Alternatively, φωτίζω does not have to denote bringing something to light in the sense of spiritual illumination; it can just as easily speak of bringing something to light in the sense of publicly revealing it (BDAG, s.v.). Assuming this meaning for φωτίζω in John 1:9, this verse would correspond with John 3:19–21 to speak of the true light as being the one who shines into the darkness, either bringing people into the light or revealing them for

what they are (Carson 1991, 124; Beasley-Murray 1999, 12; Weinrich 2015, 150). Regardless of which of these interpretations of the verse one adheres to, Augustine's use of John 1:9 as evidence for his exclusivity reading of 1 Timothy 2:4 remains unconvincing.

The second and third passages Augustine cites to make the same point (Rom 5:18; 1 Cor 15:22) are found in comparisons between Adam and Christ. Augustine (*C. Jul*. 4.8.42–44; 6.24.80) interprets Romans 5:18, "so also through one righteous act the result is life-bringing justification for all people," as stating that it is only through Christ's actions that any people receive such blessings. He further interprets 1 Corinthians 15:22, "in Christ all will be made alive," as stating that it is only through Christ that any people will be made alive (*Ep*. 217.19). Both of these Augustinian readings, however, run counter to the direction in which Paul is arguing. The question under discussion in Romans 5:12–21 is what the extent of the gracious gift is, not who it is that brings this gift.[7] Similarly, the question under discussion in 1 Corinthians 15 is whether there is a resurrection, not who it is that effects an already acknowledged resurrection.[8]

Augustine's suggestion to understand 1 Timothy 2:4 as expressing exclusivity and not universality requires straining the argumentation not only of his proposed parallel examples but also of 1 Timothy 2. Augustine's parallels denote dynamic events (φωτίζω in John 1:9, εἰς denoting a caused effect in Rom 5:18, ζῳοποιέω in 1 Cor 15:22), while 1 Timothy 2:4 speaks not directly of God's action of saving people but of his stative attitude (θέλω) of wanting to save all people. Even granting an exclusivity reading of the verse, it would not say that those that are saved are saved only by God's will, but that those whose salvation is desired have their salvation desired by God alone. Not only is it false that no human being desires the salvation of any human being (including their own), but such a reading runs counter to the direction of Paul's argument. The question under discussion in 1 Tim 2:1–8 is whom God wants prayers to be offered for, not who it is who wants prayers to be offered for all people.

[7] See especially the fact that the previous section (5:1–11) assumed that Jesus was the agent who brought God's gifts and was arguing for what the gifts are that are had in him, that the digression in 5:15–17 concerned not the identity of either of the two men but what was given through them, and that the section concludes with a statement of the expansive rule of grace not of the exclusivity of Christ's agency in bringing that rule about.

[8] See especially vv. 12, 20, 29–30, 35, which show that the denial of the resurrection was the false opinion that Paul was addressing.

3.4.2 Nonsoteriological readings of σῴζω/σωτήρ

Another alternative way to explain these verses is by positing a more general meaning for "save" and "Savior," according to which these words speak to God's temporal preservation and not God's bestowing of eternal salvation. This interpretation may have first appeared in Luther's use of glosses such as *genesen* and *geholffen* in translating 1 Timothy 2:4 (Green 1995, 284), and it is found in explanations of 1 Timothy 4:10 made by Gill (1796, 2.184), Smyth (1830, 67–69), Wardlaw (1857, 476–77), and Baugh (1992, 333–38).

However, while σῴζω can speak of a saving from noneternal dangers (BDAG, s.v.), throughout the Pauline corpus it is consistently used to denote eternal salvation (NIDNTTE, s.v.).[9] Additionally, in 1 Timothy 2:4, "being saved" is connected with "coming to the knowledge of the truth," an expression that elsewhere in the Pastoral Epistles collocates with "repentance" (2 Tim 2:25) and "faith" (Titus 1:1). The term "truth" in these letters is often a reference to the gospel as it has been divinely revealed (NIDNTTE, s.v. ἀλήθεια). Consequently, interpreting σῴζω in a more general manner that is not otherwise found in Paul would not mitigate the theological difficulties that such an interpretation is intended to address. Still, 1 Timothy 2:4 would state that God wants all people to be brought to faith.

Similarly, σωτήρ can be used in more general ways (BDAG, s.v.), but there is no clear example of it having such a meaning in any of its NT usages.[10] Foerster (1964, s.v.) further observes how often in the Pastoral Epistles, the sense in which Jesus is said to be "Savior" is explicated by a trailing description of his redemptive work. All this makes it unlikely that σωτήρ merely means "preserver" in 1 Timothy 4:10, and it becomes even more unlikely when one considers the fact that the context of this verse is already discussing the promise of the life to come (v. 8).

3.4.3 μάλιστα as a marker of specification

Theodore Skeat (1979) suggests that μάλιστα might sometimes mark the specification of a more general designation ("that is" or "namely") instead of its more accepted use as restricting

[9] Rom 5:9–10; 8:24; 9:27; 10:9, 13; 11:14, 26; 1 Cor 1:18, 21; 3:15; 5:5; 7:16; 9:22; 10:33; 15:2; 2 Cor 2:15; Eph 2:5, 8; 1 Thess 2:16; 2 Thess 2:10; 1 Tim 1:15; 2:15; 4:16; 2 Tim 1:9; 4:18; Titus 3:5. Of these passages only σῴζω in 1 Tim 2:15, a famously unclear and much-debated verse, has been interpreted as speaking of something other than eternal salvation.

[10] Luke 1:47; 2:11; John 4:42; Acts 5:31; 13:23; Eph 5:23; Phil 3:20; 1 Tim 1:1; 2:3; 2 Tim 1:10; Titus 1:3–4; 2:10, 13; 3:4, 6; 2 Pet 1:1, 11; 2:20; 3:2, 18; 1 Jn 4:14; Jude 25.

the broader designation (“especially” or “above all”). While Skeat gives this meaning for μάλιστα in 1 Timothy 4:10, his primary concern is to make the “books” and the “parchments” mentioned in 2 Timothy 4:13 coreferential. In their commentaries on the Pastoral Epistles, Knight (1992, 203–4) and Marshall and Towner (1999, 556–57) appeal to Skeat’s alternative definition for μάλιστα as the way to resolve the theological difficulties posed by 1 Timothy 4:10. According to such a reading, the passage would be stating that God is the Savior of all people, namely, believers. However, such a meaning of μάλιστα is unknown to Greek lexicographers (LSJ, s.v.; LN, s.v.; BDAG, s.v.; GE, s.v.; Martínez and Yamuza 2017, 584–90). Poythress (2002) has further shown that the specifying meaning of μάλιστα is unconvincing within each of the passages for which Skeat advocates it.

3.4.4 πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις as dependent on ἐπεφάνη

Gill (1796, 2.184) evades the relevance of Titus 2:11 to discussions over the extent of the atonement by reading πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις as dependent on the main verb ἐπεφάνη instead of on the adjective σωτήριος. By his reading, the verse would be stating not that God’s grace is salvific for all people but that it both is saving (for some) and also appeared to all people. Such an interpretation, however, overlooks the way that σωτήριος itself is functioning within the sentence. The anarthrous adjective following an arthrous noun is not an attributive adjective but is in second predicate position (Wallace 1996, 308). Consequently, σωτήριος is itself dependent on ἐπεφάνη as a subject adjunct communicating the manner in which the subject carried out the action being predicated of it (Von Siebenthal 2019, §259n). “Bearing salvation,” then, is not just a general description of God’s grace but is specifically a description of how God’s grace made its appearance (Knight 1992, 319). Even if πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις were dependent on ἐπεφάνη instead of on σωτήριος, it would still be asserting that God’s grace made its appearance to all people in a salvation-bearing manner. Such an understanding would do little to keep this verse from saying that God, in some sense, intends the salvation of all people. Nevertheless, the more standard interpretation that reads πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις as dependent on σωτήριος is the far more likely reading anyways, since σωτήριος is much closer to πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις in the sentence than is ἐπεφάνη, and since σωτήριος with the dative is an established idiom (LSJ, s.v., 1.b; BDAG, s.v., a; GE, s.v.).

3.4.5 Analysis

All four of these alternative exegetical methods for understanding these verses in ways that do not undermine Calvinist teachings about predestination and atonement—Augustine's exclusivity reading, nonsoteriological readings of σῴζω/σωτήρ, reading μάλιστα as a marker of specification in 1 Timothy 4:10, and making πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις dependent on ἐπεφάνη in Titus 2:11—lack legitimate substantiation. The passages Augustine cites as parallels do not mean what he takes them to mean. The "save" word-group is always used by Paul to speak of eternal salvation. The adverb μάλιστα cannot mark a specifying appositive but must restrict the reference. And the dative πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις most naturally goes with the immediately preceding σωτήριος.

Yet beyond the fact that all four of these interpretations lack substantiation, what makes them especially unviable is that no single one of them can be utilized in all four of the key passages that use πᾶς in the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11). The exclusivity reading does not work in 1 Timothy 2:6 and Titus 2:11 because ἀντίλυτρον and σωτήριος are both anarthrous. If the intent of these verses was that Jesus is the only ransom for people and that God's grace is the only thing that saves people—both of which would be cognitively identifiable and definite concepts—they would have been arthrous. The exclusivity reading also does not work in 1 Timothy 4:10 because of the trailing restrictive phrase μάλιστα πιστῶν. While it might make sense to say that God is the only Savior people have, it would not make much sense to follow such an assertion with the expression "especially believers." Nonsoteriological readings of the σῴζω word-group, assuming their lexical validity in the first place, could potentially be utilized in several of the key verses (1 Tim 2:4; 4:10; Titus 2:11). However, one of the key verses, 1 Timothy 2:6, does not contain any term from the σῴζω word-group, instead speaking of "redemption" (ἀντίλυτρον). Only one of the four key verses contains μάλιστα (1 Tim 4:10); likewise, only one of the four key verses would be explained by syntactic reclassification (Titus 2:11).

Occam's razor refers to the principle that when there are competing theories that can adequately account for a set of phenomena, the theoretical model that is simplest and requires the least explanatory mechanisms should be preferred as the one most likely to be correct. So, even assuming that all four of these alternative exegetical methods for understanding any of these verses were convincing in isolation, they would still have to be recognized as an inferior model for understanding these verses relative to simpler alternatives. Understanding these verses as

saying that God intended to save all and that Christ died for all is an interpretation that accounts for all these verses without multiplying the explanatory mechanisms necessary. Likewise, restricting the meaning of πᾶς would require just a single explanatory mechanism for all four verses. In contrast, it is logically and intuitively unlikely that πᾶς would be used in such contexts four times within the Pastoral Epistles and that there would happen to be a different reason necessary each time as to why the verse is not attributing to God a universal merciful will or to Christ's death a universal atonement. So, the fact that none of these interpretations, even if they were possible in isolation, can account for all four of these verses renders such explanations further unviable.

Because these other interpretations are unworkable, the Calvinist tradition has rightly coalesced around the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς as its strongest interpretive move for explaining these passages that would otherwise undermine its position on predestination and atonement. If the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς were itself to be falsified, then there would no longer remain any currently formulated interpretation by which these key verses have been explained in a viable manner that would not contradict the Calvinist teachings of double predestination and limited atonement.

3.5 Alternative Theological Methods for Understanding Predestination and Atonement in Keeping with Calvinist Motivations

3.5.1 A scholastic contribution

The primary way that scholastic theologians resolved the tension between the fact that God wants all to be saved and the fact that some are not saved was to employ various distinctions in how to speak of the divine will (Foord 2009, 180–91). Of the different scholastic solutions, the one that seems the most profitable for honoring the doctrinal concerns raised by Calvinists is that of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas (*ST* I q. 19 a. 6), elaborating on John of Damascus's (*Fid. orth*. 2.29) distinction between an antecedent and a consequent will, distinguishes between a "willingness" (*velleitas*) and an "absolute will" *(absoluta voluntas*). Thus, God can be seen as having an unfulfilled general willingness for the salvation of all and yet also have infallibly decreed the salvation of some.

Within Lutheran Scholasticism, in particular, Abraham Calov, the idea of God having an unfulfilled willingness is fleshed out more fully (Preus 1970, 98–99). It is not merely that God would delight in something and yet have no desire to actually carry it out. This willingness of

God is sincere and prompts action toward that desired result, yet, for some unknown reason, God allows the result to be frustrated.

Calvin ([1952a] 1856, 103) rejected the validity of this specific distinction between God's antecedent and consequent wills. However, Calvin also argued that God's will might seem self-contradictory in that the same event could be said to happen according to God's will and contrary to God's will (*Inst*. 1.18.3–4; [1552a] 1856, 111–12; [1552b] 1857, 67, 69–70, 88, 90). For example, a person sinning would be against God's will, and yet this could only happen by God's willing that it be allowed to happen. While Calvin does not use the terms, this would appear to be in line with Aquinas's distinction between a willingness and an absolute will, in that God's will that sin not occur is an unfulfilled desire, not something he decreed to prevent from happening.

If the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς were falsified, and Calvinists had to acknowledge a universal merciful will, then in that case, this distinction of Aquinas and Calov between a willingness and an absolute will could be applied to God's desire to save. God's desire to save could be seen as a willingness and not as an absolute will. Consequently, God could sincerely want and actively work toward the salvation of all and yet only will the salvation of some in an absolute sense. While it would still not explain *why* God would do so, it would allow Calvinists to maintain a particular election to salvation whose sole cause is God side-by-side with a universal desire to save.

3.5.2 A Lutheran contribution

Confessional Lutheranism, as defined in the Formula of Concord (Ep 11; SD 11), teaches only a single predestination, in which God has preordained some for salvation but has not preordained the others for damnation. For those who are saved, God is made the sole cause of their salvation; for those who are not, sin is made the sole cause of their damnation. This tension within the Formula represents an application of the distinction between law and gospel to questions of conversion and election (Arand, Kolb, and Nestingen 2012, 214–15). The logical inconsistency of this position has resulted in continued controversy for the Lutheran church in attempting to maintain this balanced position (Preus 1958; Brenner 2017). This logical inconsistency would also explain why this explanation has not generally seemed favorable to Calvinists, who tend to expect internal theological coherence.

However, Calvinists after Calvin wrestled with how to speak of the causes of reprobation and of damnation. Where Calvin made God's will their ultimate cause to preserve the parallel with the decree of election, others were willing to drop the expectation of complete parallelism and speak of reprobation, or at least of damnation, more as a reaction to human sinfulness. This abandonment of a need for complete symmetry is already a movement toward the Lutheran position, giving God all the credit for salvation and, paradoxically, human beings all the blame for damnation. Consequently, if the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς were falsified and Calvinists had to acknowledge a universal merciful will, Calvinists could depart further from the expectation of logical consistency and find in the Lutheran teaching of single predestination a way to uphold important motivating concerns such as God's role as the sole cause of election and salvation.

3.5.3 An Anglican contribution

Within Anglicanism developed a view of the atonement called "hypothetical universalism" (Crisp 2021, 87–111). This view is found already in early Calvinists present at the Council of Dordt, such as John Davenant (Lynch 2021). Often considered a "four-point" Calvinism, this Anglican view holds to four of the so-called five points of Calvinism (total depravity, unconditional election, irresistible grace, and perseverance of the saints), differing only by teaching an unlimited atonement instead of a limited atonement. This view is called hypothetical universalism because it posits that the atonement is not merely potentially capable of being sufficient for all people but actually is sufficient for all people. However, God also designed it so that this sufficient atonement would be received only through faith.

Calvinism has generally opposed the Arminian idea that faith would be the condition people had to meet in order to receive the benefits of a universal atonement, because this would seem to make people responsible for a part of their salvation. However, this Anglican view of hypothetical universalism is not open to the same charge, as it holds to a monergistic view of conversion, meaning that still all the credit and glory for the salvation of the elect belongs to God. Consequently, if the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς were falsified and former five-point Calvinists had to acknowledge a universal atonement, they could find in four-point Calvinism a way to uphold important motivating concerns such as God's role as the sole cause of election and salvation.

3.5.4 Analysis

The Calvinist doctrine of double predestination is part of a theological system that bears an impressively high degree of internal coherence. This means that challenging any part of that system might easily be seen as attacking and undermining all of it. However, in drawing contributions from outside the Calvinist tradition, this section shows that not all of the Calvinist system must fall if God is seen to sincerely desire the salvation of all and if Christ is seen to have died to make atonement for all. In particular, what seem to be the primary concerns motivating the Calvinist position could still be maintained. Regarding God's universal merciful will, God can want all to be saved and work toward all being saved, and yet not all are saved. Regarding God's act of predestination, God's choice of some individuals for salvation can have its cause solely in his sovereign, gracious will, and yet those who are not saved remain unconverted and damned as a result of their own sin. As previously discussed, some Calvinists have already recognized this and have taken steps toward incorporating a universal merciful will within their system.

By still attributing election and conversion entirely to God, such contributions allay the Calvinist concern regarding the extent of the atonement that any distinction between the meriting and the distributing of salvation leads to the Arminian position that makes faith the condition humans must meet for their salvation. If God is maintained as the sole party responsible for the creation of that faith, recognizing faith as the way that Christ's work is received still leaves God as the unique cause of salvation both as merited and as distributed. Although not all for whom Christ died would receive it, Christ's death could still be seen as entirely effective for the elect, as it would be that which elicits the faith by which they would receive its benefits.

Some Calvinists have already shown a comfortability with articulating multiple divine intentions to Christ's death, but they do not want to attribute to it a sincere desire to save all because this would contradict their views on God's will. However, once it is realized that God's predestination of some to salvation does not prevent him from sincerely desiring and working toward the salvation of all, then there is no reason that the salvation of all could not be considered an intention of the atonement, even as that atonement effectively accomplishes the salvation of the elect. This is how the matter is presented in the four-point Calvinism of Anglican hypothetical universalism.

3.6 Conclusion

Before specifically investigating the linguistic viability of the Calvinist "all without distinction" reading, it was helpful to explore the motivation for the teachings of double predestination and of limited atonement that led the Calvinist tradition to adopt such an interpretation. For this reason, this chapter took up this thesis's second subsidiary research question: What are the major tenets of the Reformed Calvinist doctrine that limits the scope of the Father's merciful will and the Son's atonement? Based on the systematic overview given in this chapter, several noteworthy things can be said about the Calvinist motivation for the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς.

First, regarding both God's merciful will and the atonement, the primary Calvinist concern in questions of their extent is really their nature and efficacy for the elect themselves. The nonnegotiable truth regarding divine election is that it is gracious and certain, arising solely from God's sovereign will and not caused by anything in man. The nonnegotiable truth regarding the atonement is that it is entirely effectual and sufficient to save, not requiring the fulfillment of any additional condition on the part of man. Because some are not ultimately saved, the logical consequence of these nonnegotiable truths has been taken to be that God did not want to save them and that Christ did not die for them. These logical consequences are why the "all without distinction" reading has been employed in verses that would otherwise speak of God as wanting to save all and of Christ's death as making atonement for all. However, while these logical consequences have become standard teaching in Calvinism, they are not themselves the tradition's core theological commitments.

Second, the reason why the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς has become commonplace within Calvinism is that none of the alternatives for understanding the relevant verses (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11) in ways that do not contradict double predestination or limited atonement are viable. Taken individually, each interpretation is unconvincing; taken as a group, the appeal to different explanations for the different verses goes beyond the limits of interpretive plausibility. Consequently, the "all without distinction" reading has rightly become the main vehicle for preserving the Calvinist teachings of double predestination and limited atonement over against passages that seem to teach otherwise. Ultimately, the integrity of these teachings depends on the viability of the "all without distinction" reading.

Third, although double predestination and limited atonement themselves might prove difficult to retain apart from the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς, this does not mean that the falsification of this reading requires abandoning everything that motivates the Calvinist theological system. The primary Calvinist concerns over the nature and efficacy of divine election and of the atonement are not necessarily dependent on the notions of double predestination and of limited atonement—they could be retained without them. Now, to retain them would require some theological modifications—in particular, giving up the prioritization of having an internally coherent system. However, the contributions of scholastic, Lutheran, and Anglican theology, coupled with how some contemporary Calvinists have begun to modify their position to integrate a universal desire to save, demonstrate that such a position is possible. There are ways to uphold, as Calvinists seek to do, the nature and efficacy of God's election to salvation and of Christ's atoning work, even while saying that God sincerely desires to save all people and that Christ died with the intention of saving all people.

This chapter has shown the motivations for the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς, as well as the potential theological consequences if such a reading could not be substantiated linguistically. Now that the stakes and ramifications of this question have been identified, it is time to undertake such a linguistic inquiry. To know whether the "all without distinction" reading is a viable interpretation of the key verses from the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11), it is first necessary to investigate and identify the linguistic factors that elsewhere give rise to restricted meanings. Because of this, ch. 4 examines how the sense of πᾶς finds itself restricted in other passages, with the goal of detecting and classifying what causes or allows πᾶς to undergo the kinds of restriction on which the "all without distinction" reading depends.

Chapter 4:
Linguistic Features That Restrict πᾶς

4.1 Introduction

Many Calvinists hold to the teachings of double predestination and of limited atonement as logical safeguards to their more foundational teachings of a gracious and monergistic election to salvation and of an entirely effective atonement, respectively. In turn, to uphold these teachings of double predestination and of limited atonement, many of these same Calvinists have claimed that, at least within some key verses in the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11), πᾶς does not refer to all people but to all kinds of people, an interpretation known as the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς.

The "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς attempts to derive its viability from the existence of other passages where πᾶς does not refer to every single individual (listed in ch. 2, n. 3). However, to corroborate such a reading from a linguistic perspective, more is necessary than to simply identify other instances where πᾶς admits restrictions. It is necessary to quantify within a linguistic framework both the nature of such restrictions and also what it is that brings them about. Consequently, this chapter takes up this thesis's third subsidiary research question: What does a linguistic analysis of πᾶς indicate about how the meaning of πᾶς can be restricted?

The first main section of this chapter gives an overview of the corpus analysis necessary to answer such a question. This section defines the Biblical Greek corpus used for this study and then explains the methodology employed. The six subsequent sections of this chapter present

this analysis of the six different kinds of restriction seen with πᾶς within the Biblical Greek corpus: hyperbole, implicit domain restriction, nonveridicality, intensive nouns, collective nouns, and superordinate categories. Insights from crosslinguistic studies are combined with the patterns of how πᾶς is used within the corpus to determine criteria by which the presence of these restrictions might be tested for other passages where πᾶς is found. An additional section examines verses claimed in support of the "all without distinction" interpretation where πᾶς is not really being restricted at all. The concluding section of this chapter synthesizes the criteria identified for the various restrictions to form a diagnostic test for whether πᾶς could be restricted in some way within the key verses from the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11).

4.2 Corpus Analysis of Restricted Uses of πᾶς

4.2.1 The Biblical Greek corpus

The corpus used in this study is the Biblical Greek corpus, consisting of the Greek New Testament (NT) and the Old Greek (OG)[11] translation of the Old Testament (OT).[12]

Stefanowitsch (2020, 23–28) lists three criteria for a valid corpus for linguistic study. First, a corpus must be "authentic" in that its samples were produced as naturally occurring instances of the language and were not created for or influenced by the linguistic study. The Biblical Greek corpus meets this criterion of authenticity as all of it was produced as real communication.

Second, a corpus must be "representative" in that it reflects the "language variety" by the proportionate inclusion of samples of differing "genre, register, style, medium, … dialect, sociolect, etc." (Stefanowitsch 2020, 28–36). The Biblical Greek corpus meets this criterion of representativeness in that it includes a variety of genres (history, poetry, letters, apocalypses) and registers (ranging from the simpler Greek of John to the more polished literary Greek of Hebrews). While this corpus consists of a common medium—written and not spoken—this

[11] The label "Old Greek" is preferred over the more traditional label "Septuagint" (LXX) because, historically, "Septuagint" referred only to the Greek translation of the Pentateuch. OG encompasses not only all the canonical OT writings but also the apocryphal writings, whether originally composed in Hebrew or in Greek. On this distinction in terms, see Lanier and Ross (2021, 25–38).

[12] Utilizing a Biblical Greek corpus does not assume that the Greek found in the Bible is qualitatively different than the Greek used in the common communication of its day. Rather, the assumption is that Scripture was written in the language that people used in their everyday life, and so it can serve as a corpus that reflects the patterns of that language.

does not undermine the corpus's representativeness. The ancient world did not dichotomize oral and literary communication as many cultures do today but considered the written word to be the permanent record of a spoken word (Wendland 2008, 14). A similarity in dialect throughout this corpus can be assumed because it is restricted to a relatively small historical time frame (third century BC to first century AD) and to men of Jewish background (excepting Luke, cf. Col 4:11, 14). However, such a dialect restriction is not problematic, as the target texts from the Pastoral Epistles fall within that same restricted dialect.[13] The Biblical Greek corpus is sufficiently representative to draw conclusions about how Paul would have used Greek, even if it could only provide tentative hypotheses about how, for example, either Herodotus or Chrysostom would have used Greek.

Third, a corpus must be "large enough" to have enough samples of the linguistic feature being studied, a criterion that Stefanowitsch (2020, 37–38) admits is difficult to define. He identifies a commonly used one-million-English-word corpus size as being generally sufficient. The Biblical Greek corpus meets this size criterion as it contains more than 725,000 Greek words. When translated from a more synthetic language like Greek to a more analytic language like English, this is the equivalent of a 900,000–1,000,000 English-word corpus.[14] With πᾶς being one of the most frequently used words, at 7,711 occurrences between the OG (6,468 occurrences) and the NT (1,243 occurrences), the Biblical Greek corpus is "large enough" to draw firm conclusions about the ways in which πᾶς is used and can be used.

4.2.2 Methodology

Stefanowitsch (2020, 57–58) enumerates five steps for doing corpus studies. The first is to identify the linguistic phenomenon to be characterized (57). The linguistic phenomenon to be characterized here is the restricted usage of πᾶς.

[13] While this thesis assumes Paul wrote the Pastoral Epistles, such an early dating of the epistles does not depend on the assumption of Pauline authorship. Even a recent commentator who leaves open the question of Pauline authorship of the Pastoral Epistles (Hutson 2019, 10–12, 15) dates them to the first century on the basis of Polycarp of Smyrna's apparent familiarity with them. Similarly, the theory of "allonymity," that someone within the Pauline circle composed the epistles to apply Paul's teaching to new situations arising shortly after his death (Marshall and Towner 1999, 83–92), still places composition within the first century.

[14] KJV, for example, has 925,877 words (Metzger 1957, 4) and NRSV has approximately 928,100 words (NRSV Specifications n.d.).

The second is to postulate a second element, whether linguistic or extra-linguistic, that may account for the linguistic phenomenon to be characterized (Stefanowitsch 2020, 57–58). This study postulates the following six additional elements:

1. Hyperbole
2. Implicit domain restriction
3. Nonveridicality
4. Intensive nouns
5. Collective nouns
6. Superordinate categories

The third is to ensure that the elements being studied are quantifiable such that they can be positively identified (Stefanowitsch 2020, 58). The first subsection of each of the following six sections explores those elements more thoroughly from a crosslinguistic perspective to define how these elements can be identified and how they might be expected to interact with πᾶς. Different linguistic methodologies are required to identify different ones of these elements. Hyperbole requires Gricean pragmatics (Grice 1989). Implicit domain restriction requires a more exegetical examination of the context. Nonveridicality requires consideration of operator scoping (Van Valin 2005, 8–16). Intensive nouns and collective nouns require a semantic approach. And superordinate categories require diagnostic tests derived from cognitive linguistics (Cruse 2002; Croft and Cruse 2004, 141–50).

The fourth is to retrieve and annotate the data from the corpus (Stefanowitsch 2020, 58). This study retrieved and annotated the data by examining all the instances of πᾶς throughout the Biblical Greek corpus. It employed the linguistic criteria already established to identify the degree to which any of those instances of πᾶς might be restricted as a result of the presence of any of those six postulated elements. The second subsection of each of the following six sections presents the results of this data retrieval and annotation. To demonstrate that these six different elements are what results in restrictions to πᾶς and that these categorizations are not subject to researcher bias, these subsections consist entirely of examples from within the Biblical Greek corpus that are themselves uncontroversial, as they are not known to have been cited as support for the “all without distinction” interpretation.

The fifth is to analyze the data to determine the degree to which the linguistic phenomenon being studied can be accurately explained by the postulated second element (Stefanowitsch

2020, 58–59). The third subsection of each of the following six sections undertakes this analysis, primarily by examining passages that have been cited as linguistic evidence for the "all without distinction" interpretation of πᾶς. While space prohibits explicit discussion of all instances of πᾶς within the Biblical Greek corpus, all such passages as have been alleged as parallels for the "all without distinction" interpretation are either discussed in the text or referenced in the footnotes of this chapter. Since analyzing linguistic criteria in these verses relies on human judgment and therefore could be susceptible to researcher bias, such documentation allows the reader to check for themselves whether these six elements are sufficient to account for all the restricted usages of πᾶς cited as support for the "all without distinction" interpretation.

4.3 πᾶς with Hyperbole

4.3.1 Crosslinguistic principles

Hyperbole is when a speaker uses an expression that is intensified relative to the literal truth (Claridge 2011, 12; Burgers et al. 2016, 166). Examples are obviously exaggerated statements such as "I haven't seen you in a million years" or "I'm so hungry I could eat a horse." This rhetorical device, articulated already by Quintilian (*Inst. orat*. 8.6.67–76), is a crosslinguistic phenomenon found in all languages (Claridge 2011, 1–2, 176).

The purpose of hyperbole is not to be deceptive (McCarthy and Carter 2004, 152, 162; Brdar-Szabó and Brdar 2010, 415) but to vividly communicate how the situation seems and feels to the speaker (Norrick 1982, 172–73; Edwards 2000, 359, 363, 365; Claridge 2011, 18–20; Beare and Meade 2015, 78–79). Accordingly, hyperboles communicate a phenomenological truth instead of an ontological truth. "I haven't seen you in a million years" would be intended to communicate how long it feels like to the speaker that they have not seen the other person, while "I'm so hungry I could eat a horse" would be intended to communicate how hungry the speaker feels.

An important subclass of hyperbole (Norrick 2004) is the "extreme case formulation (ECF)" (Pomerantz 1986). As opposed to other hyperboles that merely inflate the description (e.g., "I haven't seen you in a million years"), ECFs inflate it to its most extreme case possible (e.g., "I haven't seen you in forever") (Edwards 2000, 349). Hyperbolic uses of "universal descriptors" (Claridge 2011, 51) such as "all," "every," and "everyone"—all common glosses of πᾶς—would all be considered ECFs (Pomerantz 1986, 219–20).

The use of ECFs is quite common. One study found that ECFs made up one-third of the hyperboles within its corpus (Cano Mora 2009, 32), while another study identified specifically universal descriptors as almost a tenth of hyperboles within its corpus (Claridge 2011, 32). The frequency that universal descriptors are used as ECFs shows that this usage has been conventionalized as part of the language (170). Nevertheless, the fact that their use can be challenged or questioned in conversation (Edwards 2000) indicates that universal descriptors such as "all," "every," and "everyone" do not bear two discrete meanings—one, literal; the other, figurative. These words retain a single, universal meaning. However, this single, universal meaning has a conventionalized hyperbolic use that can be contextually evoked (Claridge 2011, 32, 170–71).

Context is crucial in interpreting hyperbolic expressions, because it is impossible to tell purely from the words themselves whether they are intended hyperbolically. Positive identification of a hyperbole depends on prior knowledge about the referent of the potentially hyperbolic expression so as to know that the expression exceeds the literal truth (Claridge 2011, 5–16; Burgers et al. 2016, 164–66). For example, sentences such as "He is the wisest man who ever lived" and "This is the worst thing that ever happened to me" could be hyperbolic due to the extreme language employed ("wisest" and "worst"). On the other hand, these sentences could also be intended literally. To know whether these statements are hyperbolic would require extra information external to the sentence itself. For the first example, the hearer would have to know who "he" is and also how wise he is relative to all the other people who have ever lived. For the second example, the hearer would have to know what "this" is and also how bad it is relative to all the other things that have happened to the speaker.

Because the hyperbolic use of universal descriptors is conventionalized (Claridge 2011, 170), the presence of extreme language can alert hearers to the possibility that hyperbole is being employed (16). However, hyperboles can only be positively identified in cases where it is already known that the statement goes beyond the literal truth (Claridge 2011, 5–16; Burgers et al. 2016, 164–66). Hence, there is an obvious methodological problem when it comes to identifying whether a given instance of extreme language is hyperbole (Claridge 2011, 15). The way to know that a statement is hyperbolic and not literally true is ultimately to have prior access to the information that tells us that such a statement is not literally true.

In light of this, the Hyperbole Identification Procedure (HIP) devised by Burgers et al. (2016) cannot be profitably applied when there is a debate over whether extreme language is literal or

hyperbolic. The critical final step of HIP asks: “Is the expression more extreme than justified given its ontological referent?” (168). When there is a question over what would be justified for the ontological referent because the nature of that referent is itself in question, there would be no way to positively identify whether the extreme language is more extreme than that or not.

Because recognizing hyperbole depends on knowledge external to the sentence itself, attempts have been made to account for hyperbole via the cooperative conversation principles of Gricean pragmatics (Grice 1989, 26–37). Some have considered hyperbole to be a flouting of the maxim of quality (Grice 1989, 34; Norrick 2004, 1732–33). This approach, however, proves problematic (Wilson 1995, 200–205; Wilson and Sperber 2002; Brdar-Szabó and Brdar 2010, 415–17) because it assumes that the speaker is saying something that they “believe to be false” (Grice 1989, 27), while hyperbole is intended to communicate in a nondeceptive way how something seems to the speaker (Norrick 1982, 172–73; Edwards 2000, 359, 363, 365; Claridge 2011, 18–20; Beare and Meade 2015, 78–79). Consequently, it is best to understand the maxim of quality as applying to “truthfulness within certain limits of tolerance varying according to the conversational purpose” (Claridge 2011, 135). In this approach, hyperbole can be considered truthful and, as such, in keeping with the maxim of quality—provided that this hyperbolic expression is sufficiently precise for its particular situation.

In light of this, hyperbole is better approached via Grice’s (1989, 26) maxim of quantity: “Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).” Some communicative settings and purposes require a level of informativeness that reaches numerical precision, while others have no such requisites (Stein 1985, 13; Beare and Meade 2015, 84). A hyperbole will only be acceptable in contexts that do not require greater precision than that hyperbole provides. So, while we may be unable to test directly whether a given statement is hyperbolic, we can use Grice’s maxim of quantity to test whether a given statement could be hyperbolic and still be contextually felicitous in keeping with cooperative conversation principles.

For example, without already knowing the precise number of days of rainfall a location received over the last month, we would not be able to know whether the statement “It’s rained every day this month” was literally true or not. However, the context can tell us whether such a statement would be felicitous if intended hyperbolically. Perhaps this sentence was said on the phone in response to an out-of-town friend who had asked, “What’s the weather like there?”

Such a context does not typically require numerical precision. Here, hyperbolically stating that it had rained every day, when it had rained not every day but still so many days that it seemed like it rained practically every day, would be in keeping with the Gricean maxim of quantity because it would be sufficiently precise for the nature of the conversation. As a result, such a statement would be a felicitous communicative act even if it had not rained literally every day.

On the other hand, perhaps this same sentence was said in a meteorology station to a coworker who had asked, "Exactly how many days did it rain this month?" Such a context does require numerical precision. Here, hyperbole would not be in keeping with the Gricean maxim of quantity, so attempting to employ hyperbole would be an infelicitous communicative act. If not literally true in the former context, the statement "It's rained every day this month" would be hyperbole; if not literally true in this latter context, the same statement would simply be false.

Help in testing the contextual felicitousness of a potential hyperbole comes from the way speakers can use "softening" (Edwards 2000, 352–60), also known as "downtowning" (Claridge 2011, 102–3). Speakers can make explicit the exaggerated nature of their hyperbolic expression using adverbial softeners such as "almost," "essentially," "just about," "mostly," "practically," "seemingly," and "virtually." Such softeners are not what makes the expression hyperbolic; they merely make explicit the expression's already implicitly hyperbolic nature (Edwards 2000, 359).

Using a softener to make ECFs explicitly hyperbolic can be helpful because these explicitly hyperbolic expressions are more easily tested as to whether they remain felicitous in context as hyperboles. For example, the statement "It's rained every day this month" could be softened to say, "It's rained [almost/practically/seemingly] every day this month." Does this softened, explicitly hyperbolic statement satisfy the Gricean maxim of quantity? It would be felicitous if said on the phone in response to an out-of-town friend who had asked, "What's the weather like there?" It would be a flouting of the maxim to a coworker in a meteorology station who had asked, "Exactly how many days did it rain this month?" because it would lack the specificity required by the context. In this way, mentally supplying softeners to universal descriptors can help test whether a universal descriptor could be felicitous in context if intended as hyperbole and not as literally true.

Some genres seem especially accepting of hyperbole. Proverbs and other generic statements readily employ hyperbole because the general truth they intend to communicate stands despite

the existence of exceptions (Stein 1985, 57–59; Norrick 2004, 1730). Vivid narration, whether past-tense prose (Beare and Meade 2015, 78–83; Stein 1985, 67) or future prophecy (Stein 1985, 60), can likewise readily employ hyperbole because the exaggerated language helps the audience experience the phenomenological truth of the events being narrated.

4.3.2 Within the Biblical Greek corpus

Sometimes information from outside the text shows a statement to be literally untrue and, thus, hyperbolic. For example, Jesus calls the mustard seed "the smallest of all (πάντων) the seeds" (Matt 13:32; Mark 4:31). At approximately a millimeter wide (Ravindran 2017, 121), the mustard seed is quite small but is not literally the smallest of all the seeds. Because we know the statement is not literally true, we are in a position to positively identify this as a hyperbolic way of emphasizing how small the mustard seed is.

This example, for which we do have the necessary external information to identify a hyperbole, can help demonstrate how hyperboles within the Biblical Greek corpus will operate in keeping with the Gricean maxim of quantity, as this hyperbolic expression can be seen to be entirely felicitous within the context. A parabolic reference to the mustard plant does not require a level of informativeness such that a speaker would be expected to define precisely where the mustard seed ranks in size relative to other seeds. For the purposes of the current conversation, it is enough to express that it is very small. The felicitousness of a hyperbole in context is confirmed by making the hyperbole explicit via softening: "It may be smaller than [almost/practically/virtually] all the seeds, but when it grows, it is bigger than the vegetables and becomes a tree" (Matt 13:32).

Sometimes other details in the text itself indicate that an expression is more extreme than the literal truth. For example, Paul states that everyone (πάντες) in Asia has turned away from him (2 Tim 1:15), but in the subsequent verse, he identifies Onesiphorus as having done the opposite. Because we now know that the statement is not literally true, we are in a position to positively identify this as a hyperbolic way of communicating the seemingly total abandonment experienced, as some commentators have rightly interpreted the expression (Lea and Griffen 1992, 197; Mounce 2000, 493; Johnson 2008, 360; Yarbrough 2018, 367–68).

This example too, for which the text contains enough contextual information to identify a hyperbole, shows how hyperboles within the Biblical Greek corpus will operate in keeping with the Gricean maxim of quantity, as this hyperbolic expression can be seen to be entirely

felicitous within the context. An appeal to Paul's current experience does not require a level of informativeness such that a speaker would be expected to define precisely the percentage of people who had abandoned him. For the purposes of the current conversation, it is enough to express that it seems like there is no one left. The felicitousness of a hyperbole in context is confirmed by making the hyperbole explicit via softening: "You know that [almost/practically/virtually] everyone in Asia turned away from me, including Phygelus and Hermogenes" (2 Tim 1:15).

Most potential instances of πᾶς being used hyperbolically are found in contexts that do not provide the necessary information to arrive at absolute certainty as to whether the expression is more extreme than the literal truth. Consequently, previous methods suggested for identifying hyperbole within the Bible (Stein 1985; Cruise 2018, 2019), much like Burgers et al.'s (2016) HIP, are of little help, as they are too dependent on already knowing whether the statements could be literally true. However, in such passages, we can still use explicit softeners to test whether a hyperbole would have been contextually felicitous in keeping with Grice's maxim of quantity.

Statements with a proverbial air to them easily allow hyperbole. An example is found in the words of the banquet master at the wedding at Cana: "Everyone (πᾶς ἄνθρωπος) sets out the good wine first and then, once the people are drunk, the worse wine" (John 2:10). While the banquet master is likely not citing an established proverb (Haenchen 1984, 174; Beasley-Murray 1999, 35), nonetheless the statement is intended as a general maxim (Weinrich 2015, 304). Even when explicitly softened to read "[Most] everyone sets out the good wine first," it is felicitous in context. For the banquet master to express shock at the late presentation of the good wine does not require that there be absolutely no possible exceptions to the practice of serving the good wine first. It is sufficient that serving better wine later in the celebration can be a surprising exception to a general, or perhaps even near-universal, practice.

Even statements that are not proverbial can be generic and hyperbolic. Jesus states that the synagogues and the temple are "where all the Jews (πάντες οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι) gather" (John 18:20). Even when explicitly softened to read "where [just about] all the Jews gather," this statement is felicitous in context. Jesus does not need to assert that literally every Jewish person gathers in the places where he has spoken to demonstrate that he has spoken openly in very public places.

Hyperbole is also often found in narrations where a literal count is unnecessary. When Herod heard of Jesus's birth, he was disturbed, as was "all Jerusalem (πᾶσα Ἰεροσόλυμα) with him" (Matt 2:3). If explicitly softened to read: "[virtually] all Jerusalem with him," this would still communicate the same point that the people of Jerusalem were nervous over what a nervous Herod might do. The context does not require numerical precision, so such a statement would be felicitous if intended hyperbolically.

In contrast to the previous examples, there are times when πᾶς is used in statements that would not be felicitous if intended hyperbolically. For example, the closing summary statement of the shipwreck Paul experiences is that "in this way it happened that all (πάντας) reached land safely" (Acts 27:44). This statement could be explicitly softened to say: "[almost] all reached land safely." However, such a hyperbole would not be a felicitous closing statement to an incident that not only had made a point of the fact that not one of the men on board would be harmed (v. 34) but also had given an exact count of the 276 people on board (v. 37). Under those circumstances, if not all actually reached land safely, it would not be an acceptable use of hyperbole; it would be a lie.[15]

4.3.3 Analysis

It is important to recognize that testing the felicitousness of a potential hyperbole through softening identifies only whether that statement could possibly be hyperbolic; it cannot positively identify hyperbole. A statement that would have been contextually felicitous as hyperbole might still be intended as an expression of literal truth.

An example of this is 1 Corinthians 9:25: "Every (πᾶς) competitor exercises self-control in all things (πάντα)." Even when explicitly softened to read, "[Practically] every competitor exercises self-control in [practically] all things," it is still felicitous in context. The preceding context does not require providing the precise number of competitors who train or the precise degree to which they exercise self-control. As support for the exhortation to "run to win" (v. 24), it would be sufficient to express the general truth that competitors are generally rather disciplined in pursuit of the prize. However, the second-century geographer Pausanias (*Descr.* 5.24.9) documents that Olympic competitors had to take an oath that they had carefully

[15] See similarly, "I have kept all these (πάντα ταῦτα)" (Matt 19:20), whose context requires precision as to the number of commandments kept, and "All (πάντες) sinned and lack the glory of God" (Rom 3:22), whose context requires precision to support the previous verse's claim that there is no substantial differentiation between believers.

observed the required training regulations for the past ten years. So, although hyperbole would be entirely felicitous in the context of 1 Corinthians 9, Paul's words may still have been intended literally.

However, despite the inability of this pragmatics-based criterion to positively identify hyperbole, it still serves as a reliable way to rule out some instances of extreme language as are found in contexts where hyperbole would be inappropriate. When such a test is applied to the Biblical Greek corpus, many occurrences of πᾶς are identified as potentially hyperbolic, including many of the passages cited as linguistic parallels for the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς.

Sometimes reference is made to a crowd of people, where the context does not require that every single member of the crowd carried out such an action.[16]

> [Virtually] all the crowd (πᾶς ὁ ὄχλος) was trying to touch him (Luke 6:19).
>
> [Seemingly] all the people (πᾶς ὁ λαός) were coming to him (John 8:2).

Sometimes reference is made to something happening to a large number of individuals. The exceptions are not explicitly mentioned because, for the present purposes, it is sufficient to express in a general way how virtually comprehensive the action was.[17]

> The time of [almost] every human being (παντὸς ἀνθρώπου) has come before me (Gen 6:13).

Sometimes hyperbolic reference is made to a whole place. Some of these references to places are similar to the previous examples in that they are metonymies of container (place) for contained (people of that place).[18]

> Then Jerusalem and [seemingly] all Judea (πᾶσα ἡ Ἰουδαία) and [seemingly] all the region (πᾶσα ἡ περίχωρος) of the Jordan were going out to him (Matt 3:5).

[16] Also, Exod 32:3, 26; Matt 21:26; Mark 1:37; 14:64; Acts 4:21.

[17] Also, Gen 6:17; Exod 9:6; Jer 13:19 (which has been cited as a parallel because the Hebrew has כֹּל, despite this word being omitted in OG); Rev 8:7 (assuming that this verse requires harmonization with Rev 9:4 in the first place, which is not necessarily the case in an apocalyptic vision such as this).

[18] Also, Matt 9:35; Acts 2:5; Col 1:23.

> [Practically] all the Judean countryside (πᾶσα ἡ Ἰουδαία χώρα) and [practically] all the people of Jerusalem (οἱ Ἱεροσολυμῖται πάντες) were going out to him (Mark 1:5).

Sometimes proverbial and other generic statements employ exaggeration for effect.[19]

> You will be hated by [almost] everyone (πάντων) for the sake of my name (Matt 10:22; Mark 13:13; Luke 21:17).
>
> For the love of money is the root of [seemingly] all evils (πάντων τῶν κακῶν) (1 Tim 6:10).[20]

These instances of πᾶς being limited within a hyperbole do not show that πᾶς can mean "many" or "most" instead of simply "every/all." Even in these instances, πᾶς means "every/all." It is just that this single universal meaning is being used figuratively instead of literally. The situation is no different from how the hyperbolic use of the English words "every" and "all" does not mean that these words have the additional meanings "many" and "most" (Claridge 2011, 32). Thus, πᾶς cannot just be arbitrarily limited to mean "many" or "most" in a given passage but can only have this nonliteral usage in those places where hyperbole would be felicitous.

4.4 πᾶς with Implicit Domain Restriction

4.4.1 Crosslinguistic principles

Although quantifiers such as "all" or "every" are themselves universal in nature, the domain over which they quantify is usually restricted (Iacona 2016). Sometimes this domain restriction can be made explicit. For example, in the statement, "Everyone in the audience laughed," the quantifier "everyone" remains universal. However, this universality does not quantify the

[19] Also, Ps 116:11 [OG 115:2]; Mark 11:32; Luke 6:26; John 3:26; 11:48; Acts 21:28; Rom 16:19; 1 Cor 1:5; 6:12 (which even if intended literally, is quoting a Corinthian thought and is not an attitude Paul endorses); 1 Thess 2:15.

[20] Since there are certainly many exceptions where evil is caused by something other than a love of money, a number of translations (ASV, CSB, ESV, ISV, LEB, NASB, NIV, NKJV, NRSV, WEB, and YLT) and commentators (Kelly 1963, 138; Knight 1992, 257; Mounce 2000, 346; Johnson 2008, 296) have taken advantage of the fact that ῥίζα is anarthrous to render the verse as if it says that the love of money is merely "a root" of all the evils. However, Merkle (2019, 44–47) has shown that, in keeping with Colwell's (1933) Rule, ῥίζα is still definite and that it lacks the article because the predicate nominative precedes the copular verb. Instead, this statement is proverbial in nature and, as such, is intended as hyperbole (Marshall and Towner 1999, 651; Towner 2006, 404; Merkle 2019, 46–47). Another possible interpretation of this verse takes it as a case of implicit domain restriction.

unrestricted domain of every person that exists; it quantifies only the domain that was explicitly restricted by the phrase “in the audience.”

This domain restriction can also be left somewhat implicit. For example, “Everyone laughed” contains no explicit domain restriction. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the universal quantifier “everyone” is intended to quantify the unrestricted domain of every person that exists. Instead, whatever restriction there is to the domain quantified by “everyone” is left to be inferred.

Linguists disagree on how this implicit domain restriction occurs. Some favor a syntactic explanation, positing an ellipsis that contains the domain restriction (Collins 2018). Under this understanding, “Everyone laughed” would be short for “Everyone in the audience laughed,” with “in the audience” safely ellipsed because it was already contextually present. Others prefer a semantic explanation whereby a covert operator activates a more restricted domain (Stanley and Szabó 2000). Under this understanding, “everyone” would have the more specific contextually-derived meaning of “everyone in the audience.” Still others advocate a pragmatic explanation in keeping with Grice’s cooperative conversation principles (Bach 1994, 2000), specifically the maxims of relation (“Be relevant”) and manner (“Be brief”; “avoid unnecessary prolixity”) (Grice 1989, 27). Under this understanding, “everyone laughed” simply means “everyone laughed”; however, a hearer knows to interpret the statement in a way that is relevant to the context, and this means inferring that the domain of “everyone” is restricted to those in the audience.

Adjudicating between these theoretical approaches lies outside the scope of this thesis. Instead, what is relevant here is what the three approaches agree on. They all agree that hearers are supposed to be able to recover the unexpressed domain restriction from the context of the statement. Similarly, although the three approaches would differ over whether the domain restriction “in the audience” is there via ellipsis, as part of the contextually-derived meaning of “everyone,” or by being pragmatically implied, they would use the same phrase to communicate the implicit domain restriction vis-à-vis the sentence’s context.

The English quantifier “all” shows two other noteworthy patterns relating to domain restriction. The first pattern concerns times when “all” is used without the explicit inclusion of a noun that it modifies. In such nounless instances, when some domain restriction is intended, “all” will generally not be found by itself. Instead, there will be a referential pronoun (either anaphoric or deictic) that points to the restricted domain. For example, it is more natural to say, “All of

them laughed," or, with quantifier-pronoun flip (Maling 1976), "They all laughed," as opposed to simply, "All laughed."

The second pattern concerns times when "all" quantifies a plural noun. Nouns whose referents are identifiable are marked as such by the presence of a definite article. Because these definite articles mark contextual identifiability (Comrie 1989, 128), they interact similarly with implicit domain restriction as do other quantifiers (Neale 1990, 46, 180; Cooper 1996). The very fact that the context enables a hearer to recover an unexpressed definite domain restriction automatically entails that the referent is identifiable and, as such, will have the definite article. This results in an observable correlation between the domain restriction of "all" and the presence of a definite article. When the domain is restricted to a definite set, the definite article will be present. However, when no definite article is present, there is no intended restriction to the domain of "all" so as to make it refer to a definite set (Matthewson 2001, 167–74). Compare the domain-unrestricted statement "All animals have tails" with the domain-restricted statement "All the animals have tails."

However, the definite article will not be present when the implicit restriction to the domain intends an indefinite set (i.e., one with potential members). As indefinite implicit domain restriction correlates with nonveridicality, this phenomenon is discussed in section 4.5, which addresses how πᾶς interacts with nonveridicality.

4.4.2 Within the Biblical Greek corpus

Throughout the Biblical Greek corpus πᾶς often has its domain restricted. Sometimes this domain restriction is entirely explicit. For example, it does not simply say that Herod the Great "killed all" in an unrestricted domain or even "killed all the children" with a partially restricted domain. Instead, it says that he killed specifically "all (πάντας) the children in Bethlehem and in all its vicinity from two years old and younger" (Matt 2:16). Similarly, Paul does not simply say his letter to the Galatians comes from "all" in an unrestricted domain, or even from "all the brothers" in a partially restricted domain. Instead, he says that it comes from specifically "all (πάντες) the brothers with me" (Gal 1:2).

More commonly, however, the domain restriction intended for πᾶς is left at least somewhat implicit. This matter of the implicit restriction to the domain of πᾶς is something the NT even discusses. After citing Psalm 8:7, "You placed everything (πάντα) beneath his feet," Paul immediately clarifies that God the Father is obviously not included within the domain of

"everything" here (1 Cor 15:27). Interestingly, when Auctor quotes this same verse, he explicitly notes that nothing is outside the domain of this "everything" and makes no mention of the fact that God is not included (Heb 2:8). However, this does not contradict what Paul said. Rather, it shows that it was so obvious that God was outside the domain of πάντα here that it did not occur to Auctor that someone would ever consider God to be included in it (Bruce 1990, 74).

It seldom proved necessary to identify that the domain of πᾶς was restricted to created things. For example, it simply says, "All things (πάντα) were made through him, and not one of the things that has come to be came to be without him" (John 1:3). More specifically, when πᾶς is used in the masculine as opposed to the neuter, it is often self-evident that the domain is restricted—at the very least—to the human race. In hearing, "Everyone (πάντες) was going to register, each to his own city" (Luke 2:3), no one would ever think animals or angels are included within the domain of πάντες.

Four more specific implicit restrictions can be placed on the domain of πᾶς beyond these. The domain will always be implicitly restricted to what is relevant to the context. As the various linguistic approaches to implicit domain restriction agree, these contextually-derived implicit domain restrictions can always be made explicit.

The first kind restricts the domain to that which is relevant to the topic at hand. "All" denotes all that are being discussed. In the parable of the wedding banquet, the servants were to tell the invited guests, "I have prepared my dinner. My bulls and fattened calf are slaughtered, and everything (πάντα) is ready" (Matt 22:4). Even without any explicit domain restriction, πάντα is not meant to quantify over every item in the universe, as if the host had ensured everything in the world was now ready for some unspecified purpose. Instead, the domain of πάντα is implicitly restricted to that which is relevant to the topic at hand: "Everything [for the dinner being discussed] is ready."

The second kind restricts the domain to that which is relevant to the setting. "All" denotes all that are present. At the feeding of the five thousand, it says that "all (πάντες) ate and became full" (Mark 6:42). Even without any explicit domain restriction, πάντες is still not meant to quantify over every person in the universe, as if Jesus had miraculously fed the whole world on this occasion. Instead, the domain of πάντες is implicitly restricted to those who were

relevant to the setting by actually being there at that time: “Everyone [who was present] ate and became full.”

The third kind restricts the domain to that which is relevant to the person. “All” denotes all of that person’s. In the parable of the lost son, Jesus describes the younger son as first “gathering up” and then “wasting everything (πάντα)” (Luke 15:13–14). Even without any explicit domain restriction, πάντα is still not meant to quantify over everything in the universe, as if the prodigal son had gathered and wasted all things in existence. Instead, the domain of πάντα is implicitly restricted to that which was relevant to the person: “Gathering up” and “wasting everything [he had].”

The fourth kind restricts the domain so as to exclude another party mentioned in the sentence. “All” denotes all the others. Jesus asks if the Galileans killed by Pilate “were worse sinners than all (πάντας) the Galileans” (Luke 13:2). In addition to the explicit restriction placed on the domain of πάντας to limit it to Galileans, the context implicitly limits the domain to the Galileans that were not the Galileans killed by Pilate: “Do you think that these Galileans were worse sinners than all the [other] Galileans?” English seems to require making this kind of domain restriction explicit for the statement to seem well-formed.

Subsection 4.4.1 showed two patterns for how the English quantifier “all” is used; however, only one of these patterns applies to the Greek quantifier πᾶς. When πᾶς is used without a noun, it does not need to include a referential pronoun for there to be an implicit restriction to the domain. This usage differs from the English word “all,” where a referential pronoun will be used to make the domain restriction explicit.[21] For example, the Sadducees can say to Jesus, “For all (πάντες) had her” (Matt 22:28), referring not to all people in the world marrying the hypothetical woman but only the seven brothers mentioned in the previous sentence. In English, it would be necessary to make explicit that “all” referred back to an already identifiable domain: “For [they] all had her” or “For all [of them] had her.” So, for those nounless instances of πᾶς, the lack of a referential pronoun cannot be taken as indicative of an unrestricted domain as it might with the English quantifier “all.”

The other pattern observed for how the English quantifier “all” is used does hold true with the Greek quantifier πᾶς. When πᾶς is used with a plural noun, and so would correspond with the

[21] This difference between the languages results from Greek’s acceptance of null anaphora (Welo 2014).

English “all” (as opposed to its use with a singular count noun, where it would correspond with the English “every”), that noun will have the article when there is a restriction intended to the domain such that a definite set is intended (i.e., one with defined members).[22] For example, it is said that at the beginning of his third missionary journey, Paul was “strengthening all the disciples (πάντας τοὺς μαθητάς) [who were there]” (Acts 18:23).

However, as with English, the article will not be present when the implicit restriction to the domain intends an indefinite set (i.e., one with potential members). As indefinite implicit domain restriction correlates with nonveridicality, this phenomenon is discussed in section 4.5, which addresses how πᾶς interacts with nonveridicality.

4.4.3 Analysis

Often πᾶς quantifies over a restricted domain, and often this domain restriction is left at least somewhat implicit and is to be recovered from the context. When πᾶς is used without a noun, the restriction can be left entirely implicit, unlike in English, where a referential pronoun would be used. When πᾶς is used with a plural noun, that noun will also have the article when the domain is restricted so as to refer to a definite set. The many times within the Biblical Greek corpus where the domain of πᾶς is implicitly restricted to what is relevant for the context include many of the passages cited as linguistic parallels for the “all without distinction” reading of πᾶς.

Sometimes the domain of πᾶς is implicitly restricted to that which is relevant to the topic in that it refers to those entities already under discussion.[23]

> And at my table you will eat your fill of horse and rider, mighty men and every warrior (πάντα ἄνδρα πολεμιστήν) [within the army being discussed] (Ezek 39:20).

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[22] This is due to the obligatory role of the Greek article in identifying the noun as being identifiable (Bakker 2009, 162–71; Napoli 2019, 28; Guardiano 2019, 68–74, 77).

[23] Also 1 Chr 22:15; Isa 66:23; Jer 31:34 (OG 38:34); Luke 17:27; Rom 14:2 (where the reference to eating obviously restricts the domain of “everything” to food); 1 Cor 9:22; 12:6; Col 3:11; 1 Tim 6:10 (which may alternatively be hyperbolic). Perhaps also Ps 14:3 (OG 13:3), whose domain may have no intended restriction, as Paul cites these verses in support of the teaching of universal unrighteousness (Rom 3:11–12) and modern commentators have demonstrated that there are coherent ways to read Ps 14 in this way without violating the context (Boice 2005, 116–17; Saleska 2020, 293–99). At the same time, the domain of πᾶς could be implicitly restricted to the class of fools mentioned in the opening verse of the psalm. What renders such a reading of the verse especially plausible is the fact that the Hebrew underlying πάντες is not the anarthrous כֹּל but the arthrous הַכֹּל, since the article is used anaphorically with כֹּל to show that the domain is restricted to something under discussion (BDB, s.v.).

> For [they] all (πάντες) sinned and lack the glory of God, being justified freely, by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus (Rom 3:23–24).[24]

Sometimes the domain of πᾶς is implicitly restricted to that which is relevant to the setting in that it refers to those entities present in that place and at that time.

> Jeremiah sent a letter from Jerusalem to Babylon to the captivity, to the elders in captivity and to the priests and to the false prophets and to all the [other] people [who were there] (ἅπαντα τὸν λαόν) (Jer 29:1 [OG 36:1]).

> He went into the temple and all the people (πᾶς ὁ λαός) [who were present] were coming to him (John 8:2).

Sometimes the domain of πᾶς is implicitly restricted to that which is relevant to a person.[25]

> I have no one like-minded who will be sincerely concerned about your interests, for all (οἱ πάντες) [of them that I do have right now] seek their own interests, not the interests of Jesus Christ (Phil 2:20–21).

> We always pray for you that our God may fulfil every desire (πᾶσαν εὐδοκίαν) for goodness [that you have] (2 Thess 1:11).

Restriction to entities that are relevant to a person can mean that the intended domain is implicitly restricted to those who are a part of the audience's people-group.

> I will also pour out my Spirit onto every fleshy being (πᾶσαν σάρκα) [who is part of your people] (Joel 2:28 [OG 3:1]/Acts 2:17).[26]

---

[24] Commentators struggle over the connection between "all" and "being justified," yet the simple solution (Johnston 2011) is that this context provides implicit domain restriction, as the previous verse has just spoken specifically of "all who believe." Even though it is true that all, and not merely all believers, sinned, this sentence is only considering why there is no basis for distinction between Jewish and Gentile Christians: They all have sinned, having their righteousness only through Christ.

[25] Also, Luke 2:1; John 4:29; 1 Tim 2:8; Titus 2:14; 1 Pet 1:15.

[26] The context of the book of Joel, and especially the immediately preceding verses, makes clear this prophecy is in reference to the people of God. This reading is also confirmed by the immediately subsequent references not merely to sons, daughters, old men, and young men, but specifically to "your sons," "your daughters," "your old men," and "your young men" (Garrett 1997, 369).

Sometimes the domain of πᾶς is implicitly restricted to exclude a particular entity that is mentioned.

> Every [other] sin (πᾶν ἁμάρτημα) a human being commits is outside the body, but the one who commits adultery is sinning against his own body (1 Cor 6:18).

> As you abound in everything (παντί) [else], … see to it that you also abound in this grace (2 Cor 8:7).

The most striking way that πᾶς is implicitly restricted to what is relevant is when God or Christ is said to be everything, not in that he is the only one who exists but in that he is the only one who is relevant.

> God will be all in all (τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν) [that is relevant] (1 Cor 15:28).

> But Christ is all (τὰ πάντα) [that is relevant] and is in all (Col 3:11).

These patterns for how the domain of πᾶς can be implicitly restricted serve as a way to test whether a given instance of πᾶς might similarly have its domain restricted. For example, when Paul states, "If it is only in this life that we have put hope in Christ, we are the most pathetic of all people (πάντων ἀνθρώπων)" (1 Cor 15:19), this does not admit any of the kinds of implicit domain restriction observed elsewhere. It would not fit the context to say that we Christians are the most pathetic of "all people [being discussed]" (topic-relevance), of "all people [who are here]" (setting-relevance), of "all people [we have]" (person-relevance), or of "all [other] people" (excluding mentioned party). Because none of these restrictions to the domain work in this context, the domain of πάντων must not be implicitly restricted to some definite set. The fact that the plural noun ἀνθρώπων does not have the article is further indication that here are indicated all human beings.

4.4.4 Passages of interest

Special comment is merited by three passages that are best understood as instances of implicit domain restriction. This further comment is necessitated either by the frequency with which the passage is cited as a parallel or because the implicit domain restriction, while present, proves somewhat more difficult to recover.

4.4.4.1 John 10:8

"All (πάντες) who came before me are thieves and robbers."

While there is considerable discussion over whom Jesus is referring to when he says, "all who came before me," no one interprets the phrase as if it referred to every previous human being throughout history (Brown 1974, 393–94; Carson 1991, 384–85; Morris 1995, 450–51; Beasley-Murray 1999, 170; Klink 2016, 462). The context of Jesus's discourse makes clear that the domain is not all people but a much narrower group.

Many commentators find it necessary to clarify that the OT patriarchs and prophets must somehow be excluded (Carson 1991, 384; Morris 1995, 450–51; Beasley-Murray 1999, 170; Klink 2016, 462). They seem to assume that the domain of "all who came before me" is implicitly restricted to all religious leaders (Brown 1974, 393–94; Beasley-Murray 1999, 170). If such is the case, those patriarchs and prophets would be excluded from this reference via hyperbole: "[Practically] all who came before me [as religious leaders] are thieves and robbers."

More likely, however, the domain of "all who came before me" is restricted more narrowly than to the category of religious leaders. Jesus has just called himself the gate for the sheep (v. 7), which is to say that he is the only way to salvation (v. 9). This suggests that the domain of "all who came before me" is implicitly restricted to "messianic pretenders" (Carson 1991, 385) or "other, potential candidates" (Klink 2016, 462) who had set themselves up as competitors with Jesus, attempting to usurp his role as the gate by setting themselves up as a rival way to salvation: "All who came before me [who tried to be the gate for the sheep] are thieves and robbers."

It is also possible that "all who came before me" is even more restricted than that. It could be restricted to those rival religious teachers of Jesus's day (Morris 1995, 451) or perhaps going back only as far as the Hasmonean period (Brown 1974, 393–94). Such an interpretation is bolstered by the fact that Jesus says not those people *were* thieves and robbers but *are* (εἰσίν) thieves and robbers (Morris 1995, 451): "All [contemporaries] who came before me [as rival leaders] are thieves and robbers."

Regardless of whether we can define exactly whom Jesus meant to include within this comment, it is clear that πάντες has its domain restricted. The interpretive question is not a

result of any ambiguity in the universal quantifier but of the apparent vagueness of the explicitly restricted domain: “those who came before me.”

4.4.4.2 John 12:32

“And as for me, if I am lifted up from the earth, I will draw [them] all (πάντας) to myself.”

This verse is often considered among the strongest evidence in favor of the “all without distinction” interpretation. The fact that there are non-Jews are in the context (the Greeks who came to see Jesus in vv. 20–21) lends some credence to the idea that here is meant “all kinds of people” and not simply “all.”

Nevertheless, this verse can be understood in a way that does not require πᾶς to have such a meaning. Unlike many of the other passages for which the “all without distinction” reading has been utilized, here there is only the bare quantifier πάντας and no quantified noun. While universally quantified nouns will always be arthrous if their domain is implicitly restricted to refer to a definite set, the bare quantifier requires no explicit indication of its anaphorically restricted domain in Greek. In English, this restriction would likely have to be made explicit: “I will draw [them] all to myself.”

Michaels (2010, 684) renders the verse in just that way, connecting the πάντας drawn to Jesus with the sizable crop (v. 24) of those servants who would follow after Jesus (v. 26) (685, 699–700). However, when English translations choose to render πάντας as “all people” (CSB, ESV, ISV, LEB, NASB, NIV, NRSV, WEB), they make it almost impossible for readers to catch the implicitly restricted domain, because English would have to make the anaphora explicit. To some degree this translation choice is unsurprising, as the amount of intervening text since the last reference to Jesus’s servants does make such an implicit domain restriction somewhat easier to overlook. Nevertheless, connecting πάντας with that earlier reference to Jesus’s many followers fits, because vv. 31–32 are clearly meant to tie up the discussion of vv. 23–26. Although the context of John 12:32 does not lead a reader to the implicit domain restriction as clearly as context normally does or ideally should, still an implicit domain restriction can be discerned when πάντας is read (or rendered in English) anaphorically.

4.4.4.3 1 Corinthians 15:22

“For just as in Adam all (πάντες) die, so also in Christ all (πάντες) will be made alive.”

The first "all" could be understood without any restriction, but the second "all" cannot.[27] There are two possible ways to account for the restricted scope of πάντες here.

The first way is to understand the domains of both instances of "all" as being implicitly restricted by the larger context (Fee 2014, 830–31; Taylor 2014, 386). Throughout this chapter, Paul has been speaking only of the death and resurrection of believers. This verse, then, would compare not the death of all people with the resurrection of believers but the same believers' Adam-induced death with their Christ-induced resurrection: "For just as in Adam [they] all die, so also in Christ [they] all will be made alive."

The second way is to understand the domains of both instances of "all" as being explicitly restricted by the phrases "in Adam" and "in Christ" (Garland 2003, 707; Taylor 2014, 386). These (metaphorical) locational phrases define who the "all" refers to: all who are in Adam/Christ. It would be similar to how the statement "In China everyone eats rice" does not mean that everyone in the world goes to China and there eats rice but that everyone who is in China eats rice. In much the same way, "In Christ all will be made alive" would mean not that all will be made alive in Christ but that all who are in Christ will be made alive.

4.4.4.4 Analysis

Communication is not always perfectly clear, and that includes the implicit restriction of the domains of universal quantifiers. Most often, the intended domain is so obvious that a hearer does not realize that they had to infer something to understand what they are hearing. Nevertheless, it can and does happen where a hearer is unable to immediately infer the domain over which πᾶς is intended to quantify. However, a careful reading of the context clarifies, if not exactly what the confines are of that restricted domain, then at least the fact that there is some such intended restricted domain.

4.5 πᾶς with Nonveridicality

4.5.1 Crosslinguistic principles

Some words and phrases can be used in negative sentences but cannot be used in most positive sentences. Such expressions are called "negative polarity items" (NPIs) (Baker 1970). A

[27] What is being discussed in 1 Cor 15 is not merely the resurrection of all people either to life or condemnation (Dan 12:3; John 5:29) but more specifically the idea of believers being raised to eternal life (cf. "those who have fallen asleep" in vv. 18 and 20).

common English NPI would be the phrase “at all.” It can be used in a negative sentence, such as “He didn’t like the food at all,” but not in the corresponding positive sentence “He liked the food at all.”

The English indefinite adjective “any” and the corresponding pronouns “anyone” and “anything” are NPIs. They can be used in negative sentences but not in most positive sentences. For example, someone can say “He didn’t eat anything yesterday,” but not “He ate anything yesterday.”

While NPIs are named for the negative contexts in which they are used, they can also be found in several other types of nonnegative sentences. Examples include the protases of conditionals (e.g., “If he liked the food at all,” “If he ate anything yesterday”), modal expressions (e.g., “You may order anything at all,” “He could eat anything”), and generics/habituals (e.g., “Any cow will eat grass,” “He likes any food,” “He used to eat anything”).[28] What all these types of sentences have in common is that they are not making a positive assertion of truth about a specific event. In keeping with this commonality, Giannakidou (1998, 2002) classifies these types of sentences under the general designation “nonveridicality.”

These nonveridicality operators (i.e., negation, conditionality, modality, genericity/habituality) can scope either over all of a sentence or only over part of it (Van Valin 2005, 8–16). Different languages employ different kinds of words as NPIs depending on whether the NPI scopes over the nonveridicality operator or the nonveridicality operator scopes over the NPI. Some languages, such as English, use an indefinite (“any”) that is outscoped by a negative. Other languages use universal quantifiers (“every”) that outscope the negative (Giannakidou 2000, 2006; Giannakidou and Zeijlstra 2017). Compare the following approaches:[29]

> Negation outscopes indefinite: <It is NOT <that he ate anything yesterday>>.
>
> Universal outscopes negation: <As for EVERYTHING, <he did not eat it yesterday>>.

[28] According to Carlson (2005), there is no hard-and-fast distinction between generics and habituals, though the most standard differentiation is made on whether the subject refers to a generic kind (generic) or a specific entity (habitual). Since such a distinction bears no apparent significance when it comes to how such genericity/habituality operators interact with quantifiers, I treat generics and habituals together as a single category, while also attempting to provide examples of both.

[29] Angle brackets are used to clarify which element in the sentence is outscoping the other.

This same difference between languages occurs in the nonnegative contexts that can use NPIs. In languages like English, the nonveridicality operator outscopes an indefinite quantifier. However, in languages where the nonveridicality operator does not have as wide a scope, a universal quantifier is used.

This pattern is seen in conditionals:

> Conditionality outscopes indefinite: <On the CONDITION <that he ate anything yesterday>>,
>
> Universal outscopes conditionality: <As for EVERYTHING, <if he ate it yesterday>>,

This pattern is also seen in modal expressions:

> Modality outscopes indefinite: <It is PERMISSIBLE <for you to eat anything>>.
>
> Universal outscopes modality: <As for EVERYTHING, <you may eat it>>.

With genericity/habituality operators, English can employ either indefinite or universal quantifiers with no significant difference in meaning. However, in languages where the quantifier outscopes the genericity/habituality operator, a universal quantifier will be used.

> Genericity outscopes indefinite/universal: <As for the GENERIC CLASS of cow, <any/every one of them will eat grass>>.
>
> Universal outscopes genericity: <EVERY one <of the generic class of cows will eat grass>>.
>
> Habituality outscopes indefinite/universal: <It was his HABIT <to eat anything/everything>>.
>
> Universal outscopes habituality: <As for EVERYTHING, <he used to eat it>>.

Languages in which universal quantifiers will outscope the nonveridicality operator also tend to display negative concord (Giannakidou 2000, 2006; Giannakidou and Zeijlstra 2017).[30] Ancient Greek is a negative-concord language, regularly using two negative items together to

[30] Negative concord refers to when a language uses multiple negatives to communicate a single negative. This is as opposed to double negation, where each negative retains its force, even if that means the two negatives will effectively cancel each other out.

communicate a negative statement (Horrocks 2014; Muchnová 2016). This raises the expectation that it will use universal quantifiers to outscope nonveridicality operators to communicate the same thoughts that would be expressed in English using indefinite quantifiers outscoped by nonveridicality operators.

4.5.2 Within the Biblical Greek corpus

The Hebrew universal quantifier כֹּל is known to often function as an NPI (Van der Merwe, Naudé, and Kroeze 2017, §41.9d; Doron 2020). However, the interaction between πᾶς and negative polarity in the NT remains an unstudied phenomenon (Miller-Naudé and Naudé 2021, 8). Negatives being found with πᾶς where English would use "any" has long been attributed to Semitic influence (Winer 1882, 214–16). However, apart from the question of the origin of this pattern of quantification, the fact remains that the Biblical Greek corpus does frequently feature universal quantifiers that outscope nonveridicality operators in contexts where English would use indefinite quantifiers that are outscoped by nonveridicality operators.

This pattern is seen in negated statements, such as "If the Lord had not cut the days short, every (πᾶσα) fleshy being would not be saved" (Mark 13:20).

> English (negation outscopes indefinite): <It would NOT be <that any fleshly being would be saved>>.
>
> Greek (universal outscopes negative): <As for EVERY fleshy being, <they would not be saved>>.

This pattern is seen in conditionals, such as "If two of you on earth agree about every (παντός) matter you ask about, it will be done for you by my Father in heaven" (Matt 18:19).

> English (conditionality outscopes indefinite): <On the CONDITION <that two of you on earth agree on any matter you ask about>>,
>
> Greek (universal outscopes conditionality): <For EVERY matter you ask about, <if two of you on earth agree on it>>,

This pattern is seen in modal expressions, such as "Eat everything (πᾶν) sold in the market without asking questions because of conscience" (1 Cor 10:25).

English (modality outscopes indefinite): <It is PERMISSIBLE <for you to eat anything sold in the market>>.

Greek (universal outscopes modality): <As for EVERYTHING sold in the market, <you may eat it>>.

With genericity/habituality operators, English can employ either indefinite or universal quantifiers with no significant difference in meaning. In Greek, where the quantifier will outscope the genericity/habituality operator, a universal quantifier will be consistently used. This pattern is seen in generics, such as "Everyone (πᾶς) who believes is justified in him" (Acts 13:39).

English (genericity outscopes indefinite/universal): <As for the GENERIC CLASS of believers, <any/every one of them [that there may be] is justified in him>>.

Greek (universal outscopes genericity): <EVERY one <of the generic class of believers [that there may be] is justified in him>>.

This pattern is also seen in habituals, such as "Let us do good to everyone" (Gal 6:10).

English (habituality outscopes indefinite/universal): <Let us be in the HABIT <of doing good to anyone/everyone [that we may encounter]>>.

Greek (universal outscopes habituality): <As for EVERYONE [that we may encounter], <let us be in the habit of doing good to them>>.

These last examples show that habitual or generic expressions often contain implicit domain restrictions. However, there is a significant difference in the manner of these implicit domain restrictions over against those discussed in section 4.4. There, the domain was implicitly restricted so as to refer to a definite set. As a result, any plural nouns modified by πᾶς would always have the article when restricted in this way, with the article marking the quantified set as being cognitively identifiable. However, plural nouns modified by πᾶς will not necessarily have the article when the statement is a habitual/generic, because the domain is not being restricted to a definite set but to an indefinite set. The members of this set are not cognitively identifiable but represent a group with merely open and potential membership.[31] An example

[31] This potential membership is reflected by the use of the modal "may" while making explicit the implicit domain restrictions.

of the plural noun quantified by πᾶς being left anarthrous when there is indefinite implicit domain restriction resulting from a genericity/habituality operator can be seen in 2 Peter 3:16: "The way he talks about these things in all letters (πάσαις ἐπιστολαῖς) [that he may write]."

4.5.3 Analysis

It is true that כֹּל and πᾶς are at times used where other languages, such as English, would use an indefinite such as "any." As a result, some grammarians have tried to claim that these words can mean not just "every" but also "any" (Moulton and Turner 1963, 199–200). However, even when כֹּל and πᾶς would be appropriately glossed with "any," this does not mean that they have ceased to be universal quantifiers. The contexts in which "any" is the appropriate gloss are all nonveridical in nature, and the universal quantifier outscopes the nonveridicality operator present.

The clearest and most frequent examples of πᾶς interacting with nonveridicality operators within the Biblical Greek corpus are when that nonveridicality operator is a negative. However, seldom are such passages cited as linguistic parallels for the "all without distinction" interpretation because Hebrew and Greek lexica have long documented this use of כֹּל and πᾶς, even if a full linguistic explanation of the phenomenon was lacking. Nevertheless, two of the purported parallel passages for the "all without distinction" reading are ones where the nonveridicality operator is a negative. The first is "All impurity (ἀκαθαρσία πᾶσα) should not be mentioned among you" (Eph 5:3), which also has a modal operator in addition to the negative.

> English (negation and modality outscope indefinite): <It is NOT PERMISSIBLE <that any impurity should be mentioned>>.
>
> Greek (universal outscopes negation and modality): <ALL impurity <should not be mentioned>>.

The second is: "Unfit for every good work (πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθόν)" (Titus 1:16).

> English (negation outscopes indefinite): <NOT fit <for any good work>>.
>
> Greek (universal outscopes negation): <For EVERY good work <unfit>>.

There is one conditional cited as supporting the "all without distinction" reading: "Blessed are you whenever they hate you and persecute you and falsely say every evil (πᾶν πονηρὸν) against you for my sake" (Matt 5:11).[32]

> English (conditionality outscopes indefinite): <WHENEVER <they say anything evil against you>>,
>
> Greek (universal outscopes conditionality): <As for EVERYTHING evil, <whenever they say it against you>>,

Excluding the earlier example where both a negative and a modal operator were present (Eph 5:3), there is one additional supposed parallel that has a nonveridicality operator that is modal in nature: "You may surely eat from every [other][33] tree (παντὸς ξύλου) in paradise" (Gen 2:16).

> English (modality outscopes indefinite): <It is PERMISSIBLE <for you to eat from any [other] tree in paradise>>.
>
> Greek (universal outscopes modality): <From EVERY [other] tree in paradise <you may eat>>.

Most of the alleged parallels for the "all without distinction" interpretation have a nonveridicality operator that is a generic/habitual. In these instances, English can use either a universal or an indefinite quantifier with no apparent difference in what the sentence asserts. These uses of πᾶς, in addition to their interaction with the genericity/habituality operator, also have their domains implicitly restricted to indefinite sets.

Among those passages cited for the "all without distinction" interpretation, genericity operators are found in passages that tell the audience to do something with any and all of some such thing that they have. In addition to the interaction here between πᾶς and the genericity operator, there is also an obvious implicit domain restriction. The audience has no problem understanding they are being told to do something with all such something as they have, and not with all that exist throughout the world. Within the NT, πᾶς is used in this way specifically to tell the audience

[32] There is also an example that is not a syntactic conditional, but has a substantivized adjectival phrase that operates analogously: "So that we can comfort those who are in every trouble (τοὺς ἐν πάσῃ θλίψει)" (2 Cor 1:4).

[33] This domain is also implicitly restricted to all those trees besides the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, mentioned explicitly as the sentence continues in the subsequent verse.

to get rid of all such vices that they may have, not to rid others of those vices. One example of this would be: "All bitterness (πᾶσα πικρία) and rage and wrath and shouting should be removed from you, along with all wickedness (πάσῃ κακίᾳ)" (Eph 4:31).[34]

> English (genericity outscopes indefinite/universal): <As for the GENERIC CATEGORY of bitterness, <remove any/all of it [that you may have]>>.
>
> Greek (universal outscopes genericity): <As for ALL [that you may have] <of the generic category of bitterness, remove it>>.

As for the alleged parallels that contain habituality operators, some are passages that speak of ongoing, habitual action, such as "Healing every sickness (πᾶσαν νόσον) and every disease (πᾶσαν μαλακίαν) among the people [who may have been encountered]" (Matt 4:23).[35]

> English (habituality outscopes indefinite/universal): <In the HABIT <of healing any/every sickness [that he might encounter]>>.
>
> Greek (universal outscopes habituality): <As for EVERY sickness [that he might encounter], <habitually healing it>>.

Some are passages that tell the audience to habitually engage in a certain action, such as "Showing all gentleness to all people (πάντας ἀνθρώπους)" (Titus 3:2).[36]

> English (habituality outscopes indefinite/universal): <Be in the HABIT <of being completely gentle toward any/all people [that may be encountered]>>.
>
> Greek (universal outscopes habituality): <As for ALL people [that may be encountered], <be in the habit of being gentle toward them>>.

[34] Also, Luke 12:15; 2 Cor 7:1; Jam 1:21; 1 Pet 2:1. Acts 27:20 works the same with respect to the interaction of the genericity operator and πᾶς, but does not tell people to remove any and all of something they may have had. Instead, it speaks of people losing any and all of something they may have had.

[35] Also, Matt 9:35; 2 Cor 3:2; 10:5; Col 1:28.

[36] Also, Rom 12:17–18; Phil 4:5; 1 Tim 2:1 (which is discussed at greater length in ch. 5).

Some are passages that speak to habitual dispositions and capabilities to engage at a certain action when the opportunity presents itself, such as "To be ready for every good work (πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθόν)" (Tit 3:1).[37]

> English (habituality outscopes indefinite/universal): <HABITUALLY ready <for any/every good work [that may present itself]>>.
>
> Greek (universal outscopes habituality): <For EVERY good work [that may present itself], <habitually ready>>.

The times when πᾶς could be licensed as an NPI are limited to negative statements, the protases of conditionals, modal expressions, and generics and habituals. Passages without one of these manners of nonveridicality would be unable to license such a use. This criterion provides a simple test as to whether πᾶς could be used as an NPI. For example, the statement that Jesus "has done all things (πάντα) well" (Mark 7:37) does not contain a nonveridicality operator, so πάντα here cannot be considered an NPI, nor can it be glossed as "anything."

Since πᾶς will outscope the nonveridicality operator, a second test for whether πᾶς could be being used as an NPI is to examine how πᾶς determines the meaning of the sentence by outscoping the rest of the sentence. In the passage just cited (Mark 7:37), πάντα outscopes the rest of the sentence in this way: <ALL things <he has done well>>. From this it can be seen that the verse is a positive statement referring to all things.

Genericity/habituality operators are harder to define or immediately recognize within a sentence as compared to the other kinds of nonveridicality operators. If there is a question as to whether a statement with πᾶς could be a generic/habitual, an easy test for this is to see if rendering the statement with universal and indefinite quantifiers produce the same assertion. Rendering πάντα in the passage just cited (Mark 7:37) with a universal would read: "He has done all things well." Rendering it with an indefinite would read: "He has done any things well." Since these are not equivalent propositions (and the second is not even grammatical), this verse contains no genericity/habituality operator.

[37] Also, Matt 10:1; Rom 10:12; 2 Cor 10:6.

4.5.4 Passages of interest

Special comment is merited by two passages that are cited as parallels for the "all without distinction" interpretation but that are better understood as instances of πᾶς interacting with a nonveridicality operator.

4.5.4.1 Acts 22:15

"For you will be his witness to all people (πάντας ἀνθρώπους) of the things you have seen and heard."

If someone were to call themselves a friend to all people, this would not mean they are actually friends with all people. It would merely communicate that it is their habitual disposition to be a friend to all without excluding any. Similarly, when it is said that Paul would be a witness to all people, this does not mean that he would actually witness to all people. It would merely communicate that it would be his ongoing charge to be witness to all, without excluding any.[38] Here πᾶς outscopes the habituality inherent in characterizing him with the noun μάρτυς.

> English (habituality outscopes indefinite/universal): <A HABITUAL witness <to any/all people [you may encounter]>>.
>
> Greek (universal outscopes habituality): <To ALL people [you may encounter] <a habitual witness >>.

4.5.4.2 Romans 5:18

"So, therefore, just as [it is] from one transgression, for all people (πάντας ἀνθρώπους), resulting in condemnation, so also [it is] from one righteous cause, for all people (πάντας ἀνθρώπους), resulting in a life-giving justification."

One of the things that makes this verse difficult is the lack of any verb. Most likely, the present-tense ἐστίν is to be inferred here, as that specific form is consistently what the unexpressed verb is in a verbless sentence when certain other features are not present (BDF, §127–28). Support for this inference is found in the fact that both the previous and subsequent verses

[38] Of course, it is also true that, even as Paul did not personally speak to every one of his contemporaries, through his ongoing testimony as recorded in his epistles Paul remains an objective witness to the whole world. If this ongoing witness is in view, the use of πάντες ἄνθρωποι in this verse would be very similar to one of the options given in ch. 3 for understanding the same phrase in John 1:9.

speak of living and standing righteous as future and not past events. Therefore, it is most likely that v. 18 does not say that Jesus's righteous cause resulted in justification for all people in the past but that it is generally the case that what comes from Jesus's righteous cause is for all people and that it results in a life-giving justification.

By this understanding, the sentence would be considered a habitual, and consideration should be given to how πᾶς interacts with such a nonveridicality operator. As the sentence would bear a habituality operator, and as πάντας ἀνθρώπους is anarthrous, the implicit domain restriction would be to an indefinite set.

> English (habituality outscopes indefinite/universal): <[The effect of] Jesus's righteous cause HABITUALLY is <for any/all people [who may receive it] for life-giving justification>>.
>
> Greek (universal outscopes habituality): <For ALL people [who may receive it] <[the effect of] Jesus's righteous cause habitually is for life-giving justification>>.

Normally verbless clauses will have a nominative-case noun to serve as the subject of the implied copula (Porter 1999, 85), but this verse lacks any nouns that are not the objects of prepositional phrases. The opaque nature of a sentence that is both nounless and verbless warrants considerable interpretative caution. We should be very hesitant to take such a summative slogan (ἄρα οὖν) as asserting anything more than what is already found within the immediate context. We should likewise be very reluctant to draw any further linguistic conclusions from such a verse.

4.5.4.3 Analysis

The use of πᾶς within Acts 22:15 and Romans 5:18 may, to a cursory reading, seem to assert something untrue if a universal sense for πᾶς is maintained. However, these seemingly more anomalous uses of the quantifier can be explained as further examples of the way in which the domain of πᾶς is often implicitly restricted to refer to an indefinite set when there is a genericity/habituality operator present.

4.6 πᾶς with Intensive Nouns

4.6.1 Crosslinguistic principles

Van de Velde (1995) defines a class of abstract nouns called "intensive nouns" (*les noms intensifs*). The distinguishing feature of intensive nouns is their gradability (Haas and Jugnet 2018). A word is gradable when it is not binary in reference but represents degrees on a scale (Kennedy 1999). For example, the adjectives "old," "safe," and "intelligent" are gradable adjectives because their degree can be scaled up and down with comparatives and superlatives ("older"/"oldest," "safer"/"safest," "more intelligent"/"most intelligent"). On the other hand, "dead," "married," and "gigantic" are nongradable adjectives because, as binary states, something either has that quality or it does not. You cannot say "deader"/"deadest," "more married"/"most married," or "more gigantic"/"most gigantic," at least not without attempting to push beyond the normal use of language for rhetorical effect.

While gradability is most easily seen and tested with adjectives, it is found in other parts of speech too, including verbs (Fleischhauer 2016) and nouns (Morzycki 2009). When a gradable noun or verb is quantified, the quantification indicates the degree and not the number of instances of that noun or verb. For example, in the sentence "He loves her a lot," "a lot" quantifies the degree to which he loves her because "love" is a gradable verb. On the other hand, in the sentence "He walks a lot," "a lot" quantifies the number of times that he walks because "walk" is a nongradable verb. The same effect is seen with nouns. In the sentence "He has more confidence than her," "more" quantifies the degree of confidence he has because "confidence" is a gradable noun. On the other hand, in the sentence "He has more furniture than her," "more" quantifies the number of pieces of furniture he has because "furniture" is a nongradable noun.

Intensive nouns can be quantified as to the number of instances they occur but are more often quantified as to the degree of their intensity (Nicolas 2010; Hinterwimmer 2020). This quantification includes quantifiers like "all." The use of "all" with intensive nouns is not common in contemporary English. Nevertheless, there are stock phrases such as "in all seriousness," "in all likelihood," "with all haste," and "all hell (broke loose)," where "all" indicates the degree of an intensive noun and not the number of instances of that quality. Consequently, these expressions could be paraphrased as "in an entirely serious way," "what is entirely likely," "as hastily as possible," and "something completely hellish."

4.6.2 Within the Biblical Greek corpus

Intensive nouns are not found with πᾶς in writings translated from Hebrew because כֹּל is not generally used with intensive nouns. BDB (s.v.) states that כֹּל is used "twice, strangely, with hyperb. intensive force," citing Psalms 39:6 (OG 38:6) and 45:14 (OG 44:14). Neither of these passages, however, are rendered by the OG using πᾶς and intensive nouns.[39] One passage that the OG does render using πᾶς and an intensive noun is Proverbs 4:23: "With all watchfulness (πάσῃ φυλακῇ) keep watch over your heart." However, as the BHS apparatus on this verse notes, this translation likely reads בְּכָל־מִשְׁמָר, "in all watchfulness," instead of the MT's מִכָּל־ מִשְׁמָר, "more than anything that is guarded."

It is a completely different story with those writings of the Biblical Greek corpus originally composed in Greek. In these, intensive nouns are used with πᾶς with some regularity to maximalize their degree. These uses of πᾶς have long been recognized within NT studies and have been traditionally referred to as the "elative" use of πᾶς (Riecke 1964, s.v., A.1.b; Johnston 2004, 79–88).

The prayer that God would grant them "to speak with all boldness (μετὰ παρρησίας πάσης)" (Acts 4:29) is asking not that their speech would be every possible instance of boldness but that their speech would be entirely bold, as in, reaching the highest degree of boldness. The instruction to receive Epaphroditus "with all joy (μετὰ πάσης χαρᾶς)" (Phil 2:29) is encouraging the Philippians not that the reception of Epaphroditus should represent every possible instance of joy but that their reception of him should be entirely joyful, as in, reaching the highest degree of joy. When the faithful-saying formula indicates that what was just said is "worthy of all acceptance (πάσης ἀποδοχῆς ἄξιος)" (1 Tim 4:9), this does not mean that this statement is the only truth that should be accepted but that it should be accepted entirely. In addition to these verses, and not even including those verses cited in support of the "all without distinction" interpretation, there are many other examples of this use of πᾶς with intensive nouns.[40]

[39] Psalm 39:6 (OG 38:6) has τὰ σύμπαντα ματαιότης, "the wholeness of vanity," and 45:14 (OG 44:14) has πᾶσα ἡ δόξα αὐτῆς, where the article and possessive pronoun communicate not the intensive meaning "all-gloriousness" but the referential meaning "all her glory."

[40] ἀλαζονεία (2 Macc 15:6), ἁμαρτία (PsS 17:20), ἀπάτη (2 Thess 2:10, if an adjectival abstract noun meaning "deceitfulness," but it would be a superordinate category if a verbal abstract noun meaning "trick"), ἁπλότης (2 Cor 9:11), ἀποδοχή (1 Tim 4:9), ἀσφάλεια (2 Macc 3:22; 15:1; Acts 5:23), δύναμις (Jud 4:15; 9:14; 13:4; 3 Macc 5:7; 7:9), εἰρήνη (2 Macc 3:1), ἐκτενία (2 Macc 14:38), ἐλεημοσύνη (Sir 16:14), ἐλπίς (2 Macc 15:7), ἐπιείκεια (2 Macc 2:22), εὐανδρία (2 Macc 15:17), εὐλογία (Tob 8:15), εὐσέβεια (1 Tim 2:2; 1 Pet 2:2), εὐφροσύνη (3

Because the English quantifier "all" does not naturally collocate with many intensive nouns, often "all" is not a natural gloss for πᾶς in this construction. Glosses such as "full" may be more profitable ("with full boldness," "with full joy," "worthy of full acceptance"). Alternatively, the intensive noun could be rendered as a different part of speech ("in an entirely bold way," "as joyfully as you can," "worthy of being accepted fully").

Although such a construction struggles, when translated, to retain more standard English glosses such as "all," the construction itself is not difficult to understand or identify. It is simply the universal quantifier πᾶς being used with intensive nouns to maximalize the degree of that intensive noun, and such a phenomenon occurs only with intensive nouns, a noun class defined as gradable abstract nouns.

4.6.3 Analysis

Many of the passages cited as linguistic parallels for the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς are really examples of πᾶς maximalizing the degree of an intensive noun:[41]

> Filled with all unrighteousness, evilness, greediness, and wickedness (πάσῃ ἀδικίᾳ πονηρίᾳ πλεονεξίᾳ κακίᾳ) (Rom 1:29). That is, "completely filled with …"
>
> The God of hope fill you with all joy and peace (πάσης χαρᾶς καὶ εἰρήνης) (Rom 15:13). That is, "with the full measure of joy and peace."
>
> Showing all gentleness (πᾶσαν ἐνδεικνυμένους πραΰτητα) to all people (Titus 3:2). That is, "acting completely gentle."

Macc 6:30), εὐχαριστία (Acts 24:3), παράκλησις (2 Cor 1:3), παρρησία (Acts 28:31; Phil 1:20), πίστις (Titus 2:10), πλοῦτος (Col 2:2), πραΰτης (Eph 4:2), προθυμία (Acts 17:11), προσκαρτέρησις (Eph 6:18), σεμνότης (1 Tim 2:2; 3:4), σπουδή (Jude 3), ταπεινοφροσύνη (Acts 20:19; Eph 4:2), φόβος (1 Pet 2:18), and χαρά (Jam 1:2).

[41] Also, ἀγαθωσύνη (Eph 5:9), ἀγαθόν (Heb 13:21), ἁγνεία (1 Tim 5:2), αἴσθησις (Phil 1:9), ἀλήθεια (Eph 5:9), ἀποδοχή (1 Tim 1:15), ἀρεσκεία (Col 1:10), αὐτάρκεια (2 Cor 9:8), γνῶσις (Rom 15:14; 1 Cor 1:5), δόλος (Acts 13:10), δικαιοσύνη (Eph 5:9), δύναμις (Col 1:11; 2 Thess 2:9, if an adjectival abstract noun meaning "power," but it would be a superordinate category if a verbal abstract noun meaning "demonstration of power"), ἐξουσία (Matt 28:18), ἐπιθυμία (Rom 7:8, about which Chrysostom [*Hom. Rom.* 12.5] notes that the use of πᾶς is for indicating intensity [σφοδρόν]), ἐπιταγή (Titus 2:15), ἔργον ἀγαθόν (2 Thess 2:17), εὐλογία (Eph 1:3, though the noun could also be meant concretely here, with no restriction to πᾶς necessary), λόγος/λόγος ἀγαθός (1 Cor 1:5; 2 Thess 2:17, with the meaning of speech/speaking ability), ἀκροθυμία (Col 1:11; 2 Tim 4:2), ῥᾳδιουργία (Acts 13:10), σοφία (Acts 7:22; Eph 1:8; Col 1:9, 28; 3:16), σπουδή (2 Cor 8:7; 2 Pet 1:5), συνείδησις ἀγαθά (Acts 23:1), σύνεσις (Col 1:9), τιμή (1 Tim 6:1), φρόνησις (Eph 1:8), ὑπομονή (2 Cor 12:12; Col 1:11), and χάρις (2 Cor 9:8; 1 Pet 5:10).

> A woman should learn in quietness, in all submission (πάσῃ ὑποταγῇ) (1 Tim 2:11). That is, "in a fully submissive way."

Although an attempt has been made to blur and conflate this so-called elative use of πᾶς with the concept of "kinds" (Johnston 2004, 83), this construction, where πᾶς maximalizes the degree of an intensive noun, does not really resemble in any way what the "all without distinction" interpretation alleges. The reason why such verses have been appealed to as support for that interpretation is because languages like English do not readily employ such a construction. Because of this difference between the languages, translators and exegetes have failed to grasp how this degree-maximalization works, and so they have resorted to understandings and renderings that imply kinds (e.g., "all kinds of wisdom" or "all kinds of wickedness"). Such faulty interpretations and glosses have then been used to support the "all without distinction" interpretation. However, when these expressions are rightly recognized as speaking not to kind but to degree, and are further recognized as rising directly from the nature of the intensive nouns, such passages will be quickly removed from the list of those used to support the "all without distinction" interpretation.

4.7 πᾶς with Collective Nouns

4.7.1 Crosslinguistic principles

Collective nouns are singular nouns such as "group," "family," or "committee" that are made up of multiple members. Despite consisting of a plurality of members, collective nouns are not semantically the same as plurals but should be considered singular abstract entities (Barker 1992; Schwarzschild 1996, 159–92; Wisniewski, Clancy, and Tillman 2005, 108, 113–15). Collective nouns can receive either distributive or group-level predication (Ritchie 2014, 2017).

Distributive predication is when the predicate applies to each of the individuals that make up the collective noun. For example, in the sentence "The team put on their sneakers," the predicate "put on their sneakers" is predicated of each of the individual members of the team. The meaning of such a sentence could be unpacked as: "Player A put on his sneakers, Player B put on his sneakers, etc."

Group-level predication is when the predicate applies to the group itself and not to the individuals it is comprised of. For example, in the sentence "The team has ten players," the

predicate “has ten players” is predicated of the team as a group and cannot be predicated of any of the players individually. The meaning of this sentence could *not* be unpacked as: “Player A has ten players, Player B has ten players, etc.” Similarly, in sentences like “The team forfeited,” “The team ran a trick play,” and “The team beat its opponent,” the predicates “forfeited,” “ran a trick play,” and “beat its opponent” are predicated of the team as a group and not of any of the players individually. The meaning of these sentences could not be entirely felicitously unpacked as: “Player A forfeited,” “Player B ran a trick play,” “Player C beat his opponent,” etc.

Because collective nouns are singular, they can be pluralized and quantified. One can speak of multiple committees and even of “all the committees.” Such quantification quantifies the number of groups and does not directly quantify the individuals within those groups. The predication employed with such quantification could still be either distributive or group-level. Statements like “Both teams put on their sneakers” would remain distributive predications, meaning that the individual players from both teams put on their sneakers. Statements like “Both teams have ten players” would remain group-level predications, meaning that not the individual team members but the groups themselves each have that many players.

In keeping with this distinction between distributive and group-level predication, a collective noun that receives universal quantification does not necessarily communicate that all the members making up those collective nouns are having something predicated of them. “All the teams played well” does not necessarily mean that all individual team members played well. “All the committees met last week” does not necessarily mean that all individual committee members were present. “Every family took home a bingo prize” does not necessarily mean that every individual family member took home a bingo prize.

4.7.2 Within the Biblical Greek corpus

Collective nouns are commonly found with πᾶς throughout the Biblical Greek corpus. At times, all the collective entities are included, but all the individuals within these collective entities would not seem to be included. When it is said that “all the peoples (πάντες οἱ λαοί) came to hear Solomon’s wisdom” (1 Kings 5:14 [OG 3 King 5:14]), this would not include everyone from within all those peoples. It would merely mean that all the peoples were represented

among those who came to hear Solomon.[42] Similarly, Jesus states that "all the tribes (πᾶσαι αἱ φυλαί) of the earth will mourn" at the sight of his return (Matt 24:30). This would not include everyone from within all those tribes, but would merely mean that mourning will be found within all the tribes of the earth. These group-level predications are a direct result of the collective nature of the nouns being universalized.

4.7.3 Analysis

There are a handful of passages cited in support of the "all without distinction" interpretation in which πάντα τὰ ἔθνη, "all the nations," or πᾶσαι αἱ χῶραι, "all the countries," does not include every individual from all of those nations and countries.[43]

> All the nations (πάντα τὰ ἔθνη) of the earth will be blessed in him (Gen 18:18).
>
> And all the countries (πᾶσαι αἱ χῶραι) came to Egypt to make a purchase in front of Joseph (Gen 41:57).

The reason that πάντα τὰ ἔθνη and πᾶσαι αἱ χῶραι can refer to all the nations without referring to everyone within all those nations is that ἔθνος and χώρα are both collective nouns. The fact that these collective nouns work this way does not show that such a use is available to all nouns. Only other collective nouns could similarly be modified by πᾶς to speak of all the different collective entities without referring to all the individuals within those different collective entities.

4.8 πᾶς with Superordinate Categories

4.8.1 Crosslinguistic principles

Every language has multiple ways of referring to the same entity with varying levels of specificity. For example, the same referent could be called "animal," "lion," or "African lion." Terms at these different levels of categorization serve different functions. Basic-level words function as the default way to refer to an entity (Rosch et al. 1976; Rosch 1979; Mervis and Rosch 1981; Lakoff 1987, 46–47; Croft and Cruse 2004, 83–84). If someone were to point to a four-legged furry being that has a mane and roars and were to ask what that being was, in

[42] Here the Hebrew has not just כָּל, "all," but מִכָּל, "[some] from all," making the partitive sense explicit.

[43] Also, Gen 22:18; Ps 86:9 (OG 85:9); Isa 2:2; Hag 2:7.

most contexts, the appropriate answer is “That is a lion,” not “That is an animal” or “That is an African lion.” This is because “lion” is a basic-level category. “Animal” is a superordinate category because it includes within it basic-level categories like “lion” and others like it. “African lion” is a subordinate category because it is a more specific and exclusive designation than the basic-level category “lion.”

Basic-level categories are often the first words learned (Mervis and Crisafi 1982) and are the most salient of the three levels (Rosch et al. 1976; Rosch 1979; Mervis and Rosch 1981; Lakoff 1987, 46–47; Croft and Cruse 2004, 83–84). This fact determines the role that superordinate categories play within the mental lexicon over against basic-level categories. The purpose of superordinate categories is to include multiple basic-level categories within a single, larger umbrella category based on some degree of similarity (Schmid 1996, 293).

While items within a basic-level category generally share a similar shape, that is not true at the superordinate level (Rosch et al. 1976, 398–405). Because of their higher degree of similarity within the category, basic-level categories can also be pictured directly, while superordinate categories cannot be pictured directly (Lakoff 1987, 51–52; Cruse 2002, 17; Croft and Cruse 2004, 83). If asked to picture a lion, someone will simply picture a lion. However, if asked to picture an animal, someone cannot simply picture an animal in the abstract but will have to pick a particular kind of animal to picture at the basic level.

Basic-level categories and superordinate categories also differ in the kinds of hyponymy they allow (Cruse 2002, 16–17). The hyponyms of a superordinate category will always be taxonymic, whereas basic-level categories allow nontaxonymic hyponyms.

Hyponymy refers to the relationship between words where the referent of the more specific term is included within the referents of the more general term (Cruse 2002, 4; Croft and Cruse 2004, 142; Murphy 2010, 113). The more specific term, called the “hyponym,” falls within the larger category of the more generic term, called the “hyperonym.” For example, the hyperonym “food” would have among its hyponyms “cheeseburger,” “waffle,” and “ice cream.” Everything that can be called a “cheeseburger,” a “waffle,” or an “ice cream” can also more generally be called “food.” To borrow an example from Cruse (2002, 13; Croft and Cruse 2004, 147), the hyperonym “woman” would have among its hyponyms “blonde,” “queen,” and “actress.” Everything that can be called a “blonde,” a “queen,” or an “actress” can also more generally be called a “woman.”

Not all hyponymy is the same, however, because hyponymy does not always mean there is a relationship between the words themselves. Often it is just a relationship of inclusion between the words' meanings (Murphy 2003, 228–29; 2010, 117). So, just because a hyponym is included within a hyperonym, that does not make it a "kind of" that hyperonym (Wierzbicka 1984; Cruse 2002, 12–13; Croft and Cruse 2004, 147–48). Using the previous examples, we can say that cheeseburgers, waffles, and ice cream are "kinds of" food, but we would not generally say that blondes, queens, and actresses are "kinds of" women. The hyponymic relationship in which the hyponyms can be considered "kinds of" their hyperonyms can more specifically be called taxonymy.

Two definite patterns have been identified as to whether or not an instance of hyponymy will also be taxonymic. The first is that nontaxonymic hyponyms can often be defined by adding a single feature to the hyperonym (Cruse 2002, 13, 18; Croft and Cruse 2004, 148). The nontaxonymic hyponyms "blonde," "queen," and "actress" can all be defined by adding to the hyperonym "woman" single features such as "blonde-haired," "ruling," or "acting." On the other hand, taxonymic hyponyms must be defined over against their hyperonym in an encyclopedic manner (Cruse 2002, 18). One would have to add far more than a single feature to the hyperonym "food" to define taxonymic hyponyms such as "cheeseburger," "waffle," or "ice cream." In this way, the definition for these taxonymic hyponyms would have to be more encyclopedic over against their hyperonyms.

The second observable distinction between taxonymic hyponymy and nontaxonymic hyponymy involves how the hyponym specifies the hyperonym. Taxonyms specify the essence of their hyperonym (Cruse 2002, 15–16; Croft and Cruse 2004, 150). For example, the taxonymic hyponyms "cheeseburger," "waffle," and "ice cream" refer to more specific instantiations of food-ness. On the other hand, nontaxonymic hyponyms do not specify the essence of their hyperonyms. The nontaxonymic hyponyms "blonde," "queen," and "actress" do not refer to more specific instantiations of woman-ness.

Because superordinate categories will always have taxonymic hyponyms and not nontaxonymic hyponyms, the features of taxonymic hyponymy provide a first set of criteria for testing whether a given category could possibly be a superordinate category as opposed to a basic-level category. For superordinate categories, their hyponyms will be a "kind of" them (the "kind of" test), will not be able to be defined by a single feature over against them (the single-feature test), and will specify their essence (the essence test).

Because these criteria are testing for taxonymy and not directly for the category level, they could rule out certain categories from being superordinate categories. However, these criteria would not be enough to identify a category as being superordinate because some basic-level categories have taxonymic hyponyms. In the opening example of this section, “lion” is a basic-level category and yet it has a hyponym (“African lion”) that would meet all the necessary criteria of being a taxonymic hyponym. There are, however, two additional features that can be observed in how superordinate categories relate to their hyponyms as opposed to how basic-level categories relate to their hyponyms.

Because a basic-level category can already be pictured concretely on its own, the word will always call to mind individual instances of that concrete, basic-level category. For example, if told to name three women, the appropriate answer, and likely the only one that would occur to the one answering, is to name three specific women (e.g., Mary, Martha, Salome) and not three kinds of women (e.g., blondes, queens, actresses). Similarly, if told to name three countries, the appropriate answer, and likely the only one that would occur to the one answering, is to name three specific countries (e.g., France, China, Kenya) and not three kinds of countries (e.g., Asian, third world, democratic). Even with a basic-level category that has taxonymic hyponyms, the word will still call to mind individual instances of that concrete, basic-level category. For example, if told to name three lions, the appropriate answer, and likely the only one that would occur to the one answering, is to name three specific lions (e.g., Aslan, Simba, the Cowardly Lion) and not three kinds of lion (e.g., African, Asiatic, Barbary).

On the other hand, because a superordinate category serves as a general umbrella term for a number of basic-level categories, the word can be used in reference not to individual instances of the superordinate category but to the individual basic-level categories that are its hyponyms. For example, if told to name three animals, the appropriate answer given, and likely the only one that would occur to the one answering, is to name three kinds of animals (e.g., dog, bear, moose) and not three specific animals (e.g., Fido, Fluffy, Rex). Similarly, if told to name three foods, the appropriate answer, and likely the only one that would occur to the one answering, is to name three kinds of food (e.g., cheeseburgers, waffles, ice cream) and not three specific foods (e.g., the oatmeal I had for breakfast today, the turkey we ate last Thanksgiving, the chocolate bar in my pocket).

Another notable difference between basic-level categories and superordinate categories is how they interact with universal quantifiers such as “all” and “every.” Because a superordinate

category can be used in reference to the basic-level categories that are its hyponyms, it can combine with universal quantifiers to speak not of every individual instance of the superordinate category but of all of its individual basic-level categories. For example, someone can say, “This zoo has every animal,” meaning that it has every kind of animal, not every individual animal on the planet. Similarly, someone can say, “I have eaten every food this restaurant has,” meaning that they have eaten every kind of food served there, not every individual piece of food in stock.

Basic-level categories, however, cannot function in this way when universalized. Because a basic-level category automatically calls to mind concrete individuals of the category, it will combine with universal quantifiers to speak not of subordinate categories but of every individual instance. For example, someone cannot say, “I have been to every country,” if what they intend to communicate is: “I have been to at least one country of every kind of country that there is.” Similarly, someone cannot say, “Every woman is beautiful,” if what they intend to communicate is: “In every classification of women we could make, we will find that at least one of the women in each of those classes is beautiful.” This pattern holds true even for basic-level categories that have taxonymic hyponyms. For example, someone cannot say, “Every lion is dangerous,” if what they intend to communicate is: “There are at least some individual dangerous lions within every subspecies of lion.”

4.8.2 Within the Biblical Greek corpus

The use of πᾶς with a superordinate category is a much rarer phenomenon than some translations might imply by their use of the expression “all kinds of.” “All kinds of” is also a colloquial English hyperbolic expression merely meaning “a large amount of something” (Ammer 2013, s.v.). So, when a translation glosses πᾶς as “all kinds of,” it is often not even intending for the hearer to think in terms of kinds but is merely idiomatically expressing a high degree or high amount of something. Actual occurrences of πᾶς with a superordinate category to refer to all of its basic-level categories but not all of the individual members of the basic-level categories are rather rare within the Biblical Greek corpus. Nevertheless, such a phenomenon does occur.

In Luke 21:29, Jesus begins his short parable by telling his disciples to “look at the fig tree and all the trees (πάντα τὰ δένδρα).” The word δένδρον meets all the criteria for having taxonymic hyponyms. First, it passes the “kind of” test, as one can say that oaks, palms, and maples are

all “kinds of” trees. Second, it passes the single-feature test, as there is no single feature by which the kinds of trees can be defined over against the word “tree.” Instead, these specific kinds of trees must be defined encyclopedically. Third, it passes the essence test, as the specific trees are all more specific instantiations of treeness.

The word δένδρον also meets the more specific criteria for being a superordinate category. However, recognizing this requires first understanding where the Greek δένδρον and the English “tree” likely differ in the way they are structured within the mental lexicon. What level of reference is the basic level can be culture-specific (Stross 1973; Dougherty 1978; Berlin 1992). Someone within a less industrialized and more nature-attentive culture may have words like “oak,” “palm,” and “maple” as more basic-level categories, with “tree” being more of a superordinate category. On the other hand, those who belong to more industrialized and less nature-attentive cultures may simply have “tree” as their basic-level category.

This means that while modern English speakers may be able to picture a generic tree, a Greek-speaking Jew of the first century would not have pictured a generic δένδρον but, being more attuned to the different varieties of trees, would have been aware that he was picking a specific kind of tree to picture. While “tree” may not pass the picturability test to be a superordinate category, δένδρον likely would have passed. Similarly, δένδρον would likely pass the “name three” test, as people told to name three δένδρα would have quickly identified three different kinds of trees.[44]

That δένδρον would have been a superordinate category and not a basic-level term within the Biblical Greek corpus matches contemporary findings for less industrialized cultures. It also matches the data found within the Biblical Greek corpus. Subordinate categories within a language often redundantly employ the name of their basic-level category, but basic-level categories do not redundantly employ the name of their superordinate category (Mihatsch 2007, 182–83). As a result, in English, the word “tree” is often used as part of the designation for its subordinate categories (e.g., oak tree, palm tree, and maple tree). For some kinds of trees, “tree” is even a necessary part of the designation, as is the case for any tree named after its fruit (e.g., olive tree, apple tree). However, only once throughout the Biblical Greek corpus (Isa 2:13) is

[44] Contemporary English speakers would likely identify three different kinds of trees too, not three specific individual trees. However, they may consider the sentence “Name three trees” to not feel fully natural, since “tree” functions for us as more of a basic-level term. The natural response to being told to “name three trees” for many English speakers may be to ask for clarification, such as, “You mean, like three kinds of trees?” or “You mean, like ‘oak’?”

the word δένδρον used redundantly along with a more specific kind of tree. Everywhere else, the specific kind of tree stands alone, showing that these specific kinds of trees are the basic-level categories within the mental taxonomy found in that culture, and δένδρον is the superordinate category.

So, just as when Jesus tells the disciples to look at the fig tree (Luke 21:29), he is directing their attention to the generic class of fig trees and not a particular fig tree, so also in further telling them to look at all the trees (πάντα τὰ δένδρα), he is not directing their attention to every single tree in existence but to all the various kinds of trees. The universalization of the superordinate category refers to all the basic-level categories within it, not necessarily every instance of those individual basic-level categories.

Apart from those passages cited as support for the "all without distinction" interpretation (see subsection 4.8.3), the NT has two other passages where πᾶς is used with superordinate categories to speak of all the basic-level categories but not all the individuals within those basic-level categories.[45]

James states that "where there is jealousy and selfishness, there is also disorder and every evil deed (πᾶν φαῦλον πρᾶγμα)" (3:16). The expression φαῦλον πρᾶγμα would pass all the diagnostic tests for being a superordinate category.

> "Kind of" test: YES ("Slander is a kind of evil deed." / "Slandering is a way of doing evil.")[46]
>
> Single-feature test: YES (Particular kinds of evil deeds must be defined encyclopedically.)
>
> Essence test: YES (Particular kinds of evil deeds are more specific instantiations of evil-deed-ness.)
>
> Picturability test: YES (One cannot picture a generic evil deed but must picture a particular kind of evil deed.)

[45] Also possibly ἀπάτη (2 Thess 2:10), if a verbal abstract noun meaning "trick," but it would be an intensive noun if an adjectival abstract noun meaning "deceitfulness."

[46] Cruse (2002, 13) notes that the "way of" test serves to identify taxonymic hyponymy within verbs. Since πρᾶγμα, as well as its hyponyms, will be abstract nouns referring to verbal actions, this verbal test works as well, and may seem more even more natural to some readers than the "kind of" test.

> "Name three" test: YES (Slander, murder, theft, etc.)

Consequently, James is not stating that all the individual evil deeds that are ever done result from jealousy and selfishness and that no evil deeds ever result from something else. Instead, he is stating that every kind of evil deed will be there when there is jealousy and selfishness. The universalization of the superordinate category refers to all the basic-level categories within it, not every instance of those individual basic-level categories.

Listed among the merchandise that is no longer bought after the fall of Babylon the Great are "every thyine-wood object and every ivory item and every item of precious wood, brass, iron, and marble (πᾶν ξύλον θύϊνον καὶ πᾶν σκεῦος ἐλεφάντινον καὶ πᾶν σκεῦος ἐκ ξύλου τιμιωτάτου καὶ χαλκοῦ καὶ σιδήρου καὶ μαρμάρου)" (Rev 18:12). These expressions too pass the diagnostic tests for being superordinate categories.

> "Kind of" test: YES ("[Thyine-wood] tables are a kind of thyine-wood object." "[Ivory] dice are a kind of ivory item.")[47]
>
> Single-feature test: YES (Particular kinds of wooden objects and ivory items must be defined encyclopedically.)
>
> Essence test: YES (Particular kinds of wooden objects and ivory items are more specific instantiations of wooden-object-ness and ivory-item-ness.)
>
> Picturability test: YES (One cannot picture a generic wooden object or ivory item but must picture a particular kind of wooden object or ivory item.)
>
> "Name three" test: YES ([Thyine-wood] tables, cabinets, chairs, etc. [Ivory] dice, sculptures, jewelry, etc.)

As a result, these references are understood as referring to all the various kinds of objects. The universalization of the superordinate category refers to all the basic-level categories within it, not every instance of those individual basic-level categories.

[47] Because the objects that are made out of wood or ivory are sometimes also made out of other materials, it may be necessary to redundantly specify the material the particular kinds of objects are made from so that they feel fully hyponymic.

In addition to these NT examples, and not yet even including those passages that have been specifically cited as support for the "all without distinction" interpretation of πᾶς, there are a number of OG examples of πᾶς being used with superordinate categories. These other nouns all pass the five diagnostic tests for superordinate categories.[48]

4.8.3 Analysis

The use of πᾶς with superordinate categories to refer to all the underlying basic-level categories but not all the individuals within those basic-level categories represents a small minority of those verses claimed in support of the "all without distinction" reading. Nevertheless, unlike all the previously discussed ways that πᾶς can be used, these superordinate categories are actually a way that πᾶς can be restricted with reference to kinds. Because of this, it is unsurprising that these few passages in which πᾶς is restricted in its scope by virtue of it modifying a superordinate category have provided some of the foundational parallel passages to which appeal has been made in support of the "all without distinction" reading.[49]

4.8.3.1 Plants

When Augustine first originated the "all without distinction" interpretation, he did so by citing Luke 11:42, where Jesus comments that the Pharisees tithe "mint, rue, and every [other][50]

[48] ἀγαθά (Gen 45:18, 20, 23; Deut 6:11; Neh 9:25 [OG 2 Esd 19:25]), βάσταγμα (Neh 13:15 [OG 2 Esd 23:15]), βρῶμα (Gen 6:21), γένημα (Gen 40:17, in which passage OG reads γενῶν, from γένος, "kind," which is hard to account for as a gloss of מַאֲכָל, "food," but Lust, Eynikel, and Hauspie (2003, s.v. γένος) emend to γεννημάτων; 2 Chr 31:5; Amos 8:6; Tobit 1:7), ἑρπετόν (Gen 6:19–20; 7:8), θηρίον (Gen 2:20; 6:19), κακία (2 Macc 7:31), κτῆνος (Gen 2:20; 6:19–20; 8:20), λίθος (1 Chr 29:2; Sir 50:9; Ezek 28:13), μαλακία (Deut 28:61), νόσος (Exod 15:26), ξύλον (Neh 9:25 [OG 2 Esd 19:25]; Eccl 2:5; Song 4:14; Ezek 47:12), ὄρνεον (Gen 6:20), πληγή (Deut 28:61; 1 Sam 4:8 [OG 1 King 4:8]), πετεινόν (Gen 2:20; 6:20; 8:20), πρᾶσις (Neh 10:32 [OG 2 Esd 20:32]), σάρξ (Gen 6:19; 7:15–16; this word would not seem to naturally be a superordinate category, but the underlying Hebrew בָּשָׂר occasionally is used in ways that seem to imply that it is an umbrella term to refer the different varieties of living things that there might be [TLOT, s.v.]), and σκεῦος (Exod 35:22; 1 Chr 12:34, 38).

[49] In addition to the plants, animals, and stones discussed more thoroughly, other alleged parallels where πᾶς quantifies superordinate categories are found in reference to wares (ἀγαθά in Gen 24:10; 2 Kgs 8:9 [OG 4 Kgd 8:9] and πρᾶσις in Neh 13:16 [OG 2 Esd 23:16]); good works (ἔργον ἀγαθόν in 2 Cor 9:8; Col 1:10), although if ἔργον is understood to refer to the doing instead of the deed that is done, such expressions could alternatively be understood as πᾶς modifying intensive nouns, as in 2 Thess 2:17: "entirely good labouring"; unclean things (ἀκαθαρσία in Matt 23:27; Eph 4:19); and miraculous powers (δύναμις in 2 Thess 2:9, if a verbal abstract noun meaning "demonstration of power," but it would be an intensive noun if an adjectival abstract noun meaning "power"). Since ἔργον, ἀκαθαρσία, and their hyponyms are abstract nouns referring to verbal actions someone can do or adjectival qualities someone can be, using the "way of" test may seem more natural than the "kind of" test (see n. 46).

[50] In addition to being used with a superordinate category, here πᾶς is also used with implicit domain restriction to refer to all such kinds of vegetables besides the mint and rue just mentioned.

vegetable (πᾶν λάχανον).” The word λάχανον passes all the diagnostic tests for being a superordinate category.

> “Kind of” test: YES (“Carrots, onions, and parsley are kinds of vegetables.”)
>
> Single-feature test: YES (Particular kinds of vegetables must be defined encyclopedically.)
>
> Essence test: YES (Particular kinds of vegetables are more specific instantiations of vegetable-ness.)
>
> Picturability test: YES (One cannot picture a generic vegetable but must picture a particular kind of vegetable.)
>
> “Name three” test: YES (Carrots, onions, parsley, etc.)

So, when Jesus speaks of “every vegetable,” this is immediately understood as speaking not of every vegetable in existence but of every kind of vegetable. The universalization of the superordinate category refers to all the basic-level categories within it, not every instance of those individual basic-level categories.

4.8.3.2 Animals

Several passages that discuss animal life are cited as support for the “all without distinction” interpretation. “All the beasts (πάντα τὰ θηρία) according to kind and all the livestock (πάντα τὰ κτήνη) according to kind and every reptile (πᾶν ἑρπετόν) that moves on the ground according to kind and every bird (πᾶν πετεινόν) according to kind went to Noah into the ark” (Gen 7:14). “Flocks and all the beasts (πάντα τὰ θηρία) of the earth will graze in the middle of it” (Zeph 2:14). In the sheet that Peter saw were “all the quadrupeds (πάντα τά τετράποδα) and reptiles (ἑρπετά) of the ground and birds (πετεινά) of the sky” (Acts 10:12). These different labels for the different categories of animal life pass all the diagnostic tests for being superordinate categories.

> “Kind of” test: YES (“Lions, tigers, and bears are kinds of beasts.” “Cows, horses, and donkeys are kinds of livestock.” “Lizards, snakes, and tortoises are kinds of reptiles.” “Owls, sparrows, and ravens are kinds of birds.” “Dogs, cats, and sheep are kinds of quadrupeds.”)

Single-feature test: YES (Particular kinds of beasts, livestock, reptiles, birds, and quadrupeds must be defined encyclopedically.)

Essence test: YES (Particular kinds of animals are more specific instantiations of beast-ness, livestock-ness, reptile-ness, bird-ness, and quadruped-ness.)

Picturability test: YES (One cannot picture a generic beast, livestock, reptile, bird,[51] or quadruped but must picture a particular kind of animal.)

"Name three" test: YES (Lions, tigers, bears, etc. Cows, horses, donkeys, etc. Lizards, snakes, tortoises, etc. Owls, sparrows, ravens, etc. Dogs, cats, sheep, etc.)

All three passages are immediately understood as speaking not of every animal in existence but of every kind of animal. The universalization of the superordinate category refers to all the basic-level categories within it, not every instance of those individual basic-level categories.

4.8.3.3 Stones

One passage referencing gemstones is cited in support of the "all without distinction" interpretation: "The foundations of the wall of the city were adorned with every precious stone (παντὶ λίθῳ τιμίῳ)" (Rev 21:19). The phrase λίθος τίμιος passes all the diagnostic tests for being a superordinate category.

"Kind of" test: YES ("Turquoise, rubies, and emeralds are kinds of gemstones.")

Single-feature test: YES (Particular kinds of gemstones must be defined encyclopedically.)

Essence test: YES (Particular kinds of gemstones are more specific instantiations of gemstone-ness.)

[51] Modern readers may dispute the claim that a bird cannot be pictured generically and that instead a particular kind of bird must be pictured. However, as was discussed earlier with regard to trees, which level of the taxonymy is the basic level can vary based on the specific culture (Stross 1973; Dougherty 1978; Berlin 1992). Within the less industrialized and more nature-attentive culture of the Ancient Near East, the basic-level categories of the bird taxonymy are likely to found at lower levels than they are within the more industrialized and less nature-attentive culture of many contemporary English speakers. So, while for us "bird" may be more of a basic-level category and not as much of a superordinate category, πετεινόν would easily be a superordinate category within that language and culture.

> Picturability test: YES (One cannot picture a generic gemstone but must picture a particular kind of gemstone.)
>
> "Name three" test: YES ("Turquoise, rubies, emeralds, etc.")

When the foundations are said to be adorned with "every precious stone," this is immediately understood as speaking not of every gemstone in existence but of every kind of gemstone. The universalization of the superordinate category refers to all the basic-level categories within it, not every instance of those individual basic-level categories.

4.8.3.4 Analysis

These rare instances of πᾶς being limited to kinds with superordinate categories do not show that πᾶς can mean "all kinds of" instead of simply "every/all." Even in these instances, πᾶς still means "every/all." It is just that the noun that it is universalizing is itself being used in reference to its individual hyponymous basic-level kinds and not in reference to all the individuals that make up those kinds. As such, this use of πᾶς cannot just be arbitrarily assumed in a given passage but can only arise by the presence of a superordinate category. Such readings as are documented within subsection 4.8 are only possible when πᾶς is found with nouns that can pass the tests for taxonymic hyponymy and the further tests for superordinate categories.

4.9 Unrestricted πᾶς

Several passages claimed as support for the "all without distinction" interpretation of πᾶς still need to be treated, as they do not fit within any of the previously discussed categories of ways that πᾶς can be restricted. Typically, the sense of πᾶς in such verses is unrestricted and universal, but there is something else going on in the verse from a linguistic or a theological perspective that, when not properly understood, has caused interpreters to look to restrict πᾶς.

4.9.1 Explicit domain restriction

In several cases, there is no need for the domain over which πᾶς quantifies to be implicitly restricted because it is already explicitly restricted. In the following two verses, a personal pronoun shows that πᾶς is speaking only of Christians:

> For from his fullness we all (ἡμεῖς πάντες) have received even grace upon grace (John 1:16).

> For you all (πάντες ὑμεῖς) are one in Christ Jesus (Gal 3:28).

In another such alleged parallel, the domain is explicitly restricted to Israel: "And that is how all Israel (πᾶς Ἰσραήλ) will be saved" (Rom 11:26). It may seem as if πᾶς here would have to be restricted to keep from saying that every Israelite will be saved. However, Paul had already earlier in this discussion (9:6) redefined "Israel" as the true remnant of Israel that will be saved.

4.9.2 Intention vs. actualization

Several of the alleged instances of πᾶς being restricted are found within ἵνα clauses. They speak of something God intends, without saying that such an intention is necessarily actualized.

> [John the Baptist] came for testimony, to testify about the light, so that all (πάντες) might believe through him (John 1:7).

> God confined them all to disobedience so that he might have mercy on them all (τοὺς πάντας) (Rom 11:32).

Since these verses do not actually say that all believe and are saved, there is no compelling reason why πᾶς would have to be restricted in such verses.

Now, the Calvinist system does assume that if God intends something, he will, of necessity, carry it out. However, since this assumption's own validity depends on the viability of the "all without distinction" interpretation, it begs the question to use these verses as support for the "all without distinction" interpretation.

4.9.3 Other passages supporting a universal merciful will and an unlimited atonement

Several other passages are similarly inappropriate to use as parallels for the key verses in the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11) because the attempts to limit these parallel verses themselves are likewise motivated by the same Calvinist teachings of double predestination and limited atonement. Linguistic corroboration would have to be found in passages where such a reading would not be dependent on that particular theological view.

Nevertheless, even though the use of such verses in support of the "all without distinction" reading can be quickly dismissed on methodological grounds as an exegesis that begs the question, a cursory examination of the verses shows there is no reason to regard these instances of πᾶς as being restricted.

4.9.3.1 2 Corinthians 5:14–15

“For Christ’s love compels us, as the judgement we have come to is that one died for all (πάντων); therefore, they all (οἱ πάντες) died. And he died for all (πάντων) so that those who live would no longer live to themselves but to the one who died and rose for them.”

All three references to “all” in these verses refer to all human beings, and none of them admit limitation.

The domain of οἱ πάντες cannot be implicitly restricted, as the only parties present in Paul’s discourse that could serve as possible referents are “we” and “you.” If either a first- or second-person referent were intended for οἱ πάντες, its verb would not be third-person as it is. And since πάντες has the article, indicating that it has the same referent as the πάντων that precedes it (Harris 2005, 420; Furnish 2008, 310, 327), πάντων, too, has no viable contextual candidate to implicitly restrict its domain. The πάντων that follows it would naturally have the same unrestricted domain as the previous two references to “all.” Additionally, the switch to the more limited designation “those who live” suggests that the previous references to “all” cannot be restricted to believers but must be a larger group, namely, all people (Harris 2005, 421; Furnish 2008, 327).

None of the three instances of “all” here could be intended hyperbolically either, as these verses serve as the rationale for v. 16, where Paul states that as a result of this conviction (ὥστε) they look at no one (οὐδένα) in a fleshly way (Seifrid 2014, 244 n. 495). Only if literally all people were considered to have been died for, and even as having died in some sense, could that serve as a reason to consider no people in keeping with the domain of the flesh.

4.9.3.2 Hebrews 2:9

“So that, by God’s grace, he might taste death for everyone (παντός).”

There does not seem to be any compelling reason to restrict the referent of “everyone” here. Nothing in the context suggests that the domain is implicitly restricted; rather, the references to humanity in vv. 6–8 suggest the opposite.

4.9.3.3 2 Peter 3:9

"Instead, he is patient toward you, not wanting any to perish, but all (πάντας) to come to repentance."

In this statement, both "any (τινας)" and "all (πάντας)" could have their domain implicitly restricted to the "you" just mentioned in the main clause: "Not wanting any [of you] to perish, but all [of you] to come to repentance" (Baukham 1983, 313). However, such an implicit restriction is not necessary, and both "any" and "all" can also easily be read in an unrestricted way if one allows the possibility that God actually does desires all to repent (Schreiner 2003, 382; Davids 2006, 281).

4.9.4 Miscellaneous

In several other miscellaneous verses cited as parallels for the "all without distinction" interpretation, there is no apparent need for any restriction to be taking place.[52]

All (πάντα) the parts of the body, though many, are one body (1 Cor 12:12)

Every (πᾶν) creation of God is good (1 Tim 4:4).

Every (πᾶσα) good giving and every (πᾶν) perfect gift is from above (Jam 1:17).

Several miscellaneous verses that do not restrict πᾶς, but that have nevertheless been used to argue for restricted senses for πᾶς, merit more extended comment.

4.9.4.1 Psalm 145:14 (OG 144:14)

"The Lord sustains all (πάντας) who fall down and re-establishes all (πάντας) who are broken down."

As this verse and the ones that follow present the general truth of divine providence, it might seem attractive to understand πᾶς as hyperbole here. Nevertheless, explicitly softening these

[52] Also Matt 3:15 (which does not state that Jesus's baptism is the *only* thing necessary for all that is right to be brought to completion, only that, as the formal inauguration of a public ministry that would culminate in his death, resurrection, and ascension, his baptism was a necessary part of God's plan to make things right); John 1:9 (for more on this verse, see the discussion in ch. 3); Rom 1:18; Eph 1:21–22 (the fact that 1 Cor 15:23–28, similarly quoting Ps 110:1, places the full subjection of all things to Christ at the end of the world does not keep Eph 1:21–22 from saying that all things are already under Christ's feet, provided that one keeps in mind the tension between "now" and "not yet" that is found in NT eschatology); Col 4:12.

universal quantifiers does not seem entirely felicitous: “The Lord sustains [practically] all who fall down and reestablishes [practically] all who are broken down. The eyes of [virtually] all hope in you and you give them their food at the right time. You open your hand and satisfy [virtually] every living thing with what it desires.” Such softened statements would undermine the immediately preceding statement that the Lord is always faithful and holy in what he does (v. 13). Such statements would also fail to properly support the psalm’s concluding statement that every fleshy being should praise God’s name (v. 20).

These verses express God’s acts of physical preservation, which are carried out mediately (through means) and not immediately (apart from means). Because this is a fallen world (Gen 3:16–19; Rom 8:19–22), the means through which God carries out his acts of physical preservation are likewise fallen. So, within the context of a fallen world, a promise of mediate physical preservation is not an absolute promise but merely a general promise of that for which God has ordained the means.

Therefore, an unbeliever who starves does not negate the truth of this universal statement, as God does generally provide for all people, even as this providence is hidden as it operates within a fallen world and through fallen means. Nor does a believer who starves negate the truth of this universal statement—not only for the same reason as the starving unbeliever but also because the believer is provided for in a full and eternal way. All of God’s promises are “yes” in Christ (2 Cor 1:20), which means that even the general providential promises that are obscured by the fallen means God uses are fully realized in the absolute promises of the gospel.

Linguistically, such statements could still be understood as hyperbole. However, they will not appear entirely felicitous when the universal quantifier is explicitly softened, because the hyperbolic aspect of the sentence does not reside in the universal quantifier. Instead, softening the entire statement appears more felicitous: “[Generally speaking,] the Lord sustains all who fall down and reestablishes all who are broken down. The eyes of all hope in you and, [as a general rule,] you give them their food at the right time. [On the whole,] you open your hand and satisfy every living thing with what it desires.”

4.9.4.2 Isaiah 40:5/Luke 3:6

“And the glory of the Lord will become visible and every fleshy being (πᾶσα σὰρξ) will see God’s salvation.”

If this prophecy from Isaiah is understood as being fully fulfilled at the end of the world (Oswalt 1998, 52; Smith 2009, 96–97), then there is no need to restrict the referent of "every fleshy being." To whatever extent this prophecy is understood as also being partially fulfilled in the public demonstrations of God's salvation either in the first coming of Christ or in the return from exile (Lessing 2011, 138–39), the language might seem hyperbolic: "[Seemingly] all have observed God's salvation." However, taking this as an example of "prophetic foreshortening" (Kaiser 2001, 63), where multiple events are telescoped together as one without revealing how temporally distant they are from each other, the universal language that is literally true of the ultimate fulfillment is also true in a less literal respect in the earlier partial fulfillments.[53]

4.9.4.3 Isaiah 60:7

"All the sheep (πάντα τὰ πρόβατα) of Kedar will gather to you" (Isa 60:7).

Isaiah is painting a picture of how people from all nations, bearing their offerings, will stream to the God of Israel in the age to come. Within that picture, all the flocks of a place known for its flocks (Oswalt 1998, 541–42) are said to be coming to Israel, just as camels, gold, and incense were just said in the preceding verse to be coming to Israel from places known for those resources. This statement is certainly meant to be universal within the context of the prophecy of which it is a part. Nevertheless, this prophecy is an example of using OT imagery to portray NT realities (Lessing 2014, 244–45). It would not indicate either that every sheep of Kedar would be sacrificed on the Jerusalem altar or that every person from Kedar would come to Jerusalem.

4.9.4.4 Ephesians 5:14

"For everything that is made public (πᾶν τὸ φανερούμενον) is light."

This passage is famously difficult.[54] There is a genericity/habituality operator in the verse, which means that πᾶν could be appropriately rendered in English with either an indefinite or a

[53] When Luke cites this prophecy specifically in reference to John the Baptist's role in announcing the coming of Christ (3:6), this does not restrict this prophecy's referent to Christ's first coming, as John the Baptist's own heralding of Jesus in the subsequent verses operates under the same principle of prophetic foreshortening, conflating both comings of Christ into a single eschatological event (vv. 7, 9, 16–17).

[54] Rejected in passing is the interpretation followed by some translations (KJV; NKJV; NLT; CSB) that attempt to understand the middle-passive participle φανερούμενον as if it were active in sense. Such a causative meaning for this voice-form is both unsubstantiated for this particular lexeme (BDAG, s.v.) and also contrary to the consistently anticausative use of the middle-passive voice-form with other deadjectival verbs (Jensen 2018, 94–96).

universal quantifier, but that does not solve the interpretive problem. Still, it has proven unclear what it means that "everything/anything that is made public is light."

Verse 14 must somehow support (γάρ) what comes before it. It can provide this support if it expresses that anything and everything that goes through the full process of being publicly exposed will be light, as no darkness can survive such a process (cf. John 3:20–21). The thought progression throughout the paragraph would be: "Expose the deeds of darkness (v. 11). Because the things done in secret are shameful (v. 12), but, when exposed, they are made public (v. 13). [Do this] because anything that is actually made public is light (v. 14)." No further restrictions on πᾶν would be necessary.

4.9.4.5 Colossians 1:20

"And through him to reconcile all things (τὰ πάντα) to himself, making peace through the blood of his cross, whether things on earth or things in the heavens."

Instead of using the masculine to speak of personal beings, here Paul uses the neuter: τὰ πάντα, an expression frequently used to speak of the entire created universe (BDAG, s.v. 4.d.β). There is no reason to restrict "all things" to a subset of either human or angelic beings; instead, all created things are in view.

Since not all people or angels have been brought into a friendly relationship with God, it might seem inaccurate to say that Christ's death has reconciled all things to God. However, such a statement is often understood as expressing that the universe, which had been, in a sense, at war with God, was brought back into a peaceful subjection to God through Christ's death to remove sin (O'Brien 1974, 51–53; Bruce 1984, 74–76; Deterding 2003, 60–61; Moo 2008, 135–37; Pao 2012, 103). It is unnecessary to redefine the referent of "all things" to keep this verse from saying that all individual people and demons will be saved. Their full and final subjection to Christ in judgment would be a part of Christ reconciling creation to God.

4.9.5 Analysis

Some of the passages cited in support of the "all without distinction" interpretation do not even themselves have a restriction to πᾶς. Of these, some do pose interpretive difficulties, but restricted senses for πᾶς are not involved in solving such interpretive difficulties. Others are inappropriate to use in support of the "all without distinction" interpretation because their own

most natural reading supports the teaching that God wants all to be saved and that Christ's death made atonement for all. Still others are straightforward passages with no discernable need either to restrict πᾶς or to rely on other manners of interpretive ingenuity. None of these passages suggest or require there to be any additional manners of restriction that can be found with πᾶς beyond the six already enumerated throughout this chapter.

4.10 Conclusion

The "all without distinction" interpretation claims that πᾶς is restricted and does not mean "all" in several key soteriological passages within the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11). The linguistic basis for this claim is that there are many other passages where there is some limitation placed on πᾶς. So, before examining the particular passages in question, it was necessary to study these other passages that are cited as linguistic parallels, as well as the many other times πᾶς occurs within the Biblical Greek corpus. Because of this, this chapter took up this thesis's third subsidiary research question: What does a linguistic analysis of πᾶς indicate about how the meaning of πᾶς can be restricted? Based on the linguistic analysis performed, there are six measurable ways in which πᾶς bears some limitation within Biblical Greek.

First, πᾶς can be used within hyperbole. Because hyperbole is intended not as deceptive language but as a truth-bearing exaggeration, hyperbole can only be utilized in contexts where an exaggeration would be a sufficiently precise form of communication in keeping with Grice's maxim of quantity. While it is impossible to definitively state that a statement is hyperbolic without already knowing what the ontological truth is to which it refers, certain contexts can be identified as infelicitous for hyperbole. This can be done by mentally supplying a softener to make the hyperbole explicit. If the explicit hyperbole is no longer sufficiently precise to be contextually felicitous, such a statement cannot be understood as hyperbole—either it would be literally true or it would be a lie.

Second, πᾶς can be used with implicit domain restriction. In such cases, the domain over which πᾶς scopes will be implicitly restricted to what is relevant to the context of that communicative act. Possible kinds of such restriction would be to limit the domain to what is relevant to the topic being discussed, to the setting, to the people involved, or to a set that excludes a party specifically mentioned in the context. When πᾶς is used in the plural and with a noun, the noun will always be arthrous in times when the implicitly restricted domain is a definite set.

Third, πᾶς can be used in sentences containing nonveridicality operators, such as negated sentences, protases of conditionals, modal expressions, and generics/habituals. Because of differences between languages as to which element will outscope which other element, Greek has to use a universal quantifier like πᾶς where English either can or must use an indefinite quantifier like "any." Sentences with nonveridicality operators can also implicitly restrict a domain to an indefinite set, which can result in a plural noun modified by πᾶς being left anarthrous.

Fourth, πᾶς can be used with intensive nouns, a category referring to gradable abstract nouns. When modifying such nouns, πᾶς indicates the highest degree of those nouns.

Fifth, πᾶς can be used with collective nouns. Collective nouns are not semantically identical to plurals but refer to a collective entity. Consequently, something said of a collective noun may not necessarily be true of the individuals that make up that collective entity. When πᾶς is used with a collective noun, this refers to all of the collective entities but may not always refer to every individual within all the collective entities.

Sixth, πᾶς can be used with superordinate categories, which are umbrella terms to refer to a number of basic-level categories. When πᾶς is used with a superordinate category, it can at times refer to all the hyponymous basic-level categories without referring to all the individuals within those basic-level categories. Due to their role in the mental lexicon, superordinate categories will be able to pass the picturability test and the "name three" test. Because superordinate categories will always have taxonymic hyponyms, they will also be able to pass the "kind of" test, the single-feature test, and the essence test.

Looking at all six of these restrictions that πᾶς admits, it is significant that none of these are actually different meanings for the quantifier. To even speak of them as "restrictions" is itself somewhat catachrestic, because πᾶς retains its sense of universal quantification across the board. Hyperbole is not a modification of that universality but a nonliteral use of it. Domain restriction concerns determining what is being quantified; it does not affect the universal degree of quantification itself. Nonveridicality does not change the universal nature of the quantification, as the use of the less typical gloss "any" reflects merely a difference in scoping practices between languages. Intensive nouns still receive universal quantification with πᾶς; it is just that it is their degree and not their number that is being quantified. The collective entities referred to by collective nouns do receive universal quantification with πᾶς, even if something

is not being predicated of all their individual members. Similarly, with superordinate categories, πᾶς is not changing its meaning to "all kinds of"; instead, it refers to all the basic-level categories within those superordinate categories.

As none of these "restrictions" represent different meanings of πᾶς, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, the same use of πᾶς could have its domain implicitly restricted while also being hyperbolic. It would speak, then, of [practically] all [of a set relevant to the context]. As another example, there may often be some manner of hyperbole when πᾶς is used with an intensive noun to speak of something being at [seemingly] the maximal degree of that intensive noun.

Throughout the Biblical Greek corpus, however, there is no evidence to justify attempts to place restrictions on πᾶς beyond these six that are listed. Therefore, when there is a question over whether a given instance of πᾶς has some limitation on it, the passage in question can be tested against these six kinds of limitations to measure the linguistic possibility of such an interpretation. With this chapter having identified what the different manners of restriction are and how they each operate, it is now possible to run such a test on the key verses from the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11). Because of this, ch. 5 examines the contexts and linguistic features of these verses to determine the linguistic viability of the "all without distinction" interpretation given for them.

Chapter 5:
An Examination of the "All Without Distinction" Reading of πᾶς

5.1 Introduction

The "all without distinction" interpretation of πᾶς, employed by many Calvinists for key soteriological passages within the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11), assumes that other biblical passages demonstrate that πᾶς can easily be used in restricted ways. Chapter 4 quantified the six linguistic features that can account for such restrictions: hyperbole, implicit domain restriction, nonveridicality, intensive nouns, collective nouns, and superordinate categories. These criteria for recognizing such phenomena can be applied to the verses in question. Therefore, this chapter takes up this thesis's fourth subsidiary research question: What effect, either positive or negative, does a linguistic analysis of πᾶς in 1 Timothy 2:4, 6; 4:10 and Titus 2:11 have on the Reformed Calvinist doctrine that limits the scope of the Father's merciful will and the Son's atonement?

The four subsequent sections of this chapter each examine one of the four key passages. Each section begins by examining the context in which πᾶς is found. This study of the context shows why each of these debated verses is relevant to teachings such as the extent of God's saving will and of Christ's atoning death, and also introduces some of the factors that will be weighed in evaluating interpretations of these verses. Next, the occurrence of πᾶς is tested to determine the possibility and plausibility that any of the six identified manners of restriction are present. These tests demonstrate whether or not it is linguistically possible that πᾶς denotes a group less than all people in those verses, as the "all without distinction" interpretation alleges. The

concluding section of the chapter explores the ramifications of these tests for the "all without distinction" interpretation of πᾶς as a whole and also for the Calvinist doctrines of double predestination and limited atonement.

5.2 1 Timothy 2:4

5.2.1 Context

The well-known statement that God "wants all people (πάντας ἀνθρώπους) to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth" is part of an encouragement to pray.[55] Paul[56] urges that various prayers be made for all people, including all those in authority (vv. 1–2). Paul provides two reasons for such prayers. Prayers should be offered specifically for authority figures because of the role these authority figures have in promoting the peaceful situation in which God's people would like to live their lives (v. 2). Such a prayer is aimed not solely at the well-being of the Christian community but has an evangelistic purpose as well. Either it is seeking a beneficial environment to carry out its evangelistic mission (Lea and Griffin 1992, 88; Towner 2006, 162–65),[57] or the act of prayer for the welfare of the society and its leaders was itself seen as a public witness to the gospel (Mounce 2000, 81). Prayers should also more generally be offered for all people because this[58] would please the Savior-God[59] who wants all people to be saved (vv. 3–4). This last trailing relative clause, "who wants all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth," expresses the reason for what precedes it (Arichea and Hatton 1995, 48; Marshall and Towner 1999, 425). Because this verse speaks of

[55] Fee (2011, 61–62) convincingly refutes the idea that the main point of this paragraph is to clarify the Christian's relationship with the government. If that were the main point, vv. 4–7 would be an irrelevant digression away from that point. However, if the main point is that all people should be prayed for, vv. 4–7 can well support this encouragement.

[56] This thesis assumes Pauline authorship of the Pastoral Epistles that bear his name. See Johnson (2008, 55–99) for a defense of this assumption of Pauline authorship.

[57] See, for example, the way that godly behavior has as its goal to publicly beautify the gospel in Titus 2:10.

[58] The antecedent of "this (τοῦτο)" could be limited to the encouragement to pray for all people in v. 1, with v. 2 being seen as somewhat parenthetical (Mounce 2000, 85). Or it could refer to everything Paul has instructed up to this point (Yarbrough 2018, 150), not any one part of it in particular. This would mean that prayer for authorities too is at least to some degree being grounded on God's desire to save all of them, not merely on their instrumental role in promoting public welfare (Marshall and Towner 1999, 422). However, "this" would also still include prayers made for all people, including those not in authority. Any doubt that prayer for all people is included within the referent of "this" is removed by the way v. 4 continues (Fee 2011, 64).

[59] From a purely referential perspective, it would be redundant to identify "God" as "our Savior," as a monotheist like Timothy would naturally know who was meant by the reference to "God." Such a redundant characterization of God as our Savior, then, serves as "overspecification," which "highlights" the quality of God that is contextually salient (Runge 2010, 317–23). The reason such things are pleasing to God is specifically because he is Savior.

God's desire to save, the referent of πάντας ἀνθρώπους is a significant point of scriptural data for defining the extent of the Father's merciful will.

Already before the debated use of πᾶς in v. 4, Paul uses πᾶς four other times in this chapter. As these specific uses of πᾶς make up part of the context of v. 4, it is worth examining how πᾶς is used in these four other instances. The first and last are straightforward. However, the second and third require more significant comment because of the way they have been cited in support of the "all without distinction" interpretation.

5.2.1.1 πρῶτον πάντων (2:1)

"First of all" does not mean first of all things that exist but refers to the encouragement to pray as being the first of all the things that Paul wants to encourage of Timothy within this letter.[60] This is a case of πᾶς quantifying over a domain that is implicitly restricted to what is relevant to the context. This implicit domain restriction could be made explicit to say: "So, first of all [the things I am encouraging in this letter], I encourage."

5.2.1.2 ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀνθρώπων (2:1)

Francis Turretin (1688, 451) argues that this encouragement to pray for all people should not be understood as urging prayer for literally all people because 1 John 5:16 explicitly states that prayer is not to be made for those who are sinning "unto death (πρὸς θάνατον)." Turretin's claim, however, ignores the fact that John is not saying that there are people for whom any and all prayer is inappropriate but that there are people for whom a particular manner of prayer is inappropriate.[61] The specific kind of prayer that John says should be made for some people is to intercede with God for that person, asking for them to be forgiven (Thompson 1992). Making such a prayer presumes that the person being prayed for is a repentant brother or sister in Christ. Because it is only through faith in Christ that a person is forgiven, John is clarifying that God is not asking us to pray that unbelievers be forgiven. Thompson (1992, 237–38) identifies several OT passages (1 Sam 2:25; 7:4; Jer 7:16–18; 11:14; 14:11; 15:1, 11; Ezek 14:12–20)

[60] "First" could refer to this exhortation's sequence in the epistle or its relative importance. Most likely its sequence is in view (Knight 1992, 113–14), but Towner (2006, 165 n. 6) is correct to note the natural tendency to take up one's most important issue first. The resultant slight distinction between these two interpretations has no impact either way on the referent of "all."

[61] This makes Turretin's reasoning an example of the fallacy of *secundum quid*. This fallacy is when someone fails to distinguish between something being true with respect to a particular thing and something being true in an absolute and unqualified way.

that similarly restrict the parties being prayed for within this intercession for forgiveness to those who are repentant believers. We can pray that God would grant unbelievers conversion and forgiveness, but we should not pray that God would forgive them in their unconverted or apostate state.

1 Timothy 2:1, however, is not speaking about this specific kind of prayer for a person's forgiveness, and so, as in other NT passages (Matt 5:44; Luke 6:28; Rom 12:14), here Paul specifically advocates praying for those who are still outside the people of God. This is further evidenced by the fact that kings are included within this reference (2:2), and there is no reason to believe there were any Christian kings at the time this letter was written.[62] There also is nothing in the context that suggests the domain of πάντων ἀνθρώπων here has been implicitly restricted to believers (considered either as a definite set, which would be contraindicated by the lack of an article, or as an indefinite set). The reason later given to pray for all people is that God wants to bring all people to know the truth (2:4). However, if "all people" meant "all people who are believers," such people have already been brought to a knowledge of the truth.

For different reasons, it is likewise implausible that Paul intends the domain of πάντων ἀνθρώπων to be implicitly restricted to the elect (considered either as a definite set, which would be contraindicated by the lack of an article, or as an indefinite set). Since no human being can peer into God's hidden will to see which of the unconverted people are among the elect, it would be impossible for people ever to know for whom they should pray if that were the restriction placed on the objects of prayer.[63] And even if it were possible to know who is among the elect, nothing in the context would lead the hearer to such a restriction.

Obviously, such an encouragement to pray for all people must not be intended in such a way as to require that we explicitly name all other human beings in our prayers (Lea and Griffin 1992, 87). It is possible that what Paul is advocating is a generic prayer for all people: "God, we pray for all the people of the world." However, another understanding seems more likely.

[62] The legend that King Abgar V of Edessa corresponded with Jesus and converted to Christianity already within the first half of the first century (Eusebius, *Hist. eccl*. 1.13) is widely known to be a later legend (Mirkovic 2004).

[63] As Marshall (1989, 62–63) notes, if this directive was understood as advocating a generic prayer for all the elect, regardless of their kind, it would no longer even really be praying for people of all kinds, but would be simply praying for the elect in the abstract.

Because of the general nature of what Paul is encouraging, there is a nonveridicality operator in this verse[64] and, with it, an implicit domain restriction to an indefinite set.[65]

> English (habituality outscopes indefinite/universal): <Be in the HABIT <of praying for any/all people [that you may know]>>.[66]
>
> Greek (universal outscopes habituality): <As for ALL people [that you may know], <be in the habit of praying for them>>.

The presence of such a nonveridicality operator does not actually exclude anyone from the scope of this encouragement to pray. What it does is make clear that someone does not have to pray for every single other person on the planet in an explicit and individual way in order to complete such a directive. Although πάντων ἀνθρώπων is found with a nonveridicality operator here, the universal quantifier is still being used as a universal term.

5.2.1.3 πάντων τῶν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ὄντων (2:2)

Everything said about "all people" in v. 1 pertains also to "all who are in authority" in v. 2. No authority is excluded from the reference; however, a nonveridicality operator is present, along with an implicit domain restriction to an indefinite set.[67]

> English (habituality outscopes indefinite/universal): <Be in the HABIT <of praying for any/all who [may be] in authority [over you]>>.
>
> Greek (universal outscopes habituality): <As for ALL who [may be] in authority [over you], <be in the habit of praying for them>>.

---

[64] Nonveridicality operators are found in sentences such as negatives, the protases of conditionals, modal expressions, and generics/habituals, which all have in common that they are not making a positive assertion of truth about a specific event. See section 4.5 for more information about nonveridicality.

[65] As Hurrion ([1732] 1844, 191) recognized, it is self-evident that the implicit domain restriction found here restricts "all people" to those who are on earth and does not include those already in heaven or hell. However, this fact does not support his assumption that there are further limitations to the referent of "all people" either here or later in the chapter such as would restrict the referent to being the elect.

[66] Angle brackets are used to clarify which element in the sentence is outscoping the other.

[67] For this reason, Marshall and Towner (1999, 421) appropriately speak of how πᾶς serves to "generalize (rather than universalize) the prayer: Christians are to pray for whatever persons are in authority over them rather than for every single ruler."

Since all authorities could have either a positive or negative effect on the welfare of the Christian community, there is no discernible reason why any such authorities would be excluded from this command to pray.

5.2.1.4 ἐν πάσῃ εὐσεβείᾳ καὶ σεμνότητι (2:2)

"In all piety and dignity" does not speak of every instance of piety and dignity but of the full degree of piety and dignity. Both εὐσέβεια and σεμνότης are intensive nouns, which accounts for the way in which πᾶς is used with them.

5.2.2 Testing for possible restrictions on πᾶς

In this subsection, the phrase πάντας ἀνθρώπους in 1 Timothy 2:4 is tested to see if it meets the criteria for any of the manners of restriction identified in ch. 4.

5.2.2.1 Hyperbole

Some methods for identifying hyperbole (Stein 1985; Burgers et al. 2016; Cruise 2018, 2019) depend upon being able to recognize, based on information external to the sentence, that the form of the statement exceeds the literal truth. Such methods are naturally limited in their applicability when there is uncertainty as to what the literal truth actually is. However, while these methods are limited in their use, they remain the only possible way to positively identify a statement as hyperbolic in character.

This limitation proves problematic for any attempt to claim that "all people" in 1 Timothy 2:4 is hyperbolic. Those who would like to read "all people" as hyperbole must admit, in keeping with the nature of hyperbole, that this is not a reading derived from the verse but one that comes primarily, and even exclusively, from outside information. So, the question becomes: From where does a reader of this statement already possess information to know that this statement is exaggerated?

Calvinist expositors who believe that πάντας ἀνθρώπους here does not indicate literally all people would agree with the statement that it is on the basis of information known from outside this verse that they are inferring a restriction, because they also admit that on first reading, such a verse would seem to have a meaning different from the one required by the Calvinist system (Boettner 1932, 295). However, they conclude such a restriction is justified and must be preferred because they are confident that the rest of Scripture provides the outside information

necessary to already know with certainty that God does not want literally all people to be saved (295). They come to this conclusion not because there is a direct statement in the Bible that God does not want all people to be saved but because they have logically deduced this doctrine from the things that the Bible does directly teach (Gibson 2013b; Trueman 2015, 55–56).

Many Calvinists, especially those within the Presbyterian tradition, hold to the hermeneutical approach of "good and necessary consequence," as the Westminster Confession of Faith ([1646] 1996, 1.6) states that the direct statements of Scripture and legitimate deductions drawn from Scripture are equally from God and are of equal authority (McGraw 2012, 27; Williams 2015, 47, 50). So, under the Calvinist approach, finding a direct statement saying God does not want to save all people is unnecessary. It is sufficient for such a hermeneutic that this can be logically derived from what Scripture does say. Once this deduction is given full authoritative weight, it can itself be used to normalize the interpretation of verses that might seem at odds with it. While advocating for this approach of "good and necessary consequence," McGraw (2012, 26–27) even points to the historical Calvinist practice of using a deduced system of double predestination as a guide for understanding passages whose most intuitive reading attributes to God a universal merciful will as the most obvious example of "good and necessary consequence."

Now, "good and necessary consequence" is a legitimate hermeneutic, but this is an illegitimate execution of it, even by the standards set up by those advocating the approach. Because a "conclusion might be beyond the bounds of human reasoning" (Williams 2015, 53), there is always the possibility that passages cannot be harmonized in a manner entirely satisfactory to logic, as is seen with established doctrinal formulations such as the Trinity and the two natures of Christ (McGraw 2012, 41–47). Once it is allowed that the deductions drawn from Scripture might not be able to be harmonized in a logically satisfying way, it cannot be said that double predestination is a necessary deduction from Scripture.

It is also important "not to impose creedal formulations upon the text of Scripture" (McGraw 2012, 27). Therefore, a framework based on deductions cannot legitimately be allowed to override the direct statements of Scripture.[68] It seems a stretch to say that information merely

[68] This is especially true when it is considered that these verses under discussion are not the only "problem passages" for the Calvinist teachings of double predestination and limited atonement. There are also, for example, statements that God desires the conversion and life of all and not their death (Ezek 18:23, 32), that his sending of Jesus was the result of his love for the world (John 3:16), that Jesus bought for himself even those who will face

deduced from Scripture and not directly asserted by Scripture could be expected to be so firm an assumption in the minds of Paul's hearers that they would be expected to know that his apparent statements to the contrary were exaggerated.

A further problem with this line of thinking is that those who wish to read 1 Timothy 2:4 as hyperbole do so not merely as the logical outworking of their theological assumptions. They also adopt such a reading as necessary to keep those same theological assumptions from being falsified by the biblical text. Consequently, the argument for understanding this verse hyperbolically becomes circular. Only by already knowing that God does not literally want all people to be saved could someone identify such a statement as hyperbolic. Yet at the same time, only by identifying such a statement as hyperbolic could someone maintain the belief that God does not literally want all people to be saved.

Now, the use of a circular argument does not in itself invalidate either of the propositions. In fact, the interpretive task itself is well described as a "hermeneutical circle" (Osborne 2006, 350–57), where the details of the text inform an understanding of the whole, while an understanding of the whole guides the interpretation of the text's details. Nevertheless, this dependence on an entirely circular argument does still mean that no valid argumentation has been provided in support of such a view.

However, this entire discussion of whether there can be a conclusive argument for hyperbole in 1 Timothy 2:4 assumes that hyperbole is even possible in that context in the first place. Chapter 4 demonstrated that, even when hyperbole cannot be identified because there is a question concerning the literal truth, it still can be determined whether hyperbole would have been contextually felicitous in keeping with Grice's maxim of quantity. By making the alleged hyperbole explicitly hyperbolic through the addition of a softener, we can test whether such a statement is sufficiently precise for its context.

When softened, 1 Timothy 2:3–4 reads: "This is good and pleasing before our Savior God, who wants [practically] all people to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth." While nothing in these verses themselves would render a hyperbole infelicitous, something in the previous verses would. If God only wants virtually all people to be saved, with some exceptions, no longer can God's saving will serve as support for the command in v. 1 to pray

destruction (2 Pet 2:1), and that he took away or made sacrifice for the sins of the world (Jn 1:29; 1 Jn 2:2) and came to be Savior of the world (1 Jn 4:14).

for all people. Just as the command to pray for all is not hyperbolic but universal, so also the truth that undergirds this command, God's will to save all people, must not be hyperbolic but universal.[69]

Another reason this expression would not be considered felicitous if intended as hyperbole is the sheer magnitude of the alleged hyperbole itself. A contemporary estimate places the number of Christians at just 0.0126% of the population of the Roman Empire by the end of the first century (Stark 1996, 6–7). Such an estimate is significantly low, as it assumes the numbers given in Acts (2:41; 4:4; 21:20) are grossly hyperbolic and that there were a mere 1,000 Christians in AD 40. Nevertheless, even if the estimated percentage were eighty times too small, Christians would still represent only a single percent of the population in the empire by the century's end. To hyperbolically refer to such a minority population as "[seemingly] everyone" would be so severe an exaggeration that it is unlikely it would be tolerated by the audience. Even today, where Christianity (including nominal Christians) is estimated as a third of the world population (Zurlo, Johnson, and Crossing 2022, 77), such a hyperbolic statement would seem too hyperbolic to be acceptable in any context.

Therefore, due to the circularity of the argument for hyperbole, the contextual infelicitousness of a hyperbole as support for a universal command to pray, and the excessive degree of the supposed hyperbole itself, it is not viable to consider "all people" to have been intended hyperbolically here.

5.2.2.2 Implicit domain restriction

If the domain of πάντας ἀνθρώπους were implicitly restricted in some way, it is difficult to see what that restriction would be, as the context presents no relevant set. It cannot be restricted to what is relevant to the topic ("God wants all people [we are talking about] to be saved"), as the people being talked about are all people, including kings and all in authority (2:1–2). It cannot be restricted to what is relevant to the setting ("God wants all people [who are present] to be saved"), as this expression must speak beyond the confines of the Christian community when it speaks of God wanting to bring those same people to know the truth (2:4). It cannot be restricted to what is relevant to the person ("God wants all people [who are ours] to be saved")

[69] Interestingly, Knight (1992, 118), even as he advocates for the "all without distinction" reading, agrees that v. 4 is meant to support v. 1, and that in v. 1 we are being called upon to imitate God's attitude toward people in v. 4. If he were to follow this logic, he would recognize that, since "all people" is universal in v. 1, it must be universal here.

for the same reason. It cannot be restricted to exclude another party mentioned ("God wants all [other] people to be saved") because there is no other party mentioned. Consequently, there is no reason to take "all people" as having its domain implicitly restricted.

The lack of an article with πάντας ἀνθρώπους further indicates that, if there were any implicit domain restriction, it would be to an indefinite and not to a definite set. Therefore, such a possibility is more appropriately explored with reference to nonveridicality.

5.2.2.3 Nonveridicality

1 Timothy 2:4 has no negative element, and it is not a modal expression or the protasis of a conditional, so these kinds of nonveridicality operators can be dismissed. The question becomes whether a genericity/habituality operator is present in the sentence.

Consider other present-tense statements like "John likes everyone" and "Mary wants to help everyone." Such statements could perhaps be understood universally as saying that John likes everyone in existence and that Mary wants to help everyone in existence. However, due to a genericity/habituality operator, there is another more likely meaning. "John likes everyone" could mean that he is in the habit of liking everyone he meets, while "Mary wants to help everyone" could mean that she is in the habit of wanting to help everyone that she meets who needs help. Accordingly, there would be no real difference in using a universal or an indefinite quantifier in English, and the domain would be implicitly restricted to the indefinite set of those who are encountered.

> Habituality outscopes indefinite/universal: <John is in the HABIT of liking <anyone/everyone [he may meet]>>.
>
> Habituality outscopes indefinite/universal: <Mary is in the HABIT of wanting to help <anyone/everyone [she may encounter]>>.

However, the statement made in 1 Timothy 2:4, despite the superficial similarity in having a present-tense verb, is qualitatively different from such statements. This difference is found primarily in the nature of its subject. Human beings like John and Mary can, at various times, meet and encounter people. However, God is omniscient (Job 28:24; Ps 147:5; Prov 15:3; Isa 40:13; Jer 23:24; Heb 4:13; 1 John 3:20) and immutable (Ps 102:27; Mal 3:6; Jam 1:17). Therefore, he cannot meet or encounter someone that he was not previously familiar with. God

could not, for example, be in the habit of liking everyone without actually liking everyone, and he could not be in the habit of wanting to help everyone without actually wanting to help everyone. Similarly, an omniscient, immutable God cannot be in the habit of wanting all people to be saved without actually wanting all people to be saved. Such a statement with God as its subject cannot be considered a habitual/generic; therefore, it does not contain a nonveridicality operator. The only appropriate gloss would be "all people," so as to say that God does want to save all people.

There is, however, another way to examine the verse with regard to nonveridicality. From God's omniscient, immutable perspective, he cannot learn of people or mentally encounter them in time. However, the encountering of these people could be considered not from God's perspective but from a human being's perspective. The idea would be that Timothy, as the audience of this letter, could freely propose for consideration any particular individual, and Paul, as the author of this letter, would be telling him what God's attitude toward such individuals is.

> English (habituality outscopes indefinite/universal): <God HABITUALLY wants <any/all people [you may propose] to be saved>>.

Significantly, as is always the case with English habituals/generics, the alternation of a universal and an indefinite quantifier does not change the sentence's propositional meaning. Still, for any and every person, it is the case that God wants them to be saved. Saying that for any person you mention, God wants them to be saved is no different a proposition than saying that God wants all people to be saved. As such, even if this statement were understood from the perspective of the audience and not from God's perspective, the nonveridicality operator would still leave πάντας ἀνθρώπους with its universal meaning.

> Greek (universal outscopes habituality): <For ALL people [you may propose], <God wants them to be saved>>.

Since, in Greek, the universal quantifier will outscope any nonveridicality operator, all people will still be in view. So, even in the unlikely case that this verse can be construed as having a nonveridicality operator present, this does not obviate the inevitable exegetical conclusion that God wants all people to be saved.

5.2.2.4 Intensive noun

The word ἄνθρωπος is not an intensive noun, as it is neither abstract nor gradable when it has the meaning "human being."

Patristic literature does use ἄνθρωπος with an abstract meaning, specifically when speaking about the humanity of Christ (Lampe 1961, s.v., I.2–3). However, even when used like this as an abstract noun, ἄνθρωπος would not be an intensive noun since it is not gradable. It refers to the fact that Jesus is a human being and not the degree to which he is a human being. And such a meaning is clearly not being used in 1 Timothy 2:4 anyways, where ἀνθρώπους is both plural and used in reference to concrete human beings.

There is no intensive noun affecting the use of πᾶς.

5.2.2.5 Collective noun

The word ἄνθρωπος is not a collective noun. While the word "people," a common English gloss for the plural of ἄνθρωπος, is a singular collective noun, this is merely a quirk of English, as "people" is used as the suppletive plural of "person."[70] The Greek word ἄνθρωπος merely refers to an individual human being.

Literature translated into Greek from Hebrew can use ἄνθρωπος as a collective noun. Since אָדָם can be used with the more abstract meaning of "mankind" or "humanity" (HALOT, s.v., I.1, 3), occasionally ἄνθρωπος will have such a meaning when used to render אָדָם (e.g., Gen 1:26, 27; 6:6,7, 9:6; Deut 4:32). But because 1 Timothy 2:4 is not a translation from a writing originally composed in Hebrew and because ἄνθρωπος is found there as a plural, this rarer collective meaning is not possible in this verse.

There is no collective noun affecting the use of πᾶς.

5.2.2.6 Superordinate category

Is ἄνθρωπος a superordinate category or a basic-level term? The intuitive answer is that it is a basic-level term. A child would learn a term like "human being" before learning terms that

[70] This quirk is not entirely unique to English. The Komi language (spoken by the Komi people in the northwestern part of Russia) uses the singular collective noun *jöz, "*people" as the plural of *mort*, "person" (Surrey Morphology Group Suppletion Project n.d., 3).

describe different occupations, ethnicities, or even sexes, and basic-level categories are often learned before superordinate categories (Mervis and Crisafi 1982). Similarly, while there are other lower-level and higher-level terms that could be used for a specific person, the default way to refer to someone would be as a "human being." Being the most salient of the levels, this too makes it likely that ἄνθρωπος is a basic-level category term. The somewhat redundant use of ἄνθρωπος along with other nouns and with adjectives when forming hyponyms (BDAG, s.v., 3.a.ε) would further indicate that ἄνθρωπος is a basic-level category. If it were a superordinate category, it would not be so common to include ἄνθρωπος as part of the designation (Mihatsch 2007, 182–83).

Therefore, the natural assumption is that a word like ἄνθρωπος is not a superordinate category, and thus it would be unable to behave the way that superordinate categories can with πᾶς. This assumption can be examined using the five diagnostic tests for superordinate categories outlined in ch. 4.

The first diagnostic test is the "kind of" test. Statements for "human being" that use the phrase "kind of" feel generally unacceptable.[71] For example:

> We can say: "A farmer is a human being." But not: "A farmer is a kind of human being."
>
> We can say: "An Indian is a human being." But not: "An Indian is a kind of human being."
>
> We can say: "A pauper is a human being." But not: "A pauper is a kind of human being."
>
> We can say: "A woman is a human being." But not: "A woman is a kind of human being."

This shows that ἄνθρωπος has nontaxonymic hyponyms and, as such, is not a superordinate category.

[71] The same results would be seen for any of these examples if different glosses for ἄνθρωπος were used, such as "man" or "person."

The second diagnostic test is the single-feature test. The hyponyms of "human being" can generally be defined over against "human being" by adding a single feature.[72] For example:

> A farmer is a human being who farms.
>
> An Indian is a human being from India.
>
> A pauper is a human being who is poor.
>
> A woman is a human being who is female.

While there is much more to know about any of these human beings than the single feature added to them, the addition of these single features is sufficient as a definition of any of these hyponyms. As opposed to taxonymic hyponyms, which must be defined encyclopedically, all the hyponyms of ἄνθρωπος could be defined by adding a single feature. Since its hyponymy is nontaxonymic, ἄνθρωπος would not be a superordinate category.

The third diagnostic test is the essence test. The hyponyms of "human being" do not specify the essence of their hyperonym. While they might be specific instances of humans, they are not specific instantiations of human-ness. Designations like "farmer," "Indian," "pauper," or "woman" do not speak to the essence of a human being. As such, these hyponyms of ἄνθρωπος are nontaxonymic and, accordingly, ἄνθρωπος is not a superordinate category.

The fourth diagnostic test is the picturability test. When told to picture a human being, someone can simply picture a human being. It would be unnecessary either to ask, "What kind of person?" or to mentally have to decide, "What kind of person am I going to picture?" Because a generic human being is easily enough pictured without further specification as to kind, there are many times when biblical narratives often simply use ἄνθρωπος to refer to an unnamed generic individual (BDAG, s.v. 4.a.α–β). For example, when Jesus says in his parables that a man (ἄνθρωπος) found a treasure in a field (Matt 13:44) or that a certain man (ἄνθρωπος) was going down to Jericho (Luke 10:30), no one has any difficulty picturing some such generic man. This is because ἄνθρωπος is a basic-level category and not a superordinate category.

The fifth diagnostic test is the "name three" test. If told to name three human beings, the appropriate answer, and likely the only one that would occur to the one answering, is to name

[72] The same results would be seen for any of these examples if different glosses for ἄνθρωπος were used, such as "man" or "person."

three specific human beings (e.g., Peter, James, John) and not three kinds of human beings (e.g., farmers, Indians, paupers, women). This is because ἄνθρωπος is a basic-level category and not a superordinate category.

The term ἄνθρωπος fails all five of the diagnostic tests for identifying superordinate-category terms. As intuitively makes sense, ἄνθρωπος is a basic-level term. Therefore, ἄνθρωπος cannot interact with πᾶς the way that a superordinate category can. Because it is a basic-level term, ἄνθρωπος always calls to mind individual human beings and not kinds of human beings. Accordingly, πάντας ἀνθρώπους in 1 Timothy 2:4 will call to mind all individual human beings and not merely all kinds of human beings. Contrary to the claim that "nowhere in the text does Paul write as if he were arguing at the level of the individual" (Gibson 2013a, 313), the language of πάντας ἀνθρώπους itself directly speaks to individual people, and all of them.[73]

Those who wish to see "all people" here as referring to kinds will point to things in the context that might suggest that Paul is thinking in terms of kinds. For example, Paul had specifically mentioned kings and other authorities earlier in the chapter and will shortly after this speak of his mission to the Gentiles. So, they argue, Paul's point is merely that God wants to save all kinds of people, whether of the ruling class or of some other class, or that God wants to save all kinds of people, whether they are Jews or Gentiles. However, even if Paul's point was merely that even kings or Gentiles are included within the scope of God's merciful will, he still makes this point by saying, "all people." God wants all people to be saved, including kings and Gentiles, but not excluding anyone. Allen (2016, 675, 707–9; 2019, 226–27) is correct in pointing out that the distinction between "all without distinction" and "all without exception" is ultimately a distinction without a difference, as "all people without any distinction" still includes all people.

5.2.3 Analysis

None of the six possible restrictions on πᾶς can support the Calvinist interpretation that seeks to limit the referent of πάντας ἀνθρώπους in 1 Timothy 2:4. Of these six, only nonveridicality could even potentially be present within the verse, but such a nonveridical reading is unlikely and it would also not even change the fact that all individual people are being referred to. In

[73] It is also fair to ask what more would be necessary for a writer to show he was talking about individual people if words like "all" and "human beings" are not seen as sufficient to speak of individuals. Would it be necessary to say, "Now when I say 'human beings', I mean actual individual human beings and not just different categories of human beings"? To ask for such an indication is a misguided attempt to shift the burden of proof.

ch. 3, it was shown that the other interpretations of this verse that have been proposed to get around its meaning (Augustine's exclusivity reading and nonsoteriological readings of σῴζω) are similarly unviable. Consequently, 1 Timothy 2:4 must be taken as saying that God does want all individual people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.

Some advocates of the "all without distinction" interpretation suggest that Paul's use of universal language was motivated by the situation he was responding to. The assumption is that Paul spoke of "all people" to counter a "heretical exclusivism" and "elitism" (Gibson 2013a, 312). Such a mirror reading[74] of the Pastoral Epistles is certainly plausible, but it does nothing to support the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς. Regardless of which people were being wrongly excluded or of the basis on which they were being wrongly excluded, Paul nevertheless says "all." The diagnostic tests performed in this section show that there is no linguistic basis for taking πᾶς in a restricted way here. Therefore, the claim that Paul said "all" to correct "some" when all he really meant was a "somewhat larger some" assumes the apostle is a careless or incapable communicator. However, as Walton (2002, 65 n. 2) notes, hermeneutical objectivity "assumes that the author is a competent communicator and capable of being understood." Paul certainly could have communicated that he was only referring to all categories and not all individual people if that was all he was trying to say.[75]

Silva (2001, 107) states that the most important question for a mirror reading is: "Could the interpretation of the relevant passages be sustained even if we did not have the theory in question?" However, the "all without distinction" interpretation does worse than fail such a criterion. It cannot be sustained linguistically even when assuming the validity of the "exclusivism" mirror reading.

[74] A mirror reading is an attempt to reconstruct the views and teachings to which a writing is responding by looking at the statements within the writing itself.

[75] BDAG (s.v. πᾶς, 5) is incorrect when it implies that πᾶς was used in references to kinds because words like παντοδαπός and παντοῖος are not found within Early Christian literature. Such an argument overstates its case, as these words are both found in OG (Job 40:21; Dan 2:6; 2 Macc 5:3; 3 Macc 5:22; 7:16; 4 Macc 1:34), and so it cannot automatically be assumed that Paul could not have known or used these words. Even more importantly, speakers always have the ability to communicate whatever they find relevant to communicate, and as such the Biblical Greek corpus shows times where speakers found a way to make explicit that they were speaking of all kinds instead of all individuals. See, for example, παντὸς γένους (Dan 3:5) and πᾶσα φύσις (Jam 3:7).

5.3 1 Timothy 2:6

5.3.1 Context

The second key occurrence of πᾶς within the Pastoral Epistles happens within the same conversation as the first. The statement that God wants all people to come to a knowledge of the truth (v. 4) is supported (γάρ) by the claim that God is the only God and, in turn, Christ is the only mediator available to the human race (v. 5).[76] This mediator Christ is then elaborated upon as having given himself as a ransom "for all (ὑπὲρ πάντων)."

When used with personal objects, ὑπέρ typically communicates that something is being done more generically in that person's interest. However, with verbs of dying, it often refers more specifically to a substitutionary death in that person's place (BDAG, s.v., A; Harris 2012, 209–11; Aubrey and Aubrey 2020, s.v., 3). Any doubt as to whether such a substitutionary sense is intended is removed by ἀντίλυτρον, "a ransom in place of." The word λύτρον already speaks of a ransom paid, and the addition of the prefix ἀντί, the first known use of such a compound noun, likely serves to underscore the fact that this ransom is given in place of someone else (NIDNTTE, s.v. λυτρόω, 2). Therefore, the parties included within πάντων are not merely ones that Christ's death was intended to advantage in some way, but are ones that Christ died in place of, at least in some respect.[77] Because this verse speaks of Christ's substitutionary death for people, this verse, the referent of πάντων is a significant point of scriptural data for defining the extent of Christ's atoning death.

The statement that Jesus "gave himself as a ransom for all" seems to have been influenced by and to be alluding to Jesus's statement that he came to "give his life as a ransom for many (δοῦναι τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν)" (Matt 20:28; Mark 10:45). While there are several differences in the wording from the Gospels to Paul (using a reflexive pronoun instead of referring to "life," and making the preposition ἀντί a prefix and adding in ὑπέρ), the most significant difference is that "many" has been changed to "all." The wording of Jesus's statement in the Gospels is itself perhaps influenced by the way that the word "many" is used in Isaiah 53:12: "He bore the sins of many (OG: πολλῶν)." This potential intertextual

[76] As in Romans (3:30; 10:12), the fact that there is only one God is used as evidence that this God has provided the only way of salvation for all people in Jesus (Van Neste 2004, 33).

[77] This would effectively rule out any multi-intentioned view of the extent of the atonement that claims that Jesus did die for all people but not with the intension of saving all people by being their substitute.

connection and its relevance for the understanding of πάντων will be discussed further when examining 1 Timothy 2:6 for a possible hyperbolic meaning.

5.3.2 Testing for possible restrictions on πᾶς

In this subsection, the word πάντων in 1 Timothy 2:6 is tested to see if it meets the criteria for any of the manners of restriction identified in ch. 4.

5.3.2.1 Hyperbole

When explicitly softened, this verse will read that Christ Jesus "gave himself as a ransom for [virtually] all." The felicitousness of such a hyperbole would depend on "all people" being hyperbolic in v. 4. If God merely wants seemingly everyone, with many exceptions, to come to know the truth about Jesus and be saved, it would be enough that this Jesus made himself a ransom for that same group of seemingly everyone. However, if God wants literally everyone, without any exceptions, to come to know the truth about Jesus and be saved, then it is infelicitous to support such a desire by saying that Jesus merely died for seemingly everyone. Since v. 4 was shown to be infelicitous as hyperbole, v. 6 is similarly infelicitous as hyperbole.

In addition to its infelicitousness were it intended hyperbolically, πάντων would struggle to be hyperbolic since the exaggeration would seem too extreme. As with "all people" two verses earlier, if "all" here has to be restricted to a group as small as the elect, it would remain a minority of the world's population. As a result, these people, while numerically still a large group, could not be called "everyone" except by gross overexaggeration.

The most detailed attempt to treat πάντων here as a hyperbolic reference to many people has been made primarily by appealing to the verse's literary background. Gibson (2013a, 313–14), for example, claims that since Isaiah 53 used "many" to speak of a large but not universal number of people, Jesus in Matthew 20:28 and Mark 10:45 similarly used "many" to speak of a large but not universal number of people. And since Paul's statement is literarily dependent on Jesus's statement in the Gospels, then Paul would have correspondingly used "all" to speak merely of a large but not universal number of people.

This interpretation becomes untenable when one considers the way in which Paul reformulates the expression. It would be one thing to claim that Paul was quoting someone else's words and so we should be careful of attributing too much of the meaning of such a quote to Paul. After

all, he very well could have used the quote because it made the point he wanted to make, even if he was not trying to communicate absolutely everything that is communicated within the original quotation. However, it is another thing entirely to claim that Paul chose to modify the wording of a quotation in some way but that the proper way to understand his meaning is by changing the quotation back to a form he did not use. It is not necessarily even true that "many" is meant exclusively even in Isaiah (Jeremias 1964a; 1964b, 179–82; Lessing 2011, 583) or in the Gospels (Jeremias 1964a; 1964b, 179–82; Brooks 1992, 171; Davies and Allison 2004, 95; France 2007, 763; Stein 2008, 489; Gibbs 2010, 1002; Strauss 2014, 459; Voelz 2019, 788–89). However, regardless of the meaning of "many" there, Paul chose to say "all," and it is his word choice that should be considered and honored in the interpretation of this verse. The word he chose, "all," is a universal term, and it cannot be restricted in its context here via hyperbole.

5.3.2.2 Implicit domain restriction

When πάντων is used by itself, without any other pronoun, there could easily be an implicit restriction to its domain, unlike is the case with the English "all." Nevertheless, the context does not present any plausible candidate for what such a domain might be restricted to. It cannot be restricted to what is relevant to the topic ("He gave himself as a ransom for all [we are talking about]"), as the people being talked about are either "all people" (v. 4) or "people" in general (v. 5). It cannot be restricted to what is relevant to the setting ("He gave himself as a ransom for all [who are present]") because Paul immediately moves from this phrase to talk about how this ransom was a public testimony that he was called to herald to the nations (vv. 6–7). It cannot be restricted to what is relevant to the person ("He gave himself as a ransom for all [who are ours]") for the same reason. It cannot be restricted to exclude another party mentioned ("He gave himself as a ransom for all [others]") because there is no other party mentioned. Consequently, there is no reason to take "all" as having its domain implicitly restricted.

The claim that vv. 5–6, or at least vv. 5–6a, are a quotation incorporated from elsewhere does not change anything here (Mounce 2000, 77). It is true that using a statement with πᾶς apart from its context could potentially mean failing to transmit the information necessary for a hearer to understand the implicit domain restriction present in the original context. However, even assuming this is a quotation lacking its full original context, the supplied quotation is sufficiently long to see that there is not implicit domain restriction. Verse 5, as already mentioned, shows that the "all" would be "all people." Additionally, for the present purposes,

it would be irrelevant if the original formulation had an implicitly restricted domain and did not intend Jesus as a ransom for all people. What is more important is the meaning attached to this statement as it is used by the apostle within this canonical writing.

5.3.2.3 Nonveridicality

As with 1 Timothy 2:4, it can be quickly ruled out that there is any nonveridicality operator present such as would arise from a negative, a modal expression, or the protasis of a conditional. This leaves only the question of whether there is a genericity/habituality operator present.

This verse's verb (δούς) is an aorist participle, speaking of a past-time event. While past-time habituals/generics will more commonly use the imperfect (or, in this case, the present participle), the aorist can be used for such sentences too, albeit without specifically marking the habitual/generic nature of the occurrence (Fanning 1990, 244–48, 258–60). So, the use of the aorist does not rule out the presence of a genericity/habituality operator. Nevertheless, the verb phrase "gave himself as a ransom" does refer to the single past-time occurrence of Jesus's death, which effectively eliminates any possibility of this being a habitual/generic.

The only way to read a nonveridicality operator into this verse would be to take the phrase "for all" as being from the audience's perspective and not from Jesus's perspective. This reading would be like the possibility explored for "all people" in v. 4. Hypothetically, the thought could be, "for everyone/anyone [you may propose], Jesus gave himself as a ransom for them." Here too, however, as is always the case with habituals/generics, the universal and the indefinite quantifier result in the same proposition—there would be no person for whom Jesus did not give his life as a ransom. Even following such an unlikely reading to insert a nonveridicality operator, the statement would still assert that Jesus gave his life as a ransom for all.

5.3.2.4 Intensive noun

There is no noun to be an intensive noun, and the quantifier itself is plural, both of which make clear that there is no intensive noun affecting the use of πᾶς.

5.3.2.5 Collective noun

There is no noun to be a collective noun, and there is no collective noun in the context that might be taken to be the implied noun with πάντων. The only noun in the context that could be

implied to go with πάντων is ἀνθρώπων, which was shown not to be a collective noun in the discussion on 1 Timothy 2:4. All of this makes clear that there is no collective noun affecting the use of πᾶς.

5.3.2.6 Superordinate category

There is no noun to be a superordinate category, and there is no superordinate category in the context that might be taken to be the implied noun with πάντων. The only noun in the context that could be implied to go with πάντων is ἀνθρώπων, which was shown not to be a superordinate category in the discussion on 1 Timothy 2:4. All of this makes clear that there is no superordinate category affecting the use of πᾶς.

Paul connects the fact that Jesus died as a ransom for all with his own appointment to bring the gospel to the Gentiles. This does raise the possibility that when Paul says, "a ransom for all," he is thinking and even implying, "a ransom for all people, not just Jews, but also Gentiles" (Marshall and Towner 1999, 427). However, as was seen in connection with v. 4, even if Paul's purpose in saying "all" is to show that a particular group of people is not excluded, he still does this by saying "all." "All people, even Gentiles" is still "all people."

5.3.3 Analysis

None of the six possible restrictions on πᾶς can support the Calvinist interpretation that seeks to limit the referent of πάντων in 1 Timothy 2:6. Consequently, this verse must be taken as saying that Jesus gave his life as a ransom in place of all individual people.

Because this debated use of πᾶς, unlike the others, has no noun being modified by πᾶς, sometimes proponents of the "all without distinction" interpretation adopt a different method of restriction for this verse than they do for the others. For example, Gibson (2013a, 312) takes πάντας ἀνθρώπους in v. 4 as a reference to kinds of people but then takes πάντων in v. 6 simply as a vague reference to a large number of people (314). To put such an interpretation in terms of the linguistic ways that πᾶς can be restricted, Gibson would be suggesting that within the span of these three verses πᾶς is used once as if with a superordinate category and once as hyperbole.

Now, πᾶς is certainly capable of being restricted in very different ways, even within the same verse. However, it is somewhat misleading to present these two manners of restriction as if

they represented a single exegetical interpretation (Gibson 2013a, 323–25). Someone who wishes to appeal to these kinds of restrictions should admit that they are appealing to two different linguistic phenomena to get two successive instances of the same word to have the meaning they prefer.

Just as Occam's razor would speak against proposals that require a different explanation not based on πᾶς for every key verse using πᾶς, it would similarly place a high burden of proof on those who claim that two instances of πᾶς within the same paragraph, both about humanity and God's saving action toward them, feature entirely distinct limitations to the quantifier. Interpreting either πάντας ἀνθρώπους in v. 4 or πάντων in v. 6 in a restricted way is unsustainable in isolation. With the two of them taken together, the "all without distinction" reading becomes altogether unviable.

5.4 1 Timothy 4:10

5.4.1 Context

Paul tells Timothy to train himself for piety (v. 7). He then supports (γάρ) this directive by comparing the greater usefulness of piety with the relatively smaller usefulness of physical training (v. 8). Paul indicates that piety's greater usefulness comes from its holding promise not only for this life but also for the next life. This statement is then itself supported (γάρ) by the further explanation that the whole reason they[78] expend so much effort is that they trust the living God who is "Savior of all people, especially believers (σωτὴρ πάντων ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πιστῶν)" (v. 10). Because this verse speaks of God as being their Savior, the referent of πάντων ἀνθρώπων is a significant point of scriptural data for defining the extent of the Father's merciful will.

Chapter 3 of this thesis addressed several false interpretive claims about this verse. The word σωτήρ must be taken in reference to salvation and not merely in reference to providential preservation (3.4.2). The word μάλιστα must here, as always, be taken as indicating a restriction (3.4.3). Consequently, this verse asserts two things about whoever is intended by πάντων ἀνθρώπων: first, that God is in some sense their Savior, and second, that this group must have a membership that expands beyond those denoted as believers.

[78] The "they" is likely Paul and others, like Timothy, who could be considered a διάκονος (v. 6) of Christ Jesus.

Paul uses his "faithful saying" formula in v. 9, and there has been debate about which of his words represents the "faithful saying." Some understand it to refer back to the preceding statement in v. 8 that piety holds promise for the life to come (Knight 1992, 198; Marshall and Towner 1999, 554; Towner 2006, 309; Fee 2011, 104–105). Others take it to be pointing ahead to v. 10, the statement under special examination in this section (Guthrie 1990, 107; Mounce 2000, 247, 254; Collins 2012, 126–27). However, despite the existence of some debate, Marshall and Towner (1999, 554) are certainly correct when saying that the faithful saying must be in v. 8, as "verse 10 is a personal statement rather than a doctrinal statement." Verse 10 is best seen not as being the faithful saying but as being support for the faithful saying of v. 8 that "godliness is profitable for everything, having the promise of the life now and the one to come." Verse 10 supports this faithful saying by noting that the living God they labor for is Savior of all.

5.4.2 Testing for possible restrictions on πᾶς

In this subsection, the phrase πάντων ἀνθρώπων in 1 Timothy 4:10 is tested to see if it meets the criteria for any of the manners of restriction identified in ch. 4.

5.4.2.1 Hyperbole

When explicitly softened, this verse says, "the reason we labor and strive is that we have our hope in the living God, who is Savior of [practically] all people, especially believers." There is nothing in this context that would suggest that a hyperbole would not be felicitous here. Even if God is not in some way Savior of everyone, it would be enough for the present purposes if he were Savior of practically everyone, because that could still be a reason why Paul and others, included as they were within those whose Savior the living God is, would labor in piety. Possible exceptions would not undermine the overall point.

However, even though a hyperbole would perhaps be felicitous in context, there does not seem to be a way to make such a hyperbole support the Calvinist interpretation of the verse. This is due to the final phrase μάλιστα πιστῶν, "especially believers." Whoever the "practically all people" include would have to be more than those included among "believers." The whole reason why the Calvinist interpretation seeks to limit "all people" in this verse is to keep it from being said that God is Savior of those who are not among the elect. So, it would not help such

a position to say that God is Savior of practically everyone, especially of those who are elect but also of some that are not.[79]

5.4.2.2 Implicit domain restriction

If the domain of πάντων ἀνθρώπων were implicitly restricted in some way, it is difficult to see what that restriction would be, as the context presents no relevant set. It cannot be restricted to what is relevant to the topic ("God is Savior of all people [we are talking about], especially believers"), as the only possible group of people being talked about in this context is believers (either τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς in v. 6 or the "we" who labor, strive, and hope in God in v. 10). If "all people" referred to believers, Paul would not and could not then say, "especially believers." For the same reason, it cannot be restricted to what is relevant to the setting ("God is Savior of all people [who are present], especially believers") or to what is relevant to the person ("God is Savior of all people [who are ours]"). The group must, at the very least, be larger than believers. It also cannot be restricted to exclude another party mentioned ("God is Savior of all [other] people, [but] especially believers") because the only other party mentioned are believers. Reading the verse in this way would actually make more prominent the fact that God is said to be Savior of people who do not believe. Such a reading, then, would be of no use to those who desire to restrict "all people" here. Consequently, there is no reason to take "all people" as having its domain implicitly restricted.

Mounce (2000, 248) suggests that Paul may have added the phrase "especially believers" to clarify the expression "Savior of all people," which he quoted from an early Christian hymn. If such an interpretation were valid, it would allow for the possibility that we lack the original context of this hymn fragment in which the domain might be implicitly restricted. Alternatively, it would also allow for the possibility that Paul does not fully stand behind the words in the exact form he quoted them, since he saw it necessary to provide clarification.

This line of thinking, however, does not fully hold up. First, Mounce's (2000) position depends on the assumption that the "faithful saying" formula of v. 9 points ahead to v. 10. As discussed earlier in this section, an examination of the context shows the suspect nature of such an

[79] The logic similarly breaks down if one tries to take "all" as referring hyperbolically to the large number of the elect and "believers" as referring to those of the elect who already believe. Since the salvation talked about here is oriented toward the life to come, it would be strange if Paul's point were that God were especially Savior for those who already believe in him over against those who will come to faith at a later date.

assumption, which raises doubt regarding any suggestion that v. 10 contains quoted material in the first place.

Second, Paul's way of clarifying such a statement, if that is what he is doing, clarifies without rejecting what was previously said. He could have defined "all people" by saying τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν, "that is," the same way that he defines quoted material in Romans 10:6–8. He also could have used μᾶλλον, "rather," to improve an expression, as in Romans 8:34 and Galatians 4:9. Instead, he says μάλιστα, "especially." Adding that God is "especially" Savior of believers does not modify or diminish the statement that God is Savior of all, even if this material was quoted from elsewhere.

The lack of an article with πάντων ἀνθρώπων further indicates that, if there were any implicit domain restriction, it would be to an indefinite and not to a definite set. Therefore, such a possibility is more appropriately explored with reference to nonveridicality.

5.4.2.3 Nonveridicality

Nonveridicality is present in this verse, as there is habituality inherent in characterizing God with the noun σωτήρ.

> English (habituality outscopes indefinite/universal): <A HABITUAL Savior <of any/all people [there may be/you may propose]>>.
>
> Greek (universal outscopes habituality): <Of ALL people [there may be/you may propose] <a habitual Savior>>.

It is important, however, to note what the effect of this habituality operator is. This operator is why, when someone reads that God is Savior of all people, they do not automatically take that as asserting that he actually does save all people. Whether the English translation uses an indefinite or a universal, the understanding remains the same. God is, in some sense, Savior of all people, with no one excluded. He intends himself to be Savior of all.

As ch. 3 showed, Calvinist argumentation for teachings such as double predestination and limited atonement assumes that if God had intended to save a person and if Christ had died for a person, then that person must, of necessity, be saved. As not all are converted and saved, it is concluded that God has not intended to save all, and Christ did not die so as to make atonement for all. However, in reference to another passage (1 John 2:2), Allen (2019, 160–61) shows that

such arguments are built on an "invalid noun-to-verb conversion." To say, using a noun, that God is the Savior of all people is not necessarily the same as saying, using a verb, that God saved, saves, or will save all people.[80]

5.4.2.4 Intensive noun

It was already seen in reference to 1 Timothy 2:4 that ἄνθρωπος is not an intensive noun, and especially so when plural and when referring to concrete human beings. As such, there is no intensive noun affecting the use of πᾶς.

5.4.2.5 Collective noun

It was already seen in reference to 1 Timothy 2:4 that ἄνθρωπος is not a collective noun, and especially so when plural and in literature not originally composed in Hebrew. As such, there is no collective noun affecting the use of πᾶς.

5.4.2.6 Superordinate category

It was already seen in reference to 1 Timothy 2:4 that ἄνθρωπος is not a superordinate category. As such, there is no superordinate category affecting the use of πᾶς.

Relative to the other key verses in which Calvinists have appealed to the "all without distinction" interpretation of πᾶς, in 1 Timothy 4:10, any notion that Paul is thinking in terms of groups of people is entirely backgrounded.[81] However, even if Paul did have groups of

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[80] Baugh (1992, 332) claims that such a sense would only be possible if "Savior" were understood as an honorific title for God and not as a description of God's actions. Baugh further states that such a titular reference cannot be present here, as it would require for σωτήρ to have the article. However, Baugh's explanation for the use and non-use of the article with σωτήρ (332 n. 4) is overly simplistic. The presence of the article would actually be determined not by whether or not the label is considered titular but by whether it is considered qualitative ("He is Savior") or definite ("He is the Savior") (Wallace 1996, 41–46, 244–45). Both an arthrous and an anarthrous σωτήρ could be either titular or non-titular.

Additionally, even when one accepts Baugh's (1992) assertion that σωτήρ is not meant here as a title, this in no way proves what Baugh seeks to prove from it. "Savior" does not have to be a title to say that God can be the Savior of someone who is not actually saved. Someone could just as easily say that God is Savior of all people, intending "Savior" simply as a general description of God's character and activity, without implying that every single person will ultimately be saved. To reuse an example from ch. 4, someone can be a friend of all people, speaking of their habitual nature, even while there are many people out there that they might not have ever done something to be a friend to them.

[81] It can be claimed, as do Towner (2006, 311) and Gibson (2013a, 316), that the preceding rejection of the ascetism and myths entails a rejection of elitism, and that Paul's reference to his (and others') striving refers to the Gentile mission, which requires that God be their Savior too. Nevertheless, such thoughts are clearly less overt in this section, and regardless of whether Paul was thinking in terms of no group being excluded, this does not change what it means to say "all people."

people in mind, he still does not use language that limits God's role as Savior to all those kinds of people but calls him simply "Savior of all people."

5.4.3 Analysis

None of the six possible restrictions on πᾶς can support the Calvinist interpretation that seeks to limit the referent of πάντων ἀνθρώπων in 1 Timothy 4:10. Of these six, only nonveridicality is present, but it does not keep the verse from saying that God is Savior of all individual people. It is unsurprising, then, that Baugh (1992, 333), himself a Calvinist writing in defense of limited atonement, dismisses the notion that this verse can be understood in a Calvinist manner by giving πᾶς a specific meaning. Chapter 3 showed that the other interpretations of this verse that have been proposed to get around its meaning (Augustine's exclusivity reading, nonsoteriological readings of σωτήρ, and taking μάλιστα as a marker of specification) are similarly unviable. Consequently, 1 Timothy 4:10 must be taken as saying that God is, in some sense, Savior of all individual people.

In his attempt to answer "problematic texts" for limited atonement, Schreiner (2013, 380–86) discusses the meaning of this verse at some length. After thoroughly rejecting attempts to give new meanings to μάλιστα or σωτήρ, he finds this verse to be speaking of "God's salvific stance" because God "desires all people to be saved" and "is available as Savior to all people" (386). He merely points out that such facts do not necessarily negate limited atonement, a point made earlier by Baugh (1992, 331–32). In this, Baugh and Schreiner are correct. Stating that God is, in some sense, Savior of all people does not in itself refute limited atonement because there would still remain larger systematic questions that would need to be addressed.[82] Nevertheless, stating that God is, in some sense, Savior of all people does speak against double predestination, especially its strongest and most logically consistent form, where God is said not to sincerely desire the salvation of all people.

5.5 Titus 2:11

5.5.1 Context

After telling Titus what he should teach to older men (v. 2), to older women (v. 3), indirectly to younger women via the older women (vv. 4–5), to younger men (vv. 6–8), and to slaves (vv.

[82] Such as the question of whether foreseen or foreordained faith logically preceded God's intention in the atonement.

9–10), Paul supports (γάρ) his instructions by presenting the coming of Jesus, referred to as the appearance of God's grace (v. 11),[83] as being instructive for how we live in this life (v. 12) while we await Jesus's return (v. 13).

Paul finishes this thought (2:14) by describing the work of Jesus in a way that fits well with the particularist views of limited atonement, saying that Jesus gave himself "in place of us (ἡμῶν) to redeem us (ἡμᾶς)" and to "purify for himself a special people (λαὸν περιούσιον)." However, this latter description of Jesus's death should not be allowed to override the different and much broader terms in which God's grace was described in v. 11. In v. 11, Paul specifically characterizes this grace of God as having appeared as being "saving for all people" (σωτήριος πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις).

Because this verse speaks of God's saving grace for people, the referent of πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις is a significant point of scriptural data for defining the extent of the Father's merciful will. Because this verse speaks of this saving grace of God as having appeared in the coming of Jesus, the referent of πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις is also a significant point of scriptural data for defining the extent of Christ's atoning death.

5.5.2 Testing for possible restrictions on πᾶς

In this subsection, the phrase πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις in Titus 2:11 is tested to see if it meets the criteria for any of the manners of restriction identified in ch. 4.

5.5.2.1 Hyperbole

When explicitly softened, this verse says that "the grace of God appeared bearing salvation for [practically] all people." There does not seem to be anything in the context that would render such a hyperbole infelicitous. The appearance of salvation for many people would be sufficient to motivate those many people in their lives. However, as with the key uses of πᾶς in 1 Timothy 2, using hyperbole to refer to God's elect people in universal terms seems too extreme to be considered acceptable in light of the relatively small numbers of Christians then and throughout history.

[83] For confirmation that Christ's coming is what is meant by this appearance of God's grace, see the way Paul speaks in 2 Tim 1:8; Titus 3:4–7.

It also seems interpretively unnecessary to consider Titus 2:11 as hyperbolic if the other three verses cannot be adequately explained via hyperbole. If it is already admitted that God wants literally all people to be saved (1 Tim 2:4), that Jesus died for literally all (1 Tim 2:6), and that God is, in some sense, Savior of literally all people (1 Tim 4:10), it seems a relatively more modest claim to say that God's grace displayed in the coming of Jesus bears salvation for literally all people in some sense (Titus 2:11).

5.5.2.2 Implicit domain restriction

Since the preceding verses discuss the instruction that Titus should give to people within the Christian community concerning their various stations (vv. 1–10), an implicitly restricted domain in v. 11 would, theoretically, be plausible. Such restriction could be envisioned as a restriction to what is relevant to the topic ("Bearing salvation for all people [we are talking about]"), the setting ("Bearing salvation for all people [who are present]"), or the person ("Bearing salvation for all people [who are ours]").

Importantly, however, such an implicit domain restriction would speak not to the generic classes of people referred to but would speak of them as concrete individuals. This is because ἄνθρωπος is not a superordinate category term, and so it denotes individuals and not categories of people. So, with its domain implicitly restricted, πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις would be taken to mean "all [these] people [in Titus's Christian community, regardless of class]" and not "all [these abstract classes of] people."

However, even such an implicitly restricted domain here is only hypothetically possible in the context, as it does not fit with the actual form of the expression πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις. Since πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις lacks the article, any implicit domain restriction present cannot refer to a definite set, such as Titus's Christian community would be. Instead, any possible implicit domain restriction would have to be to an indefinite set. Therefore, it is more appropriately explored with reference to nonveridicality.

5.5.2.3 Nonveridicality

Nonveridicality is present in this verse, as there is habituality inherent in the predicate adjective σωτήριος.

English (habituality outscopes indefinite/universal): <HABITUALLY salvific <for any/all people [there may be/you may propose]>>.

Greek (universal outscopes habituality): <For ALL people [there may be/you may propose] <habitually salvific>>.

It is important, however, to note what the effect of this habituality operator is. This operator is why, when someone reads that God's grace bears salvation for all people, they know not to automatically take that as asserting that all people are actually saved by it. Whether the English translation uses an indefinite or a universal, the understanding remains the same. God's grace is, in some sense, salvific for all people, with no one excluded.

Even if someone were to assume that the implicit domain restriction present with this nonveridicality includes a reference to the various stations addressed earlier in this context, still no individuals would be excluded from this reference.

English (habituality outscopes indefinite/universal): <HABITUALLY salvific <for any/all people [there may be within these various classes]>>.

Greek (universal outscopes habituality): <For ALL people [there may be within these various classes] <habitually salvific>>.

5.5.2.4 Intensive noun

It was already seen in reference to 1 Timothy 2:4 that ἄνθρωπος is not an intensive noun, and especially so when plural and when referring to concrete human beings. As such, there is no intensive noun affecting the use of πᾶς.

5.5.2.5 Collective noun

It was already seen in reference to 1 Timothy 2:4 that ἄνθρωπος is not a collective noun, and especially so when plural and in literature not originally composed in Hebrew. As such, there is no collective noun affecting the use of πᾶς.

5.5.2.6 Superordinate category

It was already seen in reference to 1 Timothy 2:4 that ἄνθρωπος is not a superordinate category. As such, there is no superordinate category affecting the use of πᾶς.

Paul's point here in context may well be that people are included within the scope of God's grace regardless of which of the social categories mentioned they belong to. However, as Marshall and Towner (1999, 268) note, this does not mean that Paul is speaking of categories in such a way as would exclude any individuals from those categories. "All people, without making a distinction based on social class," still includes all individual people.

5.5.3 Analysis

Of the six possible restrictions on πᾶς, only hyperbole could perhaps support the Calvinist interpretation that seeks to limit the referent of πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις in Titus 2:11. However, even as hyperbole might have been acceptable in this context, referring to such a small percentage of the population as "all" would likely be too hyperbolic to be acceptable. While nonveridicality is present, it does not keep this verse from saying that God's grace bears salvation for all individual people.

Additionally, since no restrictions could be maintained for the other key verses, there is no real reason left to try to maintain a restriction for this verse, whose claim of a universally salvific grace is more modest than the claim of a universal desire to save (1 Tim 2:4) or of a universal atonement (1 Tim 2:6). Chapter 3 showed that the other interpretation of this verse that has been proposed to get around its meaning (reading πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις as dependent on ἐπεφάνη) is similarly unviable. Consequently, Titus 2:11 is best taken as saying that the grace of God that made an appearance in Christ's coming bears salvation for all individual people.

5.6 Conclusion

The Calvinist teachings of double predestination and of limited atonement depend on finding some restriction to the meaning of πᾶς in four key verses in the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11). This exegetical interpretation, known as the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς, has long been claimed to have linguistic support from the many other passages where there is some restriction to πᾶς and its referent is not universal. However, looking more closely at those alleged parallels, ch. 4 revealed that there were six ways that πᾶς could be restricted: hyperbole, implicit domain restriction, nonveridicality, intensive nouns, collective nouns, and superordinate categories. With those manners of restriction quantified, it was possible to examine whether any such restriction could be present in the relevant verses from the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11). Because of this, this chapter took up this thesis's fourth subsidiary research question: What affect, either positive or negative, does a linguistic

analysis of πᾶς in 1 Timothy 2:4, 6; 4:10 and Titus 2:11 have on the Reformed Calvinist doctrine that limits the scope of the Father's merciful will and the Son's atonement?

First, the Calvinist doctrine of double predestination, which limits the scope of the Father's merciful will, is contradicted by this linguistic analysis. Contrary to what the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς claims, there is no linguistic evidence or exegetical warrant for restricting the meaning or referent of πᾶς in places where the teaching of double predestination requires it to be restricted. Passages that state that God "wants all people to be saved" (1 Tim 2:4), that God "is Savior of all people" (1 Tim 4:10), and that God's grace "bears salvation for all people" (Titus 2:11) have to be speaking of all people.

If God sincerely wants to save all people, it cannot be said that the reason why not all people are actually saved is because God did not, in any sense, want to save them. Unlike what many Calvinists assume, a sovereign God can apparently want something sincerely and, for some reason, choose not to bring it to fruition. The Father's merciful will for all people is the most obvious example of this paradox, as God wants to save all and yet, for some reason, chooses to save only some. All people, even those who do not end up being saved, are within the scope of the Father's merciful will.

Second, the Calvinist doctrine of limited atonement, which limits the extent of the Son's atonement, is similarly contradicted by this linguistic analysis. Contrary to what the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς claims, there is no linguistic evidence or exegetical warrant for restricting the meaning or referent of πᾶς in places where the teaching of limited atonement requires it to be restricted. Passages that state that Christ Jesus "gave himself as a ransom for all" (1 Tim 2:6) and that his coming "bears salvation for all people" (Titus 2:11) must be speaking of all people.

If Jesus died in place of all people in order to save all people, it cannot be said that the reason why not all people are actually saved is because Jesus's death was not intended for them and their salvation. All people, even those who do not end up receiving the saving benefits of Christ's atoning death for them, are within its intended scope.

The Calvinist use of the "all without distinction" interpretation has never claimed to be able to positively prove itself based on linguistic arguments. Advocates of such argumentation have generally been content to prove the linguistic viability of πᾶς being restricted. The positive proof for such restrictions in the relevant verses is assumed to come from the immediate context

within the Pastoral Epistles and the wider context of all of Scripture. Such overall argumentation could be summarized in the following three points:

1. Linguistic: It is *possible* for πᾶς to be restricted.
2. Immediate context: It is *plausible* that Paul is primarily concerned about kinds of people.
3. Wider context: It is dogmatically *necessary* that God does not sincerely desire the salvation of all/that Jesus did not die with the intent of saving all.

When the Calvinist argumentation is outlined in this way, the centuries-long standstill on these verses is unsurprising. Both those who accept the "all without distinction" and those who reject it have accepted the validity of point 1, that restriction to πᾶς is linguistically possible. Little progress has been made by either side regarding point 2 because, as was shown throughout this chapter, it is ultimately irrelevant whether Paul's primary communicative purpose was to keep certain groups of people from being excluded. Paul could still have been speaking of literally all people while trying to keep those groups from being excluded. Even less progress has been made on point 3 because the two sides do not agree on whether the wider context of Scripture necessitates doctrines such as double predestination and limited atonement.

By building off the linguistic analysis of ch. 4, this chapter showed that evaluating the viability and legitimacy of the "all without distinction" interpretation does not need to be relegated to the area of warring dogmatic approaches. The very point on which both sides have been in agreement—that πᾶς is capable of restriction—can be sufficiently refined so as to put to bed this long-standing interpretive question. Yes, πᾶς is capable of restriction. In fact, it is capable of six different kinds of restrictions that can each be documented and quantified. However, none of those restrictions are linguistically possible where the "all without distinction" interpretation requires them to be.

A linguistic analysis of πᾶς in these key soteriological verses in the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11) showed that the teachings of double predestination and limited atonement are at odds with these verses. As this chapter showed that these verses teach that God desires the salvation of all and that Jesus died to make atonement for all, it is beneficial to discuss the theological and pastoral implications of such teachings. Because of this, ch. 6 explores the practical difference that it makes, both for Christians and non-Christians, that God wants to save all and that Jesus died for all.

Chapter 6:
Theological and Pastoral Implications of Rejecting the "All Without Distinction" Reading of πᾶς

6.1 Introduction

The purpose of the "all without distinction" interpretation of πᾶς has been to provide an understanding of several passages within the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11) that would not contradict Calvinist teachings, such as double predestination and limited atonement. Chapter 5, however, showed that this "all without distinction" interpretation could not be maintained for those verses. Consequently, these verses must be understood in their most natural sense: God wants to save all people and Jesus died to make atonement for all people. In light of this, this chapter takes up this thesis's fifth subsidiary research question: What are the theological and pastoral implications of the study for clarifying what can and cannot be said about the Father's stance toward those who are not in baptismal union with the Son by faith?

The first major section of this chapter compares the ways that one will speak of God's stance toward people depending on whether they attribute to God a universal or a limited merciful will and to Christ's death a universal or a limited atonement. The contrast between the ways these different parties present a gracious God's relationship with people provides a backdrop for exploring more fully what that means specifically for applying the gospel to non-Christians and Christians, respectively.

The second major section of this chapter draws out some implications of rejecting the "all without distinction" interpretation for how we speak about God to non-Christians. This section shows what is forfeited in evangelistic messages when someone does not feel it appropriate to tell someone else that God desires their salvation and that Jesus died for their sins until they have already been converted. Conversely, it demonstrates the benefits gained for gospel proclamation by those who hold the extent of the Father's merciful will and the Son's atoning death to be universal.

The third major section of this chapter draws out some implications of rejecting the "all without distinction" interpretation for how one speaks to Christians who need assurance as to God's gracious will for them. This section shows the difficulty that adherents of double predestination and limited atonement can have in offering reassurance to a Christian who questions whether they really believe or have been elected. Conversely, this section also shows how God having a universal saving will and Christ's death making atonement for all provide the assurance needed in such a crisis of faith.

A concluding section synthesizes the chapter's findings.

6.2 A Comparison of Ways of Expressing God's Stance Toward People

6.2.1 Those maintaining the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς

It would be an uncharitable caricature to assume the Calvinist tradition always presents God as having no benevolence at all toward the nonelect. For example, among the five different ways D. A. Carson (2000, 16–17) finds Scripture to speak of God's love, he includes both a "providential love" that extends over all creation and also a generic "salvific stance toward his fallen world." He also finds that, even within a Calvinist synthesis of the Bible's teachings, one must say that God loves the world and even that he loves each individual unconverted person (77–78). Carson decries it as somewhat "sleazy" for a Calvinist preacher only to use passages that speak of God's general love for the world when speaking to a non-Christian and to reserve passages about God's love for the elect for speaking to Christians. However, he bases this on the fact that evangelistic preaching can be undertaken even built upon passages that speak only to the elect, not on the fact that these passages actually apply to the nonelect.

Yet perhaps more telling than what Carson says is what he seems unwilling to say. While he makes this love of God for the world the basis for God's universal gospel invitation and for

God's command to take the gospel to all creation, he stops short of actually saying that God desires or intends the salvation of all those people invited or preached to. As emphatic as Carson is that Calvinists can and should tell all people that God loves them, he never clarifies what more can be said about that love that God has for them and how it relates to God's saving will or to Christ's atoning death.

This omission leads to considerable ambiguity as to what Carson considers the Bible to mean when it says God loves the world. If God's love for all people is the basis for his desire that the gospel is proclaimed to all people, and yet God does not love all people so as to actually desire that those people all believe the gospel message and be saved, then what does it even mean for God to love those people in the first place? Can such a divine stance toward people truly be considered "love" according to any recognizable use of the word? Carson acknowledges that God has some manner of love for all people. However, the statement means little because Carson's need to protect God's special love for the elect keeps him from saying enough to define such love in a way that can be clearly presented as loving.

However, even as Carson is only willing to say so much about God's stance toward people, he displays a greater openness to talking about God as having love for the nonelect than some Calvinists have shown. An example of this greater reticence is seen in Charles Hodge ([1872] 1940). Even though Hodge allows that the expression "the love of God" is sometimes used to refer to God's "special regard" for his created human beings that causes them to experience something of his goodness (549), nevertheless, Hodge's main interest is to define the "special love" that God has exclusively for the elect (549–51). According to Hodge's understanding, any temporal blessing enjoyed by people, even if called "love," is entirely disconnected from any desire on God's part for that person's eternal well-being. However, it seems difficult to view God's stance toward a person as being loving just because he decided to afford them some measure of benefits within this life, even as his sole intention was to damn them for eternity. Therefore, it seems that Hodge is allowing not so much that God has actual love for the world but merely that the gifts and care people experience in this life are sometimes called "love" in a looser sense of the word.

Rather than defining the extent to which God might still be considered to be gracious or loving toward the nonelect, most Calvinists seem to prefer clarifying that God does not owe grace or love to anyone in the first place—whether elect or not. Michael Horton (2019, 133) draws from Romans 9 the theodicy typical to such Calvinist approaches: since all people deserved

condemnation, none deserved God's mercy or Christ's saving work; therefore, it cannot be claimed that God is unfair to the nonelect. It should be noted that the argumentation in this statement of theodicy is both biblically and logically valid. No one, including the nonelect, has any right to God's mercy or to Christ's merit. However, in leaving God's law and his condemning wrath to be the entirety of how God relates with such people, this Calvinist approach leaves no consideration for how such people might relate to God's gospel and his loving-kindness.

It could be claimed that this lopsided treatment of God's relationship with the nonelect is because polemical concerns drive most of the attention to defending against the charge that reprobation is unjust or unbecoming of God's character. Yet that still cannot adequately account for the relatively little said about any loving stance on God's part toward the nonelect. Acknowledging as much divine love for such people as the Calvinist system allows would be just as advantageous to a Calvinist polemic as demonstrating the just nature of reprobation. Nevertheless, in Peter Sammons's (2022) book defending the Calvinist doctrine of reprobation, the most recent treatment of the topic, there is only a passing comment that might be taken to imply that God has any kind of love toward the nonelect—though even there Sammons still seems more interested in defining what that love is not, and saying that God has hatred for some people (164). Sammons also makes three passing references to the existence of "common grace," a concept which to Sammons seems to be limited to when God "restrains people from being as evil as they could be" (128, 232–33).

Now, there is limited validity to an argument from silence. So, just because Calvinists such as Sammons do not speak much of God's love for all people, that does not necessarily mean they do not believe God has a real love for all people. Nevertheless, it seems fair to recognize the relatively little interest these Calvinist writers seem to have in presenting God as having a real love for all people. At some point, whether the idea that God loves all people is explicitly rejected or merely passed over in silence, a reluctance to articulate such divine love ultimately leaves little place for such divine love either in one's theological system or in one's personal contemplation of God. Similarly, when Calvinist writers use words like "love" to speak of God's stance toward the world but do not define the import of these words in any transparent or tangible way, it is not surprising that this love that God has for the world would ultimately play little role in their thinking.

So, although Calvinist writers do not deny—and some specifically assert—that there is a sense in which God loves and intends to provide blessings for all people, the overriding concern to safeguard God's special love for the elect makes unclear what actual significance God's general love for the world might have.

6.2.2 Those rejecting the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς

Arminianism sees God's stance toward the world as being gracious to all people without any restriction and sees this grace as a salvific grace, centered on the work of Christ (Grounds 2015). However, the Arminian system is in many places the opposite of the Calvinist system, including its history of Arminian writers moving away from a penal substitutionary model of atonement to a more governmental model (Pinson 2021).[84] Many Calvinists even see Arminianism as entirely unevangelical because its views on conversion are synergistic and not monergistic (Olson 2011). Therefore, it is more profitable for the purposes of this chapter to see how God's stance is characterized by those who share more of the same theological concerns as motivate Calvinist teachings such as double predestination and limited atonement: a Baptist and a Lutheran.

David Allen (2016, xviii), whose historical work on the teaching of limited atonement is the most extensive to date, characterizes his Baptist views as being a synthesis of Calvinist and Arminian views. Allen finds God's love to be "both universal and particular" (783), wanting all people individually to come to be saved in Christ. Allen considers this merciful will of God to be directly linked with his intention to provide atonement for all people through Christ's death. Calvinists may have set up a binary opposition over against Arminians, namely, that Christ's death must accomplish either a universal atonement or an effective atonement, but not both. Allen, however, deliberately flouts such a false dilemma and states that Christ's death "not only makes salvation possible for all but actually secures the salvation of all who believe" (791).

As a result, Allen (2019, 175–77) rejects the Calvinist distinction between different kinds of love and wants God's love for all people "to be taken at face value." Allen accuses the Calvinist way of portraying God of prioritizing God's sovereignty over his love. He further argues that it is by maintaining a universal atonement that one retains the biblical picture of a God whose

[84] According to the governmental model of atonement, Christ did suffer instead of people, but he did not suffer the exact punishment due to all people's sin.

nature, both internally within God's Triune being and also externally toward the world, is defined as love. Unlike the way in which God's stance toward people is presented by those Calvinists discussed in section 6.2.1, there is no question that God's love for people, as Allen describes it, is a real love, as it prompts Christ's atoning death for them.

Similar to the view expressed by Allen, Daniel Deutschlander (2015, 290–92) presents a Lutheran view in which God's grace is both sufficient and universal. God's grace is sufficient in that there is nothing else that prompted Christ's work other than God's gracious attitude toward people, and it also requires no further contribution from people. It is universal in that the whole world, undeserving as it is, is the scope of this grace. While still upholding a predestination to faith and salvation, which is meant to provide additional comfort to believers (372–77), all people are considered to be in position to know that God's grace is intended specifically for them (112, 291).

Upholding God's grace as sufficient and universal makes a difference in the way in which God's stance toward people is expressed, and this is seen particularly in how Deutschlander (2015, 111–13) speaks of God's attributes. God's love for all people can be described as one that actively "seeks the ultimate good" of each and every one of all those people that he loves, with that ultimate good being their eternal salvation. Even the sufferings people experience are seen as flowing from this love, as this love is working toward bringing those people to salvation. Calvinist treatments of God's love tend to be focused on restricting most of God's love to the elect. In contrast, a Lutheran treatment such as this portrays God's love as being unrestricted as to the people who are its object and also as to when God is showing these people love in the world.

So, compared to the Calvinists briefly surveyed in 6.2.1, theological systems that reject the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς and, with it, double predestination and limited atonement, show a much greater comfortability in presenting God as having a sincerely gracious stance toward the world and all the people in it.

6.3 Theological and Pastoral Implications of Rejecting the "All Without Distinction" Reading of πᾶς for Speaking to Non-Christians

If, according to those Calvinists who appeal to the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς, God does not sincerely want all people to be saved and Christ did not actually die for all people, one could potentially deduce that God does not even want the gospel to be spoken to everyone.

When addressing this possible deduction, Roger Nicole (1995, 407) acknowledges that non-Calvinists have commonly used such an argument against the teaching of limited atonement. He also acknowledges that historically there has been a minority of Calvinists who did follow that line of thinking and rejected the work of evangelism (407). Nevertheless, Nicole calls it "mischievous" to draw from limited atonement the conclusion that the gospel should not be spoken to everyone, as Scripture itself clearly indicates that all people should have the gospel proclaimed to them (405–6). Accordingly, the Calvinist tradition has a long history of carrying out evangelism (Stewart 2009; Daniel 2019, 112–13).

The real question, however, is not whether the gospel should be presented to non-Christians but what all can and cannot be appropriately said in communicating the gospel to non-Christians. Nicole (1995, 410) himself rejects the legitimacy of making statements such as "God loves you with redemptive love" and "Jesus Christ died for your sins" without there first being "some assurance that the people involved are in fact among the elect." Instead, he prefers the formulation: "God in his unfathomable mercy has been pleased to love sinners such as you and me, and he invites you to repent and believe in Jesus Christ. If you do so, you will find that the work of Christ avails for you, and you will be saved." Significantly, any recognition of Christ's work being for a particular individual is made conditional upon their repentance and faith.

There seems to be something of doublespeak in Nicole's (1995) formulation. That is not to accuse Nicole of intending to be deceptive, as his concern is to speak truthfully. Nevertheless, his wording does seem to be exploiting the gap between what it perhaps technically says and what the hearer is likely to understand it to say. Someone who states that God loves sinners "such as you" could, in their own mind at least, be claiming only that God loves sinners of the same sort as the person to whom they are talking, without the speaker necessarily committing to the claim that God positively loves the person to whom they are talking. However, the most natural way for a person to hear that God loves sinners "such as you" is to take it to mean that God positively loves them and also other people who are like them.

Nicole (1995) is not the only Calvinist who seems to prefer ambiguous language when speaking to a non-Christian about how Christ's death relates to them. Lee Gatiss (2012, 113–18) argues against a pattern of evangelism that tells non-Christians that Christ died for them, and he does so based on the lack of any such explicit statement in the evangelistic sermons of the apostles

recorded in Acts.[85] Like Nicole, Gatiss advocates misleading formulations such as "the cross was for sinners like you and me" and "his death is sufficient for you" (118). Calvinists who employ the first of these expressions from Gatiss may tell themselves they have not actually told the person that Jesus died for them but merely that Jesus died for people like them. However, the person hearing the phrase "sinners like you and me" will almost certainly interpret it as saying that Jesus's cross was for them and also other sinners like them. Calvinists who employ the second of these expressions from Gatiss may tell themselves that by "sufficient" they are speaking only of the intrinsic value of Christ's death. However, the non-Christian who is told this, being themselves very unlikely to be familiar with historical distinctions made between sufficiency and efficiency, will almost certainly interpret that as saying that Jesus's death does positively suffice for them. There seems to be something inappropriate, bordering on dishonesty, about trying to present the gospel in terms that the speaker considers true but that will certainly be understood by the hearer in a way that the speaker considers false.

While within a sermon, a Calvinist could use "coded language" to keep from saying that Christ died for all without drawing attention to that fact (Allen 2016, 789), this kind of obfuscation will quickly break down in dialogue. Allen points out that if the unbeliever were to ask an evangelist if Christ died for them, there would be no way to give such a person the answer "yes" (789). The answer given to such a question would have to be that if they were to believe, they would find that Christ had died for their sins. Significantly, this makes any awareness of Christ having positively paid for a person's sins to be conditional on their first believing the gospel message.

Such a manner of gospel presentation would appear even more conditional and insincere if the unbeliever were to question the evangelist further. On receiving the answer that if they were to believe, they would find that Christ had died for their sins, they might follow up with the question: "But if I don't believe, then Christ never died for my sins in the first place?" Whether reluctantly or stridently, the evangelist would have to admit that, yes, in that case, then Christ

[85] Gatiss (2012, 115) acknowledges that Paul does show in 1 Cor 15:3 that Christ's death being "for our sins" is "part of the early gospel message," but he considers the sermons recorded in Acts sufficient to demonstrate that the cross and the atonement were not "necessarily the focal point of every apostolic proclamation." Gatiss raises a valid argument over whether a formula such as "Jesus died for you" is necessary to be able to say that a gospel proclamation has taken place. Yet he overlooks the real contribution that 1 Cor 15:3 makes to questions of the relationship between the extent of the atonement and evangelistic formulations. As shown by Shultz (2010, 114–15; 2013, 92–93), this verse shows that it was, in fact, Paul's practice to say to his unconverted hearers, "Christ died for our sins."

had never actually died for them. At this point, the unbeliever may feel that the evangelist is playing games with them. They may even ask, “So, does God actually want me to believe in Jesus?” An evangelist could attempt to evade such a question and answer it positively “yes” by thinking in terms of God’s revealed will: God outwardly commands all people to repent and believe. At the same time, if still operating under Calvinist assumptions, the evangelist could not definitively state that God sincerely desires that the individual would repent and believe. They may have to give an answer as uncommitted as “maybe.” Now, the uncertainty with which the gospel is being presented to someone in such terms is more obvious when fleshed out in dialogue like this. However, something of the same uncertain impression is couched within the way Calvinists are comfortable presenting the gospel, just by the things they are unwilling to say.

To use an analogy, imagine a man on an airplane is handed a backpack with a ripcord. The one handing him the backpack says, “The one who made this pack for you positively knew whether or not you would jump, without any chance of getting it wrong. And, if they knew you would jump, then this backpack is actually a fully-functioning parachute. So, you’ll be just fine when you jump. So jump.” Now, the man might still jump when presented with the certainty that an omniscient being would have ensured he would have a parachute there were he to rely on it. Nevertheless, such an invitation to jump is presented in terms that sound less than certain. It would give the man a greater sense of certainty—and also a greater encouragement to jump—if he was told, “This is a fully-functioning parachute that is being provided to you. So jump.”

Now, every analogy limps, and this analogy limps with respect to the fact that, as Calvinists rightly recognize, God not only knows whether or not a person will come to faith in him but is the very one who causes a person to come to faith in him. Therefore, whether there is a parachute (atonement) is not actually dependent in any way on the person who jumps (believes). Yet, it remains true that restricting the extent of God’s saving will and of Christ’s atoning death, such that a person could not positively be told that Jesus died for them, seems to make things much more dependent on how the person responds. As such, this analogy still accurately pictures the way in which teachings such as double predestination and limited atonement lead to a presentation of the gospel to non-Christians in terms that appear much more conditional and much less certain. There is an easily-perceived difference between saying, “Jesus died for you. Believe that,” and saying, “If you believe, then it will be true that Jesus died for you.”

As Buchholz (2012, 25–26) observes, there are some terms that the Bible uses to speak of the effect of Christ's work for the world, some terms that it uses to speak of the effect of Christ's work specifically for believers, and some terms that it uses for both. From this comes the warning for pastors today to reflect this distinction between those terms in their own speaking. So, even recognizing that God sincerely wants all people to be saved and that Christ died to make atonement for the sins of all people, there are still some things that cannot be said to someone who is not a Christian. To borrow examples from Buchholz's chart of the differing scopes of different soteriological metaphors, it would be unbiblical and inappropriate to say to someone who is not in Christ, "God has adopted you!" or "Jesus has sanctified you!"

To speak in such a careless manner would not only be inaccurate, but it would be harmful to the person being spoken to because it would communicate universalism. And, importantly, a universal saving will on God's part and an unlimited atonement are not the same as universalism. In fact, in addition to other passages throughout the Bible that communicate that not all will be brought to faith and that not all will be saved, the verses from the Pastoral Epistles discussed in this study themselves employ wording that is careful so as not to communicate universalism. When it is said that God "wants all people to be saved" (1 Tim 2:4), this is not the same as saying that all people will be saved. And in this passage, God's will for "all people to be saved" is directly connected with his will that they would "come to a knowledge of the truth." When God is called "Savior of all people" (1 Tim 4:10), the very fact that there is a sense in which that is true "especially of believers" suggests that not all people will experience that salvation. God's grace may have "appeared, offering salvation to all people" (Titus 2:11), but that too falls short of saying that all people have received it or will receive it. The Calvinist and the Universalist[86] may both assume that universalism is the natural consequence of God having a universal saving will, but the language of Scripture does not reflect that assumption. Instead, Scripture's language is careful, yet unafraid, to say what can be said of all people and to say what can be said of some people.

So, even as care is taken not to communicate universalism or to say something is true of all people that is only true of believers, nevertheless, statements like "God wants to save you!" or "God wants you to be with him forever!" or "Jesus died for you!" or "Jesus paid for your sins"

[86] For example, David Bentley Hart (2019, 82–83), the leading advocate of Christian Universalism today, shares a key Calvinist assumption in his treatment of 1 Tim 2:4. He rejects that there can be any distinction between what God wants and what happens. Where Universalism and Calvinism diverge is in how they deal with the apparent incongruity between what God wants and what happens, with Universalism denying that any are ultimately damned and Calvinism denying that God wanted all to be saved.

could—and should—be freely made regardless of who the person being spoken to is and what their relationship is with Christ. Direct statements such as this, which are true of the person being spoken to even apart from their response to or attitude toward such statements, provide a much more certain ground for the faith that one is hoping will result from such evangelistic efforts.

In addition to providing a clearer and more certain gospel message for the non-Christian being spoken to, this way of speaking also provides a clearer and more certain encouragement to the Christian who is to speak. A Calvinist who does not believe that God wants to save all people may still recognize that they should proclaim the gospel to all people because God tells them to and because that person may possibly be one of the elect. However, when a Christian recognizes that God does positively want each individual non-Christian to come to faith and be saved, that provides extra encouragement for the Christian to imitate God and desire that person's salvation and also to share with that person the gospel message by which they might be brought to faith and saved. Knowing that God's desire to save and the atonement made by Christ's death are universal helps the Christian ward off the temptation to mentally decide that a particular unconverted person is certainly, or at least probably, a reprobate and to conclude that if God does not want to save them, then neither should they work to bring that person the gospel so as to save them.

Consequently, both the effective nature of election and the universal nature of grace provide an encouragement to evangelism. There is encouragement for Christians as they speak the gospel when they do so with the knowledge that the Holy Spirit will certainly bring all the elect to faith. There is also encouragement for Christians as they speak the gospel when they do so with the knowledge that God does certainly desire their hearers' salvation and that Christ did die for their hearers' sins. Retaining side-by-side both God's gracious election of some and his desire for the salvation of all provides the evangelist with the greatest confidence to proclaim to non-Christians the gospel message they have received.

Whether or not God wants all people to be saved also affects the way that God's providential and nonsoteriological blessings are referenced when speaking to those who are not believers. Many Calvinists acknowledge that God displays a kind of temporal beneficence beyond the limits of the elect, a beneficence that has been called "common grace" (Berkhof 1938, 432–46; Daniel 2019, 572–82). Therefore, rejecting that God has a universal merciful will and that Christ's death atoned for all does not necessarily keep someone from attributing to God this

more general, nonsoteriological kindness. However, rejecting such teachings does effectively sever any direct connection that common grace might have with God's saving will and Christ's atoning death. At most, such temporal blessings can be considered a side benefit to the human race coming from God's will and Christ's death intending the salvation of merely some (Berkhof 1938, 437–39).

Regardless of someone's position on the extent of God's merciful will and of the atonement, they could still point a non-Christian to the providential care experienced in their own life as a sign of God's goodness in the abstract. However, only someone who recognizes the extent of God's merciful will and of the atonement to be universal can point a non-Christian to that providential care as a sign of God's goodness to them personally and as a sign that God has their eternal best interest in mind. It is the difference between merely being able to say to someone, "Look at how God has taken care of you. That shows he is loving and desires to save people," and actually being able to say, "Look at how God has taken care of you. That shows he loves you and wants to save you."

So, teachings like double predestination and limited atonement, supported as they are by the "all without distinction" interpretation, do not necessarily prevent evangelism. They do, however, place too strict limits on what evangelists feel they can say to non-Christians. By rejecting the "all without distinction" interpretation and, with it, double predestination and limited atonement, an evangelist can confidently tell any person that God wants to save them and that Christ died for their sins. They can point any person to the providential care they have experienced from God as evidence of God's goodwill for them, which includes God's desire for their eternal good. Being able to present the gospel in these more certain and less conditional terms provides the non-Christian being spoken to with a sure basis for faith.

6.4 Theological and Pastoral Implications of Rejecting the "All Without Distinction" Reading of πᾶς for Speaking to Christians

As was documented in ch. 3, Calvinists emphatically reject any notion that any part of a person's conversion or salvation is conditional upon them. In addition to ensuring that all the glory for a person's salvation belongs to God, this is also intended to provide the elect with greater certainty of their salvation. However, by restricting the Father's merciful will and the Son's atonement to those who are elect, they in effect make the certainty of a person's salvation conditional on them and, therefore, less certain. This is because there is no way for someone to

positively ascertain their own elect status besides looking at themselves. If God's saving stance is entirely limited to the elect, and election is known only through the evidence in one's own life, a person's knowledge that God wants to save them and that Jesus died for them is ultimately dependent on the way they can demonstrate God's election of them in their own life.

John Calvin (*Inst*. 3.24.4) himself, attempting to lead people away either from mere speculation about their status or from depending on themselves, succinctly states that the way to know that one is elect is "to begin with God's call, and to end with it," speaking, that is, of the effective call to faith. He tells people to seek their election in Christ alone, but his further discussion shows he means by looking at one's incorporation into Christ by faith (*Inst*. 3.24.4; [1552a] 1856, 117–18, 122). However, if faith is the way to see that a person is elected, and God does not want to save the nonelect, and Christ did not die for the nonelect, there remains no way for a person to positively know that God wants to save them and that Jesus died for them apart from an appraisal of their own faith.

This unintended shift in the Calvinist locus of certainty can be defined in grammatical terms, specifically the relationship between the two clauses of conditional statements. Conditionals do not always denote cause and effect (i.e., "If the cause happens, then the effect happens."). Conditionals often denote evidence and inference (i.e., "If there is this evidence, then we can make this inference.") (Wallace 1996, 683). Calvinists go to great lengths to ensure that conversion, and thus salvation, is not conditional upon anything in human beings in a cause-and-effect way (i.e., "If a person does something to cause it, then the effect is that they are converted and saved"). However, by attempting to fortify this position through teachings such as double predestination and limited atonement, Calvinists have inadvertently made conversion, and thus salvation, conditional upon something in human beings in an evidence-and-inference way (i.e., "If there is evidence of it in a person, then the inference is that they are converted and saved").

Now, it would be an uncharitable caricature of the Calvinist tradition to view it as pointing people only inward for their assurance and not directing them outside themselves to Christ. For example, while it has been assumed that William Perkins's teachings of double predestination and limited atonement would have required him to direct the doubting conscience exclusively to the person's sanctification as the assurance of their status within God's elect and atoned-for people (Kendall 1997, 61–76), Perkins's own preaching shows that he still primarily directed the doubting conscience to Christ and the gospel (Ballitch 2015). Yet that does not answer the

question of whether such a pastoral practice was fully consistent with the Calvinist dogmas espoused (452), and it especially does not answer the question of what to do whenever a person doubts that they are within God's particular designs in his decree of election. If a person were to mentally or verbally respond to a message of God's love or of Christ's death with the question, "But how can I know that God wants to save *me*?" or "that Christ died for *me*?" there would be no answer available to the Calvinist other than directing the person inward.

The Calvinist position argues that it is ultimately more reassuring for a person to know that Christ's death was effective for the elect than to know that it was for all people, including themselves. For example, Gatiss (2012, 122–23) questions whether the teaching of unlimited atonement can provide any real assurance—if Christ died for people who nevertheless end up damned, what reassurance can Christ's death provide a person? However, the reason why Gatiss does not consider unlimited atonement to provide real assurance is because he is working under the assumption that atonement can only be fully finished and for a person specifically if it is not universal. It is a false dilemma to say that Christ's death is either for everyone in an incomplete and general way (the most extreme form of Arminian views) or that it is for only a few people in a complete and personal way (the most extreme form of Calvinist views).

Upholding an effective atonement, and not merely a partial or hypothetical one that an individual must complete for themselves, is part of how a person can be given assurance through Christ's death. However, there is another part of assurance to be had in positively knowing that Christ's death is for them. This aspect of assurance is lacking in the Calvinist formulation. In claiming that limited atonement is the position of greater assurance, Gatiss (2012, 121) sidesteps any question of what a person is to do when they question their own status as being among the elect for whom Christ made atonement.

Convincing a person that Christ accomplished atonement for all the elect personally does not in itself convince that person that they are one of those elect people. Consequently, the position of stronger assurance lies in between the excesses of both Calvinism and Arminianism. Despite Calvinism's claims to the contrary, someone can know that Christ died for them personally and made atonement for their sins because God desires their salvation, and they can know that simply by virtue of their being a part of the human race. In turn, despite Arminianism's claims to the contrary, someone can know that Christ's atoning death finished all the work necessary

to save them, and there is nothing that they have to do to complete it. This middle position is the one that provides the greatest assurance.

Sinclair Ferguson (2013, 624) attempts to dismiss this question of how a person can know that they have faith as being more academic than practical, saying that it only occurs "occasionally" and thus is "something of a straw man." When he does still answer the question, he grounds the assurance of faith on faith itself and even on the exercise of faith. Later, Ferguson does acknowledge that many ministers actually have been faced with people who, observing their own inadequacies, feel no assurance of their salvation, but he attributes this lack of felt assurance to the legalism inherent to human beings, not to a flaw within the Calvinist system (625). Ferguson is certainly correct that the cause of this lack of assurance is found in the natural inclination to look to oneself for validation and assurance. However, by having no option other than to direct people to find their assurance in their own exercise of faith, the Calvinist system does not do enough to counter this harmful inward-looking inclination. In fact, it even encourages it.

Because believers remain sinners and because their faith is imperfect and technically invisible even to themselves, sometimes "the hardest thing for the believer to believe is that he believes" (Gurgel n.d., 3). This difficulty believers often have in perceiving their own faith makes it not merely an academic question or one that only pertains to a rare subset of Christians. Many, if not all, Christians will face doubts over whether their faith is genuine, doubts which arise from their failure to live in keeping with their faith or from their lack of feeling an inner sense of assurance. Telling such a person to perceive their own faith, and thus, their election and certainty of God's will and Christ's work for them, by looking at that faltering faith, is likely directing a person back to the source of the problem. Or, alternatively, it would be encouraging a person to play judge and jury over their own life of faith, weighing against each other any evidence in their own behavior that suggests their faith is real or counterfeit. As a result, as is always the case when a person looks to themselves for spiritual comfort, the Calvinist approach, despite all its intentions to the contrary, "can drive people to either self-righteousness or despair" (Deutschlander 2015, 360).

Encouraging such dangerous introspection seems to be the inevitable course of counsel given under the Calvinist system, because it has long been the practice of Calvinism for a person to find confirmation that they are among the elect within their own life of faith. The Canons of Dordt ([1619] 2001, 1.1.12) state that a person is to derive assurance of their election "by

observing in themselves with a spiritual joy and holy pleasure the infallible fruits of election pointed out in the Word of God such as, a true faith in Christ, filial fear, a godly sorrow for sin, a hungering and thirsting after righteousness." The logic behind such a statement is that faith itself serves as evidence of one's elect status because faith is the result of election (Berkhof 1938, 308).

The problem is not that Calvinism points a person to see their faith and sanctified living as evidence of their election, because such an answer has direct biblical support (Daniel 2019, 390). In 2 Peter 1, Christians are told to make themselves sure of their elect status by doing things (v. 10) such as cultivating virtue, knowledge, self-control, perseverance, piety, brotherhood, and love (vv. 5–7). Romans 8:29–30, often called the "Golden Chain" (Canons of Dordt [1619] 2001, 1.2.2), also directly connects a person's being effectually called to faith with their having been chosen by God in advance.

The problem is that Calvinism circumscribes all of God's saving activity solely within the circle of election, meaning that when a person is unsure of the existence or authenticity of their faith, there is no divine impulse or activity left that they can fall back on as still being sure for them. As a result, someone who questions that they have real faith will have to question the entire Golden Chain of election and be left with a God who, they would perhaps conclude, may not have any sure saving intentions or activity toward them. Consequently, the person is left unable to look either to the character of God or to Christ's death on the cross as a source of comfort when they have come to question whether their faith is genuine.

Under the Calvinist assumptions, it can become even more difficult for a person to look to themselves and perceive their own faith and elect status due to the Calvinist teaching of "temporary faith," an inauthentic faith that will not last (Calvin, *Inst*. 3.2.11, 3.24.8; [1552a] 1856, 123–24; Hodge [1872] 1940, 672–73; [1873] 1940, 68; Kendall 1997, 21–28). Such teaching is necessitated by the fact that both Scripture (Luke 8:13; 1 Tim 1:19–20; Heb 6:4–6) and experience testify to the existence of people who lose their faith, and yet Calvinist teachings about election preclude the loss of any faith that was genuine because God could never have wanted the salvation of such people in the first place. The pattern of obsessive introspection and the resulting lack of assurance documented within the history of Puritanism demonstrate how double predestination and limited atonement, when coupled with their corollary teaching of temporary faith, significantly undermine Christian assurance (Kendall 1997; Keathley 2022, 192–96).

On what basis can a person determine whether their faith is authentic or will ultimately be revealed to be merely temporary? Hodge ([1872] 1940, 654–55) claims that God's Word, because it is true, is able "to convince the reason, to control the conscience, to affect the heart, and to govern the life," even without "such kind and degree of the Spirit's influence, as is sufficient to lead men to repentance, faith, and a holy life." It seems, then, that saving faith and temporary faith are indistinguishable to people, even to oneself. This would ultimately make it impossible for someone to examine the effect of God's Word on their heart and on their life and know from this whether they have received sufficient saving grace as an elect believer or merely a common grace that, despite its outward effect, falls short of being evidence of faith or election.

Louis Berkhof (1938, 312) may be correct in saying that the Arminian must always fear that they will make their faith useless by throwing it away and apostatizing. However, he wrongly ignores the fact that the Calvinist must always worry that their faith is already useless because it is spurious and not a genuine faith derived from God's elective decree. While Berkhof is right to note that a believer's lack of personal assurance that they are elect does not keep them from being elect or saved, this approach of restricting God's saving will and Christ's atoning death to the elect leaves no goodness of God for a person to cling to for comfort and assurance when they struggle to see in themselves evidence of their faith and election.

Deutschlander (2015, 291) demonstrates the greater comfort that the Father's universal merciful will and that unlimited atonement provide to the person who doubts they truly have faith. He suggests that in their moments of deepest struggle, likely every Christian entertains the doubt that God's grace was for other people but not for them. Therefore, there is great comfort for the struggling Christian to hear that God's grace is for all people because "all people" would, by definition, include even them.

One final area in which the Calvinist doctrines of double predestination and limited atonement inadvertently undermine Christian assurance is the effect these teachings have on the perceived efficacy and sincerity of the means of grace (i.e., the gospel operative in word and sacrament). Much like the philosophy of occasionalism posits that all physical effects are brought about not by or through created things but directly by God on the occasions that appear to us to cause them, Calvin (*Inst.* 3.24.8; 4.14.9, 14–17) posited that God has not endowed the means of grace with any effective power but that God, when he wants to, brings about this effect on the occasion that they are used.

Such a distinction is a natural corollary of the assumption that God, as sovereign, always effects what he wants. That not all who hear the word or receive baptism are ultimately saved by it must mean that God did not want to save those people by it, which must further mean that God did not institute the preaching of the word and the administration of the sacraments to always be sincere and efficacious expressions of his saving will. The Calvinist tradition has continued to reject that there is too close a connection between God's Word and the Spirit's power. While other reasons were developed for this view, the first reason remains the fact that God's Word does not effect conversion within all who hear it (Hodge [1872] 1940, 660–65).

It is outside the scope of this thesis to provide a full comparison of the theologies of word and sacrament found within different Christian traditions. However, the Calvinist teachings of double predestination and limited atonement, due to their need for separating God's sincere working from the activity of the means of grace upon the nonelect, are certainly among the factors contributing to an overall lower sacramentology within Calvinism compared to Lutheranism and Anglicanism.

What is most relevant here is the effect of this lower sacramentology on Christian assurance. Because double predestination and limited atonement render the means of grace only occasionally associated with God's will and the Spirit's working, the Calvinist system would prevent a person from finding assurance of God's sentiment and will for them from the fact that they have received baptism, communion, and absolution. There would ultimately be no way of knowing, just from looking at the outward means, whether God had sincerely communicated anything about what he wants for that person.

On the other hand, when God is seen as desiring the salvation of all and Christ as having died to make atonement for all, the means of grace can be considered sincere and efficacious expressions of that universal saving will and universal atonement toward the individual who receives such means. Someone who doubts how they stand with God can find comfort and be directed to find comfort in the fact that God sincerely and personally promised them something in baptism, in communion, and in the absolution. They can look to such means and know that God's universal saving will and the unlimited atonement made by Christ's death were not merely for people in general but extend to them as an individual.

Despite being intended to provide assurance in one way, double predestination and limited atonement undercut assurance in another way by leaving a person no avenue to find a God who

is gracious toward them personally without examining the authenticity of their own faith. However, by upholding a single predestination and an unlimited atonement, Christians who doubt whether their faith is real are provided with several interconnected places where they can look to see what God thinks of them and wants for them personally: God's loving kindness toward all people, Christ's death for them on the cross, and the means of grace that have communicated that grace to them.

6.5 Conclusion

The Calvinist teachings of double predestination and limited atonement, which depend significantly on the "all without distinction" interpretation of πᾶς to maintain their viability, have very real effects on the way we speak about God and how he relates to people. Because of this, this chapter took up this thesis's fifth subsidiary research question: What are the theological and pastoral implications of the study for clarifying what can and cannot be said about the Father's stance toward those who are not in baptismal union with the Son by faith?

First, rejecting the "all without distinction" interpretation of πᾶς and, with it, the teachings of double predestination and limited atonement that rely on it eliminates the reticence many Calvinists seem to feel in speaking of God having a sincere love for all people. Although some Calvinists do acknowledge that God has a more general love for the world, their overriding concern is typically to safeguard God's special love for the elect, so much so that any love for all people is de-emphasized or explained in such a way that there is little love left to it. But when one recognizes that the Bible does speak of a sincere love that God has for the world, which includes a universal merciful will and results in an unlimited atonement, this divine love for all people can be freely expressed and embraced.

Second, rejecting the "all without distinction" interpretation of πᾶς and, with it, the teachings of double predestination and limited atonement that rely on it enables us to positively tell non-Christians that God wants them to be saved and that Jesus died for their sins. As opposed to Calvinist evangelistic formulations that exploit ambiguous wording or inadvertently make one's prospective faith the condition for the very thing in which they are to believe, this direct statement of God's desire to save them and of Christ's atoning death for them makes for a gospel proclamation in much more certain and less conditional terms.

Third, rejecting the "all without distinction" interpretation of πᾶς and, with it, the teachings of double predestination and limited atonement that rely on it preserves God's will, Christ's cross,

and the means of grace as places Christians can seek assurance when they find themselves questioning the genuineness of their faith and the reality of their election. If double predestination and limited atonement were true, Christians unsure about whether their faith is authentic have nothing else to fall back on other than to examine their own hearts and lives—which is often what had precipitated such a spiritual crisis in the first place. Conversely, because God sincerely wants to save all and Christ died for all, even when someone has doubts about their faith, they can look to God's expressed will to save them and to Christ's death for their sins. They can also seek further assurance in the fact that this sincere saving will and atoning death has been communicated to them personally and individually within baptism, communion, and the absolution.

The Calvinist and the Arminian each maintain that their position provides people greater assurance of their personal salvation, so much so that one can find both a Calvinist (Ferguson 2013, 631) and an Arminian (Cottrell 2006, 133–34) who confidently cite the hymn "Blessed Assurance" as an emphatic closing statement to their own position. And each of them does preserve important parts of biblical assurance, but they each, ironically, would have people looking inward to themselves to supply the part of assurance missing in their theological system.

The Calvinist finds assurance in knowing that if God wants to save them, he will, and that if Christ died for them, they will be saved. However, the Calvinist must look exclusively to their own faith to know that God wants to save them and that Christ died for them. The Arminian, on the other hand, finds assurance in knowing that God wants to save them and that Christ died for them. However, the Arminian must look exclusively to their faith to know that this desire for their salvation will be realized and that Christ's death for them will bring them its intended results.

When one gives up the need for a theological system with complete internal coherence from a logical perspective, it is possible to retain both these parts of biblical assurance that are cherished by these two respective Christian traditions. When one, perhaps paradoxically but certainly biblically, embraces God's unconditional election of some to salvation side-by-side with God's universal desire to save and embraces an atonement that is universal in intent and yet entirely effective, there is a more comprehensive assurance. When someone doubts whether they have faith, they can find extra assurance in a universal grace that is not circumscribed by faith. When someone doubts whether they will keep their faith, they can find extra assurance

in an unfailing grace that will keep them in the faith. And through all of this, they can find extra assurance from a more robust theology of the means of grace, bringing this universal grace to them in a personal and powerful way.

Chapter 7:
Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

The major research question this thesis sought to address was: In what ways does a linguistic analysis of πᾶς in 1 Timothy 2:4, 6; 4:10 and Titus 2:11 affect the Reformed Calvinist doctrine that limits the scope of the Father's merciful will and of the Son's atonement? This final chapter summarizes the answers to this major research question.

This chapter begins by reviewing the need for undertaking this study. The following section then rehearses the subsidiary research questions considered in each chapter and provides an overview of the answers given. After distilling the major findings and suggesting avenues for further research, this chapter provides a conclusion to the thesis.

7.2 The Need for the Study

Four verses within the Pastoral Epistles assert that God desires the salvation of all people and that Christ's death made atonement for all people (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11). All four of these verses express the universal scope of God's saving will and of Christ's atoning death using πᾶς, "all." While much of the church has interpreted πᾶς in these verses to be referring to all people without any exception, there is also a long-standing tradition, particularly within the Calvinist tradition, of interpreting πᾶς in these verses as referring to all people without distinction. This "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς claims that the point in these verses is not that God wants to save all people but instead that he wants to save all kinds of people, and

similarly, not that Christ died to make atonement for all people but instead that he died to make atonement for all kinds of people. By such an understanding, God's saving grace is shown not to discriminate based on earthly divisions and classifications, as people from every category are included within it. Nevertheless, there are still said to be many people who are left out of God's desire to save and of Christ's atoning death, in keeping with the Calvinist doctrines of double predestination and of limited atonement.

The "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς makes a linguistic assertion about how πᾶς can be restricted so as not to refer to every individual person. Yet despite this definite linguistic component to the question of how to understand the verses in question (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11), no full linguistic analysis had been performed on πᾶς and its possible manners of restriction. This thesis, therefore set out to perform such linguistic analysis to identify the ways πᾶς can be restricted and the factors that trigger such restrictions in order to more objectively answer whether or not πᾶς could have such a restricted meaning in the key verses from the Pastoral Epistles. If this linguistic analysis concluded that πᾶς cannot be restricted in those verses but must refer to all people, not only would this disprove the "all without distinction" interpretation of these verses, but it would also give strong exegetical support to doctrines such as God having a universal merciful will and unlimited atonement, over against the Calvinist doctrines of double predestination and limited atonement.

For this reason, this thesis had as its major research question: In what ways does a linguistic analysis of πᾶς in 1 Timothy 2:4, 6; 4:10 and Titus 2:11 affect the Reformed Calvinist doctrine that limits the scope of the Father's merciful will and of the Son's atonement? Answering this question required linguistic, exegetical, historical, systematic, and pastoral analyses.

7.3 Study Overview

7.3.1 Chapter 1: Introduction

The first chapter of this thesis introduced the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς that was originated by Augustine of Hippo and that Calvin and many Calvinists have used to interpret four key verses in the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11) in a way that does not contradict their teachings of double predestination and limited atonement. The introductory chapter also laid out the design and methodology employed in this thesis to perform a linguistic analysis of how πᾶς can be restricted and then to examine the effects of this analysis on the "all

without distinction" interpretation and on how one should think and speak of God's stance toward all people.

7.3.2 Chapter 2: The history of the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς

The second chapter took up this thesis's first subsidiary research question: What is the current state of scholarship regarding the linguistic analysis of πᾶς in 1 Timothy 2:4, 6; 4:10 and Titus 2:11 as it relates to the Reformed Calvinist doctrine that limits the scope of the Father's merciful will and of the Son's atonement? Because the "all without distinction" interpretation goes back to Augustine and later became a mainstay of Calvinist exegesis, much was already said about it before this study. Before attempting a linguistic analysis of πᾶς in these key verses, it was necessary to first recognize the linguistic argumentation and assumptions that can historically and presently be found both in writers that accept the "all without distinction" reading and those that reject it.

This literature review revealed that the difference of opinion over these verses has generally not been linguistic in nature. Those who accept the "all without distinction" interpretation and those who reject it are in fundamental agreement on the fact that there are a number of other passages throughout the Bible where πᾶς is used in a restricted sense and does not refer to every individual. Instead of arguing on linguistic grounds, the debate between those who accept the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς and those who reject it has generally revolved around whether such a meaning is contextually, logically, or theologically appropriate within the verses in question (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11). Because the two sides have different doctrinal assumptions, the interpretation of this verse has remained at a long-standing impasse. Unfortunately, no one on either side of this debate had investigated the linguistic factors that trigger a restricted sense in the alleged parallel uses of πᾶς and that could potentially trigger it within the key verses from the Pastoral Epistles.

7.3.3 Chapter 3: The theology of the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς

The third chapter took up this thesis's second subsidiary research question: What are the major tenets of the Reformed Calvinist doctrine that limits the scope of the Father's merciful will and the Son's atonement? Since Calvinists have used the "all without distinction" interpretation of πᾶς to safeguard their teachings of double predestination and limited atonement, it was necessary to understand the motivation for these Calvinist teachings themselves and to see what is at stake theologically in examining the viability of the "all without distinction" interpretation.

For both of these teachings, the primary concern of those Calvinists who adhere to them is to safeguard the nature and efficacy of God's merciful will and of Christ's atoning death for the elect. Excluding the nonelect from any desire to save on God's part and from any of the intention behind Christ's atoning death is considered necessary to keep election and atonement as solely the work of God and in no way the work of man.

Because the primary Calvinist concern in double predestination is to preserve election to salvation, not to preserve reprobation, and because the primary Calvinist concern in limited atonement is to preserve the effective nature of Christ's atoning death, not to exclude people from it, ch. 3 also explored potential ways forward to honor such noble Calvinist commitments apart from the "all without distinction" interpretation. Alternative exegetical devices, such as Augustine's exclusivity reading, appealing to nonsoteriological meanings of σῴζω/σωτήρ, treating μάλιστα as a marker of specification, and reading πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις as dependent on ἐπεφάνη in Titus 2:11, were all found to be unworkable. Consequently, there is no other way left—besides the "all without distinction" interpretation—to understand the verses under discussion (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11) to be attributing to God a nonuniversal saving will or to Christ's death a nonuniversal atonement. However, as contributions from Scholasticism, Lutheranism, and Anglicanism demonstrated, there are theological routes available for someone wishing to uphold God as the sole cause of election to salvation and to see Christ's death as entirely effective, provided they are willing to give up the assumption that their theological system should be entirely internally coherent from a logical perspective.

7.3.4 Chapter 4: Linguistic features that restrict πᾶς

The fourth chapter took up this thesis's third subsidiary research question: What does a linguistic analysis of πᾶς indicate about how the meaning of πᾶς can be restricted? To identify if a given use of πᾶς, such as those in the key verses in the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11), is restricted so as not to refer to every individual, it was necessary to examine the other times when πᾶς is restricted throughout the Biblical Greek corpus. With the assistance of various crosslinguistic research, the goal was to identify not only the passages when πᾶς is restricted but also the manner in which it is restricted, as well as the linguistic features that either cause or allow such restriction. Six different ways were documented in which πᾶς does not refer to all individuals, and the features by which these manners of restriction can be identified.

The first manner of restriction is hyperbole. Since hyperbole is used not to deceive but to communicate the truth of how something feels via exaggeration, hyperbole can only be used in contexts that do not require greater numerical precision.

The second manner of restriction is implicit domain restriction. In such cases, the domain that πᾶς quantifies is restricted to that which is contextually relevant, whether by being relevant to the topic, the setting, or the people or by excluding some other party mentioned in the context.

The third manner of restriction occurs with nonveridicality operators, such as are found in negated sentences, protases of conditionals, modal expressions, and generics/habituals. Because languages differ in which element will outscope another element, Greek uses πᾶς with nonveridicality operators, even where English would use an indefinite pronoun like "any."

The fourth manner of restriction occurs with intensive nouns. Intensive nouns are gradable abstract nouns. Therefore, when πᾶς is used with these intensive nouns, it serves to maximalize their degree.

The fifth manner of restriction occurs with collective nouns. Collective nouns differ from plural nouns in that they refer to a single collective entity. So, πᾶς can be used with collective nouns to assert something about all the collective entities without necessarily asserting that same thing about all the individuals that make up any of those collective entities.

The sixth manner of restriction occurs with superordinate categories. Because superordinate categories serve as umbrella terms for multiple basic-level categories, πᾶς can be used with superordinate categories to refer to all the underlying basic-level categories without necessarily referring to all the individuals within those basic-level categories. Superordinate categories can be positively identified by five diagnostic tests (the "kind of" test, the single-feature test, the essence test, the picturability test, and the "name three" test).

All the passages cited as linguistic parallels for the "all without distinction" fell within one of these six manners of restriction, or there was some other explanation for what was going on in the passage that did not pertain to the meaning of the word πᾶς. This linguistic study of the ways πᾶς can be restricted provided a more specific set of criteria by which any other alleged restricted use of πᾶς can be tested.

7.3.5 Chapter 5: An examination of the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς

The fifth chapter took up this thesis's fourth subsidiary research question: What effect, either positive or negative, does a linguistic analysis of πᾶς in 1 Timothy 2:4, 6; 4:10 and Titus 2:11 have on the Reformed Calvinist doctrine that limits the scope of the Father's merciful will and the Son's atonement? This application of the linguistic findings of ch. 4 to the uses of πᾶς within these particular verses was crucial for determining whether the "all without distinction" interpretation is—or even potentially can be—a valid interpretation of these verses. Since Calvinist teachings such as double predestination and limited atonement have depended on the "all without distinction" interpretation, it was also important to explore what the ramifications of that linguistic and exegetical analysis are for these teachings.

When the linguistic criteria identified in ch. 4 were applied to the verses for which the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς has historically been employed (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11), the six potential manners of restriction were not present within these key verses such as would keep πᾶς from referring to all individual people. Consequently, these verses must be understood as saying that God wants to save all people and that Christ died to make atonement for all people. Therefore, when a linguistic analysis of πᾶς is brought to bear on theological debates over election and the extent of the atonement, the Pastoral Epistles contradict the Calvinist teachings of double predestination and limited atonement. Instead of debating whether the immediate context of these verses suggests that Paul is thinking in terms of kinds or individuals, or whether the larger context of all of Scripture requires that Paul not be speaking in universal terms, the linguistic analysis of πᾶς is sufficient in itself to rule out the viability of the "all without distinction" interpretation.

7.3.6 Chapter 6: Theological and pastoral implications of rejecting the "all without distinction" reading of πᾶς

The sixth chapter took up this thesis's fifth subsidiary research question: What are the theological and pastoral implications of the study for clarifying what can and cannot be said about the Father's stance toward those who are not in baptismal union with the Son by faith? Questions of whom God wants to save and for whom Christ died are not merely theoretical questions. The answers given to these questions can significantly affect how people think and speak about God and his stance toward them.

Without the “all without distinction” interpretation, the Calvinist teachings of double predestination and limited atonement become untenable, and so, in ch. 6, it was seen that rejecting the “all without distinction” interpretation leads a person to a clearer understanding of the fact that God loves all people, and that this love includes a desire to save all people and finds expression in the death of Jesus to make atonement for the sins of all people. It was also worthwhile in this chapter to explore what the ramifications of such biblical teachings are for Christians and non-Christians.

Although the Calvinist theological system is rightly concerned with keeping God as the sole cause of a person’s salvation, teachings like double predestination and limited atonement end up, practically speaking, making Christ’s work for a person conditional upon whether that person believes, because this work only pertains to the elect. This would make it impossible to positively tell non-Christians that God desires their salvation or that Jesus died for them. Instead, they would have to be told that if they believed, then they would find that these things were true for them. In contrast, rejecting double predestination and limited atonement enables an evangelist to directly tell non-Christians that God wants to save them and that Jesus died for them. Such a gospel proclamation in certain, direct, and unconditional terms provides a surer basis for faith.

The same phenomenon is seen regarding the assurance felt by Christians. While the Calvinist system communicates the great assurance that a believer should feel that God will preserve their faith and save them, when a believer questions whether their faith is authentic and whether they are really among the elect, there remains little recourse for the Calvinist other than to point a person to their own faith and their exercise of it. In contrast, rejecting double predestination and limited atonement enables a Christian who has doubts about their faith’s genuineness to still look directly to God’s will, Christ’s death, and the means of grace and to find assurance there.

7.4 Major Findings of the Study

In performing a linguistic analysis of the Calvinist “all without distinction” interpretation of πᾶς in the Pastoral Epistles, this study arrived at contributions in several areas: Greek linguistics, biblical exegesis, systematic theology, and pastoral theology.

Regarding linguistic knowledge and the Ancient Greek language, this study provided a clearer and more accurate picture of how πᾶς is used relative to the way this word is often presented

in lexica and handled by exegetes. It showed that the so-called restrictions to πᾶς are not different meanings that the quantifier can have, because πᾶς retains its universal quantification in every case. It documented six specific kinds of restrictions to the referent of πᾶς: hyperbole, implicit domain restriction, nonveridicality, intensive nouns, collective nouns, and superordinate categories. The process of exploring these specialized uses of πᾶς arrived at contributions in particular linguistic fields as well.

With respect to hyperbole, this study added to previously proposed methods for its detection, which all depended on already knowing the literal truth. It did so by formulating a way to test the felicitousness of a potential hyperbole on the basis of Gricean pragmatics by employing softeners. This new method provides a way to positively rule out the possibility that a universal quantifier such as πᾶς might be intended hyperbolically. This study's exploration of πᾶς with hyperbole falsified the assumption that πᾶς can mean merely "many," because using πᾶς hyperbolically is to employ the universal quantification of πᾶς rhetorically in a nonliteral manner.

With respect to domain quantification, this study mapped out the ways that the domain of a quantifier can be implicitly restricted to a contextually relevant set, namely, by being relevant to the topic, the setting, or the people, or by excluding some other party mentioned in the context. It also documented the ways that the implicit domain restriction of universal quantifiers correlates with indicators of referentiality, as well as how such correlation patterns differ between languages. Both Greek and English will have the article with plural nouns whose universal quantifier is quantifying over a domain that is implicitly restricted to a definite set. However, Greek does not require a referential pronoun to accompany nounless instances of πᾶς whose domain is implicitly restricted in the way that English does with "all" in such nounless instances.

With respect to nonveridicality, this study introduced nonveridicality as a category within Ancient Greek grammar and mapped out how nonveridicality scopes relative to quantification within this particular language. In Greek, the quantification will outscope the nonveridicality, while in English, the nonveridicality will outscope the quantification. This means that when nonveridicality is present, Greek will use a universal quantifier such as πᾶς to communicate the same thought that English will express using an indefinite quantifier such as "any." This study's exploration of πᾶς with nonveridicality falsified the assumption that πᾶς can mean

"any," because πᾶς retains its universal sense with nonveridicality even if "any" might be the appropriate English gloss in such instances.

With respect to intensive nouns, this study introduced to Ancient Greek lexicography the concept of intensive nouns itself. This brought greater sophistication to the understanding of the so-called "elative" use of πᾶς, as it is now possible to identify which kinds of nouns are capable of such a meaning. This study's exploration of πᾶς with intensive nouns found that translations that employ glosses such as "all kinds of" with intensive nouns open the door to misunderstanding the phrase in terms of kinds instead of, correctly, in terms of degree.

With respect to superordinate categories, this study introduced to Ancient Greek lexicography the distinction between taxonymic and nontaxonymic hyponymy, as well as the concept of superordinate categories itself. It further developed a set of diagnostic tests for identifying whether a given noun is a superordinate category. This study's exploration of πᾶς with superordinate categories falsified the assumption that πᾶς can mean merely "all kinds of," because πᾶς only speaks to kinds and not individuals when modifying a superordinate category, because superordinate categories themselves, unlike other nouns, can be used to refer to hyponymous basic-level kinds with reference to individuals.

Regarding biblical exegesis, when this study applied this linguistic information to examining the validity of the "all without distinction" interpretation of πᾶς, it found that, while there are six ways in which πᾶς can be restricted so as not to refer to every individual, none of these restrictions are present within the key verses from the Pastoral Epistles for which Calvinists have traditionally employed the "all without distinction" reading (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11). This study, therefore, effectively refuted the "all without distinction" interpretation of πᾶς that Calvinism has long employed. It moved the debate over these verses past the centuries-long standstill to the point of resolution, where the "all without distinction" interpretation is shown to be linguistically unviable, even apart from the theological questions involved.

Likewise, all other proposed methods for interpreting these verses in a manner amenable to the Calvinist system (i.e., Augustine's exclusivity reading, appealing to nonsoteriological meanings of σῴζω/σωτήρ, treating μάλιστα as a marker of specification, and reading πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις as dependent on ἐπεφάνη in Titus 2:11) were found to be similarly unviable. In carrying out this exegetical work, this study confirmed the most natural reading of these verses,

namely, that God does want all people to be saved and that Christ's death did make atonement for the sins of all people.

Regarding systematic theology, when this study falsified the "all without distinction" interpretation of πᾶς and corroborated the universal scope of the Father's merciful will and of the Son's atoning death, it further demonstrated that Calvinist teachings such as double predestination and limited atonement are inconsistent with Scripture. Calvinists have considered double predestination to be the necessary corollary of the teaching that God has elected some to salvation solely by his sovereign grace, and they have considered limited atonement to be the necessary corollary of the teaching that Christ's atonement was effective and sufficient to save. However, this study showed that verses such as 1 Timothy 2:4, 6; 4:10, and Titus 2:11 do not allow for such corollary teachings, because God sincerely desires the salvation of all people and Christ died to make atonement for all people.

Nevertheless, this study also found that the main theological concerns that motivate such Calvinist teachings can still be honored and maintained even apart from these teachings themselves, provided that one abandons the assumption that a theological system should have complete internal coherence from a logical perspective. It is still possible to believe that God has effectively chosen to save some individuals solely by his sovereign grace, even while also believing that God sincerely desires the salvation of all. It is also still possible to believe that Christ's death on the cross has made an atonement that effectively saves some, even while also believing that his death made atonement for the sins of all. Not only can such beliefs be held simultaneously, but there have been many Christians who have held them simultaneously.

Regarding pastoral theology, when this study demonstrated that God sincerely desires the salvation of all people and that Christ died for the sins of all people, it reinforced the significant difference that such teachings can make in applying the gospel both to non-Christians and to Christians. It found that, when one rejects the teachings of God's universal merciful will and of unlimited atonement, it becomes very difficult to maintain that God loves the world in a real and meaningful sense. It also showed that, over against Calvinist evangelistic formulations that employ deceptive or conditional-sounding language, gospel proclamations that confidently and directly present God as desiring the salvation of the person being addressed and Christ as having died for the sins of the person being addressed provide a surer basis for the faith that such evangelistic efforts hope to engender.

A universal merciful will on God's part and an unlimited atonement were shown to have a similar benefit for people who already are Christians but could benefit from reassurance as to God's love toward them. While the doctrine of election proves to be a great source of assurance to Christians fearful that they will lose their faith, the universality of God's desire to save and of Christ's atoning death proves to be a great source of assurance to Christians who question whether they genuinely believe and are truly among the elect. This study, then, found that the universal scope of the Father's merciful will and of the Son's atonement provides locations for Christians to look outside themselves to see God's gracious attitude toward them—God's heart for all people, Christ's death for all people, and also the way that this universal grace was communicated to them personally through the means of grace.

7.5 Areas for Further Research

This thesis addressed one major category of passages that present problems for the Calvinist teachings of double predestination and limited atonement. There are, however, other kinds of passages that seem to undermine such teachings. Since some Calvinists have devised ways of interpreting these verses in a manner more conducive to their theological system, areas for further research could include examining the linguistic viability of these other interpretations, just as this thesis has examined the viability of the "all without distinction" interpretation.

One category of such other passages is within the writings of John that speak of the "world" (John 1:29; 3:16; 1 John 2:2; 4:14). Some Calvinists restrict the meaning of "world" in these verses to the large number of believers and find support for this in the fact that elsewhere "world" does not refer to all people in the world (Gatiss 2012, 47–52). Just as this thesis tested, on the basis on what is seen in other uses, whether "all" could be hyperbolic or could quantify over a restricted domain, it could be tested what causes "world" to have a restricted referent and whether the necessary conditions are found in those key verses.

Another category of such other passages are those that speak of God granting faith to someone or Christ redeeming someone who nevertheless later falls away (Luke 8:13; Rom 14:15; 1 Cor 8:11; Heb 6:4–6; 2 Pet 2:1). Some Calvinists claim that these verses are spoken phenomenologically, that is, that they describe how things seem, not how they really are (Gatiss 2012, 52–58; Schreiner 2013, 387–92). Just as this thesis tested the felicity conditions for hyperbole with "all," it could be tested under what conditions it would be contextually

felicitous to employ phenomenological language and whether the necessary conditions are found in those key verses.

A different area for further research would be to more fully integrate the universal scope of the Father's merciful will and of the Son's atoning death within a Calvinist theological system. This thesis demonstrated linguistically and exegetically that these teachings must be upheld and that upholding them does not necessitate the forfeiture of the teachings most dear to Calvinists. However, there would still be work to be done to explore all the possible modifications that upholding a universal saving will and a universal atonement might effect within the Calvinist theological system. While this thesis was written from a perspective entirely sympathetic to the Calvinist concerns to preserve an election by grace and an effective atonement, it was not written by a Calvinist. As such, it would be best left for someone within the Calvinist tradition to work out the full implications it has for their theology proper, their anthropology, their soteriology, their ecclesiology, their sacramentology, and their missiology when they recognize that God wants all people to be saved and that Christ died for the sins of all.

7.6 Conclusion

When proclaiming the gospel to someone who is not yet converted, it makes a difference whether that person can be told that God positively desires their salvation and that Christ positively died for their sins. When providing gospel assurance to a Christian who doubts that they truly believe and are among the elect, it makes a difference whether that person, instead of being pointed back to their own faith, can be pointed to God's merciful will for them, to Christ's atoning death for them, and to the means of grace as they have been applied to them. Therefore, passages from the Pastoral Epistles that present God as desiring the salvation of all and Christ's death as making atonement for all (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11) are significant not only for formulating a theological system but also for carrying out evangelism and for providing pastoral care. Accordingly, when an interpretation is proposed that differs significantly from the natural reading of such verses, as the "all without distinction" interpretation of πᾶς does, it is important that this proposed interpretation be fully examined to determine whether it does justice to the language of Scripture.

This thesis, then, took up as its main research question: In what ways does a linguistic analysis of πᾶς in 1 Timothy 2:4, 6; 4:10 and Titus 2:11 affect the Reformed Calvinist doctrine that

limits the scope of the Father's merciful will and of the Son's atonement? A linguistic analysis of πᾶς in these verses falsifies both the "all without distinction" interpretation of πᾶς and the Calvinist teachings of double predestination and limited atonement that depend on it. In turn, it confirms that these verses do attribute to God a universal merciful will and to Christ's death on the cross a universal atonement.

The "all without distinction" interpretation of πᾶς is ultimately falsified by this linguistic analysis because it is shown to rely on an improper use of parallel passages. There are indeed many other passages where the referent of πᾶς is something less than every individual in existence. However, in those other passages, there is a specific reason why the referent of πᾶς is limited, and these various reasons can be quantified linguistically. Hyperbole, implicit domain restriction, nonveridicality, intensive nouns, collective nouns, and superordinate categories can all result in sentences that restrict what is referred to by πᾶς. However, none of these linguistic features are present within the relevant verses within the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11) such as would keep these verses from stating that God wants to save all people and that Christ died to make atonement for all people. The alleged linguistic parallels are not truly parallel from a linguistic perspective; therefore, it is improper to use them to overturn the clear sense of these scriptural statements about the extent of the Father's merciful will and of the Son's atonement.

The Calvinist teachings of double predestination and of limited atonement are falsified along with this "all without distinction" interpretation because these verses (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11) contradict such teachings when one realizes that the meaning of these verses cannot be evaded via the "all without distinction" reading. God does sincerely want all people to be saved, and Christ did die to make atonement for all people. Nevertheless, the teachings Calvinists have sought to safeguard by double predestination and limited atonement, namely, that God's grace is solely responsible for the salvation of the elect and that Christ's death effectively accomplished salvation for the elect, remain scriptural truth and can and should be believed even once one gives up problematic teachings such as double predestination and limited atonement.

Therefore, even though it might not be entirely consistent from a logical perspective, we retain Scripture's teaching—and simultaneously receive Scripture's fullest comfort—when we see God's grace as both universal (wanting all people to be saved) and effective (saving his chosen people for no other reason than his grace), and similarly, when we see Christ's atoning death

as being both universal (paying for the sins of all people) and also effective (accomplishing the salvation of the elect with no further contributing cause necessary). This understanding enables God's sure and saving love to be communicated to—and to be appropriated by—a person who doubts whether they have faith, a person who doubts whether they will keep their faith, and a person who does not yet have faith.

Consequently, in light of this linguistic analysis, the "all without distinction" interpretation of πᾶς should be abandoned when it comes to interpreting these verses (1 Tim 2:4, 6; 4:10; Titus 2:11), as should also the teachings of double predestination and limited atonement. On another level, though, the "all without distinction" reading and the teachings of double predestination and of limited atonement never really needed to be formulated in the first place. True, they might have served the purpose of ensuring several biblical teachings within a system that has assumed complete internal logical coherence. However, far better than any perfectly consistent system is the paradoxical scriptural truth: God has effectively chosen some for faith and salvation solely out of his grace, and yet he also sincerely wants all to believe and be saved. Christ has effectively bought the elect for God by his death, and yet Christ's death also made atonement for the sins of all.

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